

A P P E A R A N C E S

The Sole Member:

His Honour Judge Peter Smithwick

For the Tribunal:

Mrs. Mary Lavery, SC
Mr. Justin Dillon, SC
Mr. Dara Hayes, BL
Mr. Fintan Valentine, BL

Instructed by:

Jane McKevitt
Solicitor

For the Commissioner of
An Garda Siochana:

Mr. Diarmuid McGuinness, SC
Mr. Michael Durack, SC
Mr. Gareth Baker, BL

Instructed by:

Mary Cummins
CSSO

For Owen Corrigan:

Mr. Jim O'Callaghan, SC
Mr. Darren Lehane, BL

Instructed by:

Fintan Lawlor
Lawlor Partners Solicitors

For Leo Colton:

Mr. Paul Callan, SC
Mr. Eamon Coffey, BL

Instructed by:

Dermot Lavery Solicitors

For Finbarr Hickey:

Fionnuala O'Sullivan, BL

Instructed by:

James MacGuill & Co.

For the Attorney General:

Ms. Nuala Butler, SC
Mr. Douglas Clarke, SC

Instructed by:

CSSO

For Freddie Scappaticci:

Niall Mooney, BL
Pauline O'Hare

Instructed by:

Michael Flanigan
Solicitor

For Kevin Fulton:

Mr. Neil Rafferty, QC

Instructed by:

John McAtamney
Solicitor

For Breen Family:

Mr. John McBurney

**For Buchanan Family/
Heather Currie:**

Ernie Waterworth
McCartan Turkington Breen
Solicitors

NOTICE:

**A WORD INDEX IS PROVIDED AT THE BACK OF THIS TRANSCRIPT.
THIS IS A USEFUL INDEXING SYSTEM, WHICH ALLOWS YOU TO QUICKLY SEE
THE WORDS USED IN THE TRANSCRIPT, WHERE THEY OCCUR AND HOW OFTEN.**

EXAMPLE: - DOYLE [2] 30:28 45:17

**THE WORD "DOYLE" OCCURS TWICE
PAGE 30, LINE 28
PAGE 45, LINE 17**

I N D E X

<u>Witness</u>	<u>Page No.</u>	<u>Line No.</u>
DERMOT JENNINGS		
EXAMINED BY MRS. LAVERTY	2	1
CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR. O'CALLAGHAN	45	19
CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR. DURACK	52	7
RE-EXAMINED BY MRS. LAVERTY	81	25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

THE TRIBUNAL RESUMED ON THE 26TH OF JANUARY, 2012, AT
11 A.M. AS FOLLOWS:

MRS. LAVERTY: Good morning, Chairman. The witness for today is Mr. Dermot Jennings, who is a retired member of the Garda.

1 DERMOT JENNINGS, HAVING BEEN SWORN, WAS EXAMINED BY MRS.

2 LAVERTY AS FOLLOWS:

3

4 1 Q. MRS. LAVERTY: Good morning, Mr. Jennings.

5 A. Good morning.

6 2 Q. I think that you made a statement to the Tribunal and I
7 might sort of quickly go through your career...

8 A. That's correct.

9 3 Q. ... in accordance with your statement?

10 A. I did, yes.

11 4 Q. And I think that you joined the Garda in 1973. I think you
12 have a copy of it there?

13 A. Yes, I have, I have, Chairman.

14 5 Q. And I think initially you were based in Santry until 1978,
15 and at that time you joined the Special Detective Unit?

16 A. That's correct.

17 6 Q. And when you were there in 1981 'til 1982, you were
18 promoted to the rank of Sergeant and you worked in the
19 Security Task Force?

20 A. Correct.

21 7 Q. And this was a force that was set up in conjunction with
22 the Divisional Task Force, which was as a result of two
23 gardaí being shot in French Park by the INLA in a bank
24 robbery, and it was part of the Special Detective Unit?

25 A. Yes, after the bank robbery.

26 8 Q. After the bank robbery, yes. And I think then in 1984 the
27 Emergency Response Unit was set up, and you were one of the
28 people involved in the setting up of the unit, and you were
29 there until 1986?

30 A. That's correct, Chairman.

1 9 Q. And you received an injury on duty and you had other duties
2 in the city investigating the activities of subversive
3 groups, and then you were promoted to uniform inspector in
4 1989 and you went to Cabra for a year?

5 A. Correct, Chairman.

6 10 Q. And then, during that year, I presume -- is that '89 or
7 '90? -- you spent three months in the FBI?

8 A. In 1990, in 1990.

9 11 Q. In 1990, you were in the FBI for three months. And in
10 December 1990, you were transferred to Harcourt Street with
11 the Special Detective Unit as Detective Inspector in charge
12 of the Emergency Response Unit, and then later in 1991 you
13 were transferred to Headquarters, to Crime and Security
14 section, where you were employed as the Operational
15 Detective Inspector in charge of the National Surveillance
16 Unit?

17 A. Correct.

18 12 Q. You were there until September 1994, and then you
19 transferred as Border Superintendent to Monaghan for a
20 period of nine months, you were transferred to the Security
21 Branch in June '95, where you were appointed the Detective
22 Superintendent in charge of the National Surveillance Unit,
23 and in December 1995 you were assigned as Detective
24 Superintendent at the Intelligence Section in Security
25 Branch, and 1998, then, you were promoted to Chief
26 Superintendent, and you remained in the Security Branch
27 with responsibility for security and intelligence until
28 2001, and then you were promoted to Assistant
29 Commissioner --

30 A. Correct, Chairman.

1 13 Q. -- and transferred to Galway. And then, in March 2005, you
2 moved to Mullingar and you retired earlier last year?

3 A. Last year, that's correct.

4 14 Q. So you seem to have spent a lot of time involved with and
5 moving up the ranks in the surveillance, the National
6 Surveillance Unit, is that right?

7 A. I did, Chairman, yeah, in that whole area of investigating
8 subversive and criminal organisations.

9 15 Q. And there was -- you would have been in the Security Task
10 Force, I note, from 1981 to 1982?

11 A. That's correct, Chairman.

12 16 Q. And what did your duties --

13 A. It may have been '82, '83, in either of those.

14 17 Q. But I think that was the Special Task Force that was called
15 out to help along the border with searches, am I correct?

16 A. With searches and security patrols and combatting bank
17 robberies.

18 18 Q. And escorts?

19 A. And escorts of VIPs and different crime patrols and all of
20 that, and duties along the border.

21 19 Q. And would you normally with work under the direction of the
22 local gardaí or did you work independently?

23 A. Well, we worked under the direction of a detective
24 inspector, but in liaison, there was always liaison with
25 the local people and basically we assisted local people in
26 doing searches where numbers were small in some of the
27 divisions along the border and we assisted them in carrying
28 out searches and different operations.

29 20 Q. Now, the Chairman has heard evidence from Mr. Blair
30 Wallace, who was the second deputy constable, he ended up

1 second deputy constable in the North, and he was head of
2 Special Branch at the time that we are talking about. He
3 said that in 19 -- between 1981 and 1983, he had a source
4 who gave information about arms in the Louth area and he
5 passed on this information with a caveat that Dundalk
6 gardai were not to be involved in the searches because he
7 feared a leak and he said that in those instances, through
8 Brian Fitzsimons, that they dealt directly with the Task
9 Force in Dublin, and he recalls on three occasions that
10 there were searches in which Dundalk was excluded on the
11 caveat of the person supplying the information. Now, do
12 you know anything about that or would you have been
13 involved in those searches?

14 A. No, Chairman, I wasn't involved, and I don't recall
15 anything like that but, you know, there are various reasons
16 why that could have happened. First of all, in the whole
17 area of source protection, it often can be a caveat that
18 if, perhaps, the source was from that area or something,
19 and is that bringing in outsiders to do a search might look
20 more like it was a general search. But in any case, even
21 if the Task Force was doing the search, there would be a
22 local input, because there always was from a local
23 knowledge point of view and in particular -- and
24 particularly along the border, Chairman, there are a lot of
25 areas along the border and you could be in north or the
26 south if you weren't very careful, as we know, I think,
27 from instances where the -- on the other side, the British
28 Army coming in on the southern side. But I didn't ever
29 hear anything like that. But there wouldn't be anything
30 unusual about the Task Force going up to do operations

1 because the numbers were small along a lot of the country
2 divisions, even along the border at that time.

3 21 Q. And were there instances where, in fact, the Task Force
4 would go themselves without an input locally?

5 A. Not that I am aware. There would always be an input,
6 actually, from -- the intelligence conduit was Headquarters
7 to Headquarters, and when intelligence would come to our
8 Headquarters in the Phoenix Park, even though we were based
9 down in Harcourt Square, it would come down to the Chief
10 Superintendent and normally when a team would go to Dundalk
11 it was usually a detective inspector, two or maybe three
12 sergeants, and about ten or twelve detectives, and there
13 would be local liaison with the, often times the
14 superintendent, but we always had a liaison man, sometimes
15 a uniform man actually, just for local inquiries that might
16 come up as a result, and just to identify people. Because
17 in that particular time that we are talking about, along
18 the border, a number of, we'll say, plain clothes people
19 coming to a farmyard or to an open area along the border,
20 you know, naturally local people could be a little bit
21 scared that maybe it was somebody from the other side that
22 mistakenly came in or whatever, so we always had local
23 people with us, if that explains.

24 22 Q. You mentioned earlier that someone at detective inspector
25 level. Now are you saying that it might just have been a
26 local person, would that be through the detective inspector
27 at local level?

28 A. Well, no, no, the detective inspector normally would travel
29 with the Task Force. Now, there were times when no
30 inspector came, there is a sergeant or two sergeants would

1 go up, but the liaison would be with some of the local
2 detectives, detective sergeant or detective inspector, or
3 indeed the superintendent would be called on maybe by the
4 inspector in charge, and, like, even to take us out or some
5 local man would be nominated to take us out to a particular
6 location.

7

8 CHAIRMAN: That would arise on the day, would it?

9 A. Yes, on the day.

10 23 Q. So you are not aware of instances in which, as Mr. Wallace
11 said, these three searches; you don't recall, particularly,
12 those?

13 A. Well, I wasn't on any of those that there was anything like
14 that. And well, you know, perhaps there could be something
15 like that that I wouldn't have been made aware of, but I
16 had never heard that.

17 24 Q. I presume that if you went out on a search like that, your
18 job was searching? You wouldn't necessarily comment on the
19 fact that there may not have been anyone from the local
20 station involved in the search?

21 A. Oh, well, no. But, sorry, Chair, there would always be
22 somebody would go with us on a search like that.

23 25 Q. So there would have to be, you are saying, somebody from
24 the local --

25 A. Oh, absolutely. Like, from a local knowledge point of
26 view, to know where you were going and all of that.

27

28 CHAIRMAN: If only to tell you turn left at this
29 crossroads?

30 A. Oh, absolutely. And particularly, Chairman, as I

1 explained, along the border there it's always zigzag and
2 there is no line saying one jurisdiction or the other, so
3 it would be very easy to drift into the other jurisdiction.
4 So from that point of view, it was very important.

5

6 26 Q. MRS. LAVERTY: So whereas Mr. Wallace may be of the belief
7 and his source didn't want contact with Dundalk, the
8 reality in practice was that there would be somebody there?

9 A. Yes, yes, and, you know, without a doubt, Mr. Wallace may
10 have very good reason to say, as would often be with source
11 protection, if in fact we often done it ourselves, you say
12 look, don't have local involvement for the simple reason is
13 that, to coin a phrase, that it might blow the source or
14 whatever. But when we would go on searches like, that you
15 have to have somebody with you from a local knowledge point
16 of view.

17 27 Q. Now, I think that we have -- one of the major things of
18 interest to this Tribunal that you were involved in,
19 Mr. Jennings, was the Camon-Kirwan report which was
20 prepared in 2000 by Peter Kirwan and Sean Camon, relating
21 to whether or not -- as a result of *Bandit Country*, the
22 book by Toby Harnden, and an article by Kevin Myers, and
23 discussions in the Government, it was the report that was
24 prepared investigating whether or not there was any
25 suggestion of collusion involved in five specific murders
26 that were committed?

27 A. Mm-hmm.

28 28 Q. And I think you were given the job of checking the records,
29 is that correct?

30 A. Well, the request came through my office to Inspector

1 Kirwan, as he was then, and I passed on the request.
2 Actually, I would have, in the normal fashion, Chairman, if
3 a request comes in for any search of the intelligence
4 system, I would make contact with the superintendent in
5 charge of intelligence, but I recall at that time something
6 came in writing, which I don't have, directing that Peter
7 Kirwan assist Chief Superintendent Camon, Lord have mercy
8 on him, in his investigation and to make the files
9 available, anything that he wanted, if that is -- if that's
10 OK.

11 29 Q. Yes. And I think at that stage you were the Chief
12 Superintendent from 1998 to 2001, is that right?

13 A. That's correct, Chairman, yes.

14 30 Q. So, therefore, you would expect to be notified in the
15 course of a search like that, if anything turned up that
16 was suggestive of collusion?

17 A. Well, Chairman, once -- when Chief Superintendent Camon --
18 this was an appointment made by the Commissioner -- that he
19 was to come in and research all of the files, once he came
20 in to do that, I stepped back from it. Like, we made an
21 inspector available to him to show him anything, but I
22 wasn't going to question Sean Camon as to what his work
23 was. He was the investigator looking for evidence, and
24 certainly, because I'd meet Sean, I'd say, at least once a
25 fortnight, if not once a week sometimes, where we attended
26 a meeting with the Assistant Commissioner over the
27 different departments, and I do regularly remember saying
28 to him was everything OK, was he being facilitated? and
29 him saying to me that he was quite happy with everything,
30 that he was getting full cooperation with everything and

1 everything he wanted because he was there on-and-off, I
2 think I only saw him around the building a couple of times
3 but I would meet him. Now, he did, before he finished, he
4 did come to see me and that in my capacity, because I had
5 responsibility for the Surveillance Unit, I also, I
6 attended an awful lot of conferences, I had an awful lot of
7 dealings with the chief superintendents all around the
8 country and along the border. I dealt with the PSNI on a
9 very regular basis, apart from the international groups
10 that I sat on, and he asked me did I have anything myself
11 personal knowledge of any collusion or any evidence that
12 could help out his investigation. This was towards the end
13 -- it was at the time, and I told him -- he also asked me
14 did I know of -- did I ever meet or did I know Toby Harnden
15 or Kevin Myers? Which I explained that I didn't. And I
16 also explained to him that I didn't have any evidence in my
17 possession of any collusion. And he asked me would I make
18 a short statement out for him detailing that fact, which I
19 did, and I passed it on to him. And that was it. And
20 actually, I remember at the time, it was shortly before he
21 finished and he actually said to me that he hadn't found
22 any evidence himself so far within the department that I
23 was in.

24 31 Q. I think that I have a note here -- unfortunately I don't
25 have it with me but I think nothing much relates -- I have
26 a note that there was a letter from your good self to
27 Assistant Commissioner O'Toole on the 1st of April 2000,
28 and you said that there was -- you actually coined the
29 phrase: there was no tangible evidence uncovered and that
30 you had caused a fresh analysis of the files to be carried

1 out.

2 A. Yes.

3 32 Q. Is that correct?

4 A. Yes, it is. And, Chairman, if I can explain that. A
5 regular feature of the department that I was head of there,
6 is if something came up, maybe, that would be of concern to
7 the Oireachtas or if a question comes into the Commissioner
8 about anything to do on the security side, it would come to
9 us, the query would come to our department, so we actually
10 had a query done within days, I didn't recall the date now,
11 but I did see the that document. I went -- after I had
12 notice that I was coming to the Tribunal here I did go up
13 to the Security Branch and I found, I was shown a copy of
14 that document that I had done out. Actually, it was
15 prepared by the Superintendent there, Tim Maher, for my
16 signature, that there was no tangible evidence. And in
17 fact one of the analysts at the time done a research of the
18 system to -- referring to the five different incidents, and
19 the document, which I think -- perhaps you have the
20 document, I am not sure -- showed that there was no
21 tangible evidence.

22 33 Q. Yes. And I think that this was as a result of, if you
23 like, a trawl through the files that wasn't carried out by
24 you personally but was carried out under the auspices of
25 Sean Camon. And what did Tim Maher, did he have a
26 function?

27 A. Sorry, Chairman, sorry, the first one that we referred to
28 there that I had signed going forward to the Assistant
29 Commissioner at the time, Pat O'Toole, that was done, I'd
30 say, before Sean Camon even started, or around that time.

1 34 Q. I see.

2 A. Because there was queries came from Government to the
3 Commissioner's office, and afterwards, then, the
4 Commissioner made a decision that he wanted the full
5 investigation into the two -- the book, actually, and the
6 article, and Sean Camon was appointed, and it was then at
7 that stage that I was notified that my Inspector was to be
8 at the disposal of the Chief Superintendent for his
9 investigation, if I have made that clear?

10 35 Q. You have. I am just interested to know, a lot of people
11 have been asked about this and it has taken up a lot of
12 people but I won't take up a lot of time. You said there
13 was no tangible evidence. Did that mean that there was
14 some evidence there or there was...

15 A. Well...

16 36 Q. ... a suspicion?

17 A. At the time there were the articles, there was newspaper
18 articles. Like, there was the book, there was Kevin Myers'
19 article, but after the first search we had done, like,
20 there was no what you'd call tangible evidence that there
21 was anything. And I don't pre-empt what the Commissioner's
22 decision was to form the investigation to fully investigate
23 everything, but there was nothing from an evidential point
24 of view. Now, the intelligence system was totally searched
25 afterwards then by Mr. Camon and Inspector Kirwan.

26 37 Q. How does one go about the search? Is it on computer? Are
27 there hard files? What search parameters do you use? What
28 headings?

29 A. Well, there would be the paper files and the computer
30 system, everything was -- it was made very, very clear at

1 the time that everything was to be made available to the
2 investigator, who was the most experienced man in the
3 country we had at the time.

4 38 Q. And do you know what criteria he used in the searches? Do
5 you know what words he put into the computer system?

6 A. Well, I don't know what the codes were now.

7 39 Q. I mean, would he have looked --

8 A. That would have been for, Peter Kirwan would actually have
9 been the person from within the branch that would have done
10 that for him on whatever Sean Camon would have requested to
11 him. But it's a code you'd put into -- it's like your own
12 laptop, you unlock it and then... But it was hard,
13 laborious work, most of it trawling through the old paper
14 files of the different names or the different incidents
15 along the, all around the country that came up.

16 40 Q. Was there any separate filing system for gardaí who had
17 come under undue attention in the past?

18 A. No, no, there wasn't. All of the intelligence was kept in
19 this -- in the Security Branch department.

20 41 Q. And when this search was concluded by Sean Camon, were you
21 happy that firstly, that you had given him access to
22 everything, and secondly, that he had got access to
23 everything?

24 A. Well, yes, because on occasions, maybe just to explain as
25 well, Chairman. I think he was there for nearly a year.
26 Like, during that year, the Inspector, Peter Kirwan, and
27 the Superintendent, like, we would be doing other regular
28 work and I would say to Peter Kirwan "is everything
29 progressing OK for you?" And he says that everything he
30 wants he gets and they were working away fine. And so, I'd

1 be happy that Sean Camon had access to everything that was
2 in the branch, absolutely everything.

3 42 Q. You see, he, in his report, he refers, for example, on page
4 19 at paragraph 14.3, he refers to a criminal investigation
5 into the allegations of false pretences against Detective
6 Sergeant Corrigan. This involved a traffic accident in
7 which the DPP was prosecuting Sergeant Corrigan, and the
8 case at the trial, the main witness failed to appear and
9 the case was struck out. So that effectively is the
10 description of that particular incident. But the Tribunal
11 has found that there was information, there was an
12 intelligence document prior to this court case, and I am
13 going to ask Mr. Mills to put it up on the screen. It's
14 here in précis form, Mr. Jennings, so that -- now, it's
15 described as "*Document 131*" and "*Garda information in 1992*
16 *suggested that PIRA members had conveyed a threat to a*
17 *witness relative to an upcoming trial in which Detective*
18 *Sergeant Owen Corrigan was a defendant. The information*
19 *further suggested that as a result of the threat the said*
20 *witness was in fear and unlikely to appear in court.*" Now,
21 that is intelligence which was on your files indicating a
22 connection between -- it's effectively suggesting witness
23 intimidation. There is a member of the gardaí involved --
24 referred to and that the threat was conveyed by a member of
25 PIRA. Now, one would have expected that that would have
26 come up in the search through the files, if there was a
27 laborious search through the files looking for some
28 connection between a member of the Force and the IRA?

29 A. Well, certainly, Chairman, it should have been found, and I
30 have no doubt that it was. I am not sure now if Mr. Kirwan

1 was asked about that or not, but if the document was within
2 Security Branch, it should have been found, without a
3 doubt.

4 43 Q. You see, we are concerned about intelligence that doesn't
5 appear to have surfaced at the time, and we are just
6 wondering, the Tribunal are wondering where this
7 intelligence was at the time. For example, there are three
8 more documents that, one would have thought, would be
9 particularly significant in this trawl of documents leading
10 up to the Camon-Kirwan report and they have been put into
11 the public domain already but I will just put them in
12 again, Mr. Jennings. These documents were not referred to
13 in the Camon-Kirwan report, and I want to know if you have
14 any information about them.

15
16 Document 567: *"Garda information received within two years
17 of the murders of Buchanan and Breen suggested that a named
18 PIRA member had a garda contact who gave only short notice
19 of the visit of Buchanan and Breen to Dundalk Garda
20 Station. The report suggested that PIRA knew that officers
21 would have to take one of four roads on their way home and
22 that PIRA set out four units to cover each of these roads."*

23
24 Now, that particular piece of information suggests that a
25 garda contact gave short notice of the visit of Breen and
26 Buchanan to Dundalk, so one would imagine that that would
27 be particularly significant. Did you ever see that
28 intelligence?

29 A. No, Chairman, I saw --

30 44 Q. At the time?

1 A. At the time, I didn't, I wasn't there at the time actually,
2 I was, I was in Cabra, actually, that year. I wasn't based
3 in Headquarters at all. But I did see one of those
4 documents when I met the Tribunal lawyers in...

5 45 Q. Yes, I think it was.

6 A. ... in 2008.

7 46 Q. Yes, by arrangement it was brought down to you?

8 A. Yes, of course, yes.

9 47 Q. And can I just -- the document that you did see that was
10 communicated to a chief detective superintendent in Special
11 Branch, that information, and it was coming from someone of
12 rank?

13 A. Mm-hmm.

14 48 Q. It wasn't just information coming from an outlying station.
15 I think it was an intelligence report to Special Branch,
16 isn't that correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 49 Q. Do you recall, without going into the details?

19 A. No, I won't, because I think we have to be very careful of
20 those, as the Chairman will appreciate.

21 50 Q. Yes.

22 A. No, I think the document went to -- from a man with rank in
23 the Special Detective Unit to the Chief Superintendent in
24 Headquarters.

25 51 Q. Yes. Which would be an indication of the seriousness of
26 the document?

27 A. Yes. Well that intelligence would always, the central
28 repository for all of the intelligence was the Headquarters
29 and it would come in often times addressed to the Assistant
30 Commissioner or the Chief Superintendent, and then it would

1 be held at the intelligence section under the Detective
2 Superintendent who very often, who very often would be the
3 person to action that, the intelligence. And that is,
4 that's what happens with it, because there is only the one
5 place that all of that intelligence is kept, and that is in
6 our Headquarters, from all over the country?

7 52 Q. So you'd imagine, then, that that would jump out at all, if
8 you were looking for some suggestion of collusion in
9 preparation for a report to give to the Government?

10 A. Yes, well I have no doubt, Chairman, now I can't say
11 because I wasn't the person that showed the intelligence
12 but I have no doubt that that intelligence was shown and
13 examined by the -- Sean Camon and his people at the time.

14 53 Q. It's not contained in the report anywhere; I don't think
15 there is any reference to that, so one assumes that they
16 didn't know about it. Now, there is, if you look at --

17 A. Chairman, I'd be astounded if that -- and I am sure you
18 have put this to Mr. Kirwan.

19 54 Q. We have put it to absolutely everybody, and he was one of
20 the last people we have put it to, but nobody seems to know
21 anything about it.

22
23 Now, the next document was produced subsequently to Judge
24 Cory but not at the time. It's document 542: *"1990 Garda*
25 *information indicated by way of double hearsay that there*
26 *was a contact in the gardaí who had passed on information*
27 *that facilitated the murder of Lord Justice Gibson and the*
28 *shooting of the two RUC officers after their visit to*
29 *Dundalk Station."*

30

1 Now, that is implicating a member of the gardaí in the
2 murder of Lord Justice Gibson. So that is very serious
3 information. Have you seen the original of that document
4 since the Tribunal spoke to you?

5 A. Yes, I was shown one document, Chairman, in 2008, when I
6 met the lawyers, and then last year, when I got a draft
7 statement I went back, because I knew in 2008, when I was
8 shown this singular document, that I hadn't seen it before,
9 so I went, made contact with the Security Branch people and
10 I said that I would like to see the document. I don't want
11 to say what date was on it, but I have a particular reason
12 for remembering the date that was on the document, so I
13 asked them that I'd like to see, because there was
14 reference to three documents, that I would like to see the
15 three of them. And to me, I had never seen them before.
16 Like, it would have been dealt with long before I went to
17 Security Branch, and I have no doubt they were dealt with.
18 But...

19 55 Q. I think initially the Tribunal believed there was one
20 document, but it transpired that there were three different
21 reportings on this topic?

22 A. Yes, yes.

23 56 Q. The third document is Document 236, and that states:

24 *"Information which was based on double hearsay and received*
25 *two years after the killings, indicated that there was a*
26 *contact that passed on information that facilitated the*
27 *murder of the Gibson family."*

28 Now, I understand from what you are saying that you have
29 seen those three documents?

30 A. Yes, Chairman, yes, I saw them, I was shown them at our

1 headquarters there a couple of months ago.

2 57 Q. Yes. And I think, without going further, that you would be
3 satisfied that it's high grade intelligence?

4 A. Yeah, without doubt, Chairman, and I think it's important,
5 maybe, that I should explain this. Without a doubt,
6 something like that has the potential to be very, very high
7 grade intelligence. But intelligence, and I think I
8 remember briefly explaining this to the lawyers at the
9 time, intelligence of this nature, you must analyse it
10 very, very thoroughly, and even so much so that would you
11 actually separate even the source and the intelligence, and
12 there are a number of questions, then, that you would ask
13 yourself, and a number of things that you would do. If
14 you'll bear with me. Like, first of all, can you in any
15 way qualify the intelligence? Is it possible to establish
16 if the source would have access or was he on-the-job, shall
17 we say? Is there any other intelligence that would
18 corroborate it? And the other thing is, like, is there
19 anything whatsoever that backs it up or contradicts it?
20 Now, as well as that, I would be tasking, shall we say, the
21 source handler or whoever got this information, that can he
22 go back and talk to the source, even -- and I know there is
23 dangers in that sometimes -- but go back to see can you
24 find out anything more about it, or, where is this coming
25 from, or identify it. And perhaps -- well I know there is
26 a reference to it being double hearsay but the first bit I
27 don't think did say that. Like, the other thing is, is it
28 possible that it could be misinformation, because terrorist
29 organisations all over the world do that occasionally, and
30 I am not for a moment dismissing this now. Without a

1 doubt, this is a document you would have to consider very,
2 very seriously and you'd interrogate the full system to see
3 what can I do with this? Is there some place where I can
4 task my people to make a start to further the document that
5 you have got in the sense of, like, with a serious
6 allegation like that, where can we start from to try and
7 develop it to put, to coin the phrase, to put the meat on
8 the bones and see can we get more from this? If I am
9 explaining myself OK to you, Chairman?

10 58 Q. You are indeed. And I understand that the gardaí, the
11 Garda Síochána, as a force, is sort of a hierarchical
12 organisation in that people at different levels have
13 different jobs and information is passed up and decisions
14 have to be made --

15 A. Yes.

16 59 Q. -- in relation to what is done with it. Now, the person
17 involved in passing on this information to Headquarters was
18 not, has confirmed to the Tribunal that he was not tasked
19 with investigating the matter any further; he supplied the
20 information but was not tasked to carry out any further
21 investigation into it, so on his own bat he is not able to
22 do that?

23 A. Now, Chairman, as -- sorry, when I say tasked, I meant as
24 the member, shall we say, that was dealing with the source,
25 that I would be saying to him to go back and talk to your
26 source again. If an investigation was to ensue, it would
27 not be normal for the source handler to actually deal with
28 the investigation, and that is -- there are very good
29 reasons for that, Chairman, in the sense that building a
30 picture of any case, the person who gets this information,

1 we'll call him the source handler, it's like a piece of a
2 jigsaw that he has, it's like any case I suppose, Judge, or
3 Chairman, and you build the pieces together. But more
4 often than not, we would keep the source handler away from
5 an actual investigation. Now, certainly, the head of the
6 investigation team may go back to him, or the head of the
7 intelligence section may go back and say look, can you get
8 us anything more? Can you develop this for us? Because,
9 as I said, looking at it straightaway, it has the
10 potential. But you'd have to, to be fair to him, you
11 wouldn't drag him in to actually doing the investigation.

12 60 Q. So he has done his job; the information is supplied. But
13 looking at that as a retired ACC, does that information
14 warrant an investigation?

15 A. Well, again, Chairman, without doubt, you'd -- when I say
16 "investigate" I mean up in the intelligence section I mean
17 that you'd interrogate the system, as I outlined earlier,
18 and then after that, like, you may have to call it to say
19 where do I start? And if there is a starting point, yes,
20 you would. But, now I can't say, but I'd be of no doubt
21 that there was work done on that at the time.

22 61 Q. So far, it doesn't appear that it went any further that
23 than just this information; there certainly wasn't an
24 investigation directed into it?

25
26 MR. O'CALLAGHAN: Sorry, Chairman, to interrupt. Just to
27 assist Mrs. Laverty. On Day 54, Mr. Ned O'Dea gave
28 evidence in respect of the intelligence documents that the
29 witness is being questioned about, and he gave the
30 following evidence in respect of them, he says: "Yes, I

1 recall seeing some of those and I remember as a result of
2 one, that Superintendent Byrne, as a result of who was
3 named, there was a particular person named in the document,
4 mounted a surveillance programme on him for quite a while
5 and, as well as that, they had technical support as well
6 but nothing came from it and they had to transfer to other
7 areas of activity and nothing came out of their period in
8 that area." So I think there was some investigation done
9 on foot of one of the intelligence documents that the
10 witness has been referred to.

11
12 MRS. LAFFERTY: If I could just, I think, Mr. O'Callaghan,
13 that was in relation to the person, one of the participants
14 who was mentioned in it, I am not sure it was an
15 investigation into the gardaí.

16
17 MR. O'CALLAGHAN: No, sorry, he goes on and says: "Yes, I
18 take it when you talk about surveillance being carried out,
19 I wasn't on a member of the Garda Siochana?
20 Answer: No, one of the opposition. But there was an
21 investigation conducted on foot of one of the intelligence
22 reports".

23
24 MRS. LAVERTY: Thank you, Mr. O'Callaghan.

25 A. Chairman, and I don't want to mention the person, I
26 actually know the person's name now, that's a little bit
27 small but I know from the document there was one person's
28 name mentioned in that, and I wasn't there at that
29 particular time but he has been the subject of work for
30 many, many years and major coverage by the Garda Siochana.

1 Now, certainly the people at that time will answer for that
2 time, but I have no doubt --

3 62 Q. Isn't that all the more reason, Mr. Jennings, for that
4 information to be investigated if there is somebody high
5 profile and a link to a member of the Force, it's a very
6 serious reflection on the Force, I would have thought, that
7 should be investigated?

8 A. Chairman, without a doubt, and it is one of the things that
9 would always trouble somebody in my position, as I was at
10 the time, and even still, is that a member of the Force
11 would do anything like this, and we have had some cases of
12 that which we dealt with, but I think it's fair to say, and
13 I refer back to my earlier evidence about the analysis of
14 something like this: you must have a starting point. And
15 I think that other gentleman said that if the evidence has
16 been given, that the starting point in this case was, there
17 was a named individual, which I'd rather not mention. And
18 I think that was the only place you could actually start,
19 because actually the reference to a member of the Garda
20 Siochana, I think, went no further than a member of the
21 Garda Siochana which one can assume but one doesn't
22 know where or who this person was, so from my experience,
23 if you will bear with me, of dealing with incidences
24 similar to this, maybe not just where a member of the Garda
25 Siochana would mention it, but any strategic tasking of an
26 operation, if you have somebody named like there was in
27 this instance, you go for help, and if, with enough
28 coverage over time, or the longer you can, and of course
29 sometimes you are limited to the amount of coverage because
30 these people are very aware of coverage as well, but you

1 will eventually come to seeing some of the contacts that he
2 has, and without a doubt, with this particular individual
3 there was coverage for many, many years, and I think you
4 would be aware of that yourself, Chairman, what the end
5 result of some of that coverage was eventually, if I am
6 making myself clear.

7 63 Q. Indeed. If we could just sort of leave that there for the
8 moment. But when you said in your statement, in the
9 Camon-Kirwan report, Mr. Jennings, you said you "*were aware*
10 *of allegations of Garda collusion in five terrorists*
11 *incidents during the period '85 to '91. Arising from these*
12 *allegations I have arranged for a check of relevant files.*"
13 Now, these five allegations were the ones mentioned in the
14 newspaper and in the Myers, Kevin Myers' article?

15 A. Yes.

16 64 Q. And they included the Hanna family, the Gibson family; they
17 included Breen and Buchanan, and Tom Oliver. And you said,
18 "*Arising from these allegations I have arranged for a check*
19 *of relevant files at Security Branch and can confirm there*
20 *is no evidence of Garda collusion in the various murders*
21 *referred.*" Now, does the information contained in these
22 documents make you change your mind in any way?

23 A. No.

24 65 Q. Would you have said the same thing had you been shown that
25 information, that intelligence?

26 A. Chairman, just going back, now, to earlier. This statement
27 I made as a result of when Sean Camon came to see me. I
28 didn't actually examine the intelligence, the intelligence
29 files.

30 66 Q. I appreciate that and I am not trying to nail you to a

1 cross.

2 A. I know that very well.

3 67 Q. It's just that you delegated an investigation into the
4 intelligence and you assisted in every way you could, but
5 meanwhile you did not have access to this intelligence,
6 this intelligence wasn't produced, it wasn't produced in
7 the Camon-Kirwan report, there is no reference to it
8 whatsoever in that report. And when you signed this, when
9 you, at the end, said "there is no evidence of Garda
10 collusion in the various murders referred" you did that
11 without knowing of the existence of these three separate
12 reportings, which suggest collusion in the Gibson murders
13 and collusion in the Breen and Buchanan murders. So what I
14 am asking you is, would you have been quite as comfortable
15 stating that if you had seen this intelligence, if it had
16 been brought to your attention?

17 A. Well, Chairman, first, if you let me explain. I made this
18 statement. Sean Camon, I think I explained earlier on, did
19 come to me and he asked me did I, in my position as having
20 overall charge of other sections, did I have any
21 intelligence myself or evidence of any of the collusion,
22 and that's what I meant when I made the statement that I
23 didn't. Now, the other part of it, which counsel is
24 referring to, "all of this intelligence", I didn't examine
25 any of that intelligence, but there was a very clear
26 direction from me, as indeed there was to Mr. Kirwan, that
27 every piece of intelligence that was within the branch was
28 to be made available. So, I didn't see this intelligence.
29 And when I see it now, yes, as I said earlier in my
30 outline, the intelligence has the potential to be

1 important, but you would have to go through that process,
2 and I have no doubt, knowing the people involved, that a
3 lot of work would have been done on the particular person
4 that was named, who was very well-known to us at the time,
5 if I am making myself clear, Chair?

6 68 Q. If you weren't aware of this intelligence, I presume
7 Mr. Camon wasn't, either, when he was, when he was carrying
8 out his report for the Government, he mustn't have seen
9 this information, either?

10 A. Well, Chairman, I am not in any way trying to evade the
11 question.

12
13 MR. MCGUINNESS: I think the evidence is that Mr. Kirwan
14 said he was aware of it.

15 A. Yes. I was going to say, Chairman, the person to ask would
16 be Mr. Kirwan. I know, Lord have mercy on the other man,
17 he is not here.

18
19 69 Q. MRS. LAVERTY: So I am told now by counsel for the Garda
20 Commissioner that Mr. Kirwan was aware of this. Mr. Camon
21 was aware.

22 A. I am sure -- I would be happy that he was, but I haven't
23 been told that, but I have no doubt, and knowing the man
24 that Peter Kirwan is at the time, and the instruction was
25 to show absolutely everything within the place. And, as I
26 said earlier, Chairman, on a number of occasions I would
27 have asked Sean Camon was he happy with everything and the
28 facilities to him, and he had told me that he was quite
29 happy with everything, and I have no doubt if he had any
30 concerns, he would have come to me as the overall head of

1 the Crime and Security Department.

2 70 Q. So the conclusion at the end of the Camon-Kirwan report,
3 and indeed I think your conclusion, as well, was that there
4 was no -- there was no evidence of collusion?

5 A. Well, I had no evidence personally, Chairman.

6 71 Q. You had none?

7 A. And I read Sean Camon's report sometime after he completed
8 it. It came to me. And, yes, I read his report that there
9 was no...

10 72 Q. Can I ask you, Mr. Jennings, that that is evidence, on the
11 face of it, of collusion; it's intelligence suggesting
12 collusion?

13 A. Chairman, at the risk of repeating, and I have no problem
14 repeating it, I think something like that, it has the
15 potential, without a shadow of a doubt, and -- but you must
16 dig very deep into something like this and see where it, as
17 I outlined earlier, where did it come from? Has it
18 anything -- is there anything to contradict it or anything
19 to support it? And what can you do to further it? And,
20 like, a very critical analysis would and should be carried
21 out on a document like this, and I don't dismiss it in any
22 way. It's, without a shadow of a doubt, it's an important
23 document, but you would have to put it through a very, very
24 stern process before you could take it any further.

25 73 Q. It seems that this wasn't done, the investigation into the
26 allegation against the Gardaí wasn't carried out, a member
27 of the Garda? I mean, surely it would be very simple.
28 It's a slur on the Force. It would have been simple to
29 say: We have to investigate this, it's bad for the Force,
30 there is a suggestion that a garda was colluding in the

1 murders of Gibson and the murders of Breen and Buchanan.

2

3 MR. MCGUINNESS: With respect, Chairman, that is an unfair
4 way of putting it, because the Tribunal has evidence on
5 this topic which is consistent with what Mr. Jennings is
6 saying, that one would expect the handler to go back to the
7 source and try and develop the information, and it's quite
8 evident that that occurred, because it generated
9 successively these documents from the same place and the
10 same person, and then the operations were put in place
11 against the target to try and see what could be developed.
12 And, as Mr. Jennings has said, there was no named member of
13 An Garda Siochana, lest anyone viewing that think
14 otherwise, there wasn't any named member.

15

16 MRS. LAVERTY: This is precisely what generates rumours,
17 Chairman, that there is intelligence pointing a finger at a
18 member of the Garda -- an unnamed member of the Garda
19 Siochana implicating, if you read it on its face value as a
20 member of the public would, implicating a member of the
21 Force in two murders, in the Gibson murder and also Breen
22 and Buchanan murders, and I would have thought that the
23 first thing that should be done is to investigate, if only
24 to get rid of that. But it appears that the matter wasn't
25 further investigated as a separate investigation into the
26 allegation against the police force. That is what I am
27 trying to get to the bottom of here.

28

29 CHAIRMAN: Well, the witness is saying that there was an
30 investigation -- there was an investigation on the -- well,

1 shall I put it, the subversive, but the point you are
2 making to him is that there was no proper investigation of
3 the fact that a member of the Garda Siochana was named in
4 the intelligence and that nothing was done to investigate
5 it it from that end rather than...

6

7 MRS. LAVERTY: There is nobody named.

8

9 MR. DURACK: There is no member of the Garda Siochana,
10 there is nobody named.

11

12 CHAIRMAN: No, no there isn't. But Mrs. Laverty is making
13 the point that there should have been an investigation to
14 see who is the member of the Garda Siochana under suspicion
15 and was there any veracity in that.

16

17 MRS. LAVERTY: Indeed, Chairman.

18

19 MR. DURACK: I am terribly sorry, I don't mean to keep
20 popping up and down, but I thought that the witness had
21 given evidence that in fact the subversive connection was
22 put under surveillance for the purpose of trying to see
23 with whom he might have contacts in the Gardai, and that
24 was the only way to go --

25

26 MR. ROBINSON: That hasn't been the evidence, that this
27 target was placed under surveillance to find out who the
28 Garda contact was.

29

30 CHAIRMAN: The details of surveillance under which he was

1 put has not been given, that is true.

2

3 MRS. LAVERTY: If I just move on.

4 74 Q. In Judge Cory's report, Mr. Jennings, there is a reference
5 to one of these pieces of intelligence, and it's at
6 paragraph 2122 of his report, and he refers to a second
7 report received by the Gardaí, and in fact I think this is
8 the one that -- let me just check -- he is referring to
9 Document 567, that is that garda information received had
10 the garda contact who gave only short notice of the visit
11 of Breen and Buchanan. And he says that *"It indicates by
12 way of double hearsay there was a contact in the Gardaí who
13 had passed on information that facilitated the murder of
14 Lord Justice Gibson and the shooting of the two RUC
15 officers after their visit to the Dundalk Garda Station.
16 This report was received many years after the shooting.
17 What's of greater concern is that it was based on double
18 hearsay."*

19 Now, Judge Cory is completely incorrect in that. So one
20 assumes that he worked on information that was given to him
21 by the Gardaí, and he seems to be of the opinion that this
22 report was many years after the shooting, whereas in fact
23 it was only a year after the shooting, so that the
24 information seems to have been downplayed or trivialised,
25 if you like; he is dismissive of it. Have you any idea why
26 that would be?

27 A. Well, Chairman, I am a loss here because I had no dealings
28 whatsoever with judge Cory, and the document, if my memory
29 serves me right, one of these documents was a
30 year-and-a-half after the incident.

1 75 Q. Exactly, yes. So how would he have got the impression that
2 it was years after?

3 A. Well, Chairman, I don't know.

4 76 Q. You don't know. Yes. So to come back to the, just the
5 original point again to get your view on it: Do you feel
6 that there should have been a reference in the Camon-Kirwan
7 report to this intelligence?

8 A. Well, Chairman, to be fair, I don't think I can
9 second-guess the investigator. Like, I wasn't involved in
10 the investigation, and I have no doubt, from my knowledge
11 of the workings of the department, that this was dealt with
12 at the time, I don't know, and some gentleman there said
13 how Mr. O'Dea gave some evidence of it, but I can't say why
14 or should there have been any reference made by Sean Camon.
15 He had access to everything, he had possession of all of
16 the facts and I don't think I could second-guess the
17 gentleman.

18 77 Q. I see. Now, I think at the time of the preparation of the
19 Camon-Kirwan report, there is a reference in it to
20 information given by Alan Mains that Chief Superintendent
21 Breen had concerns and reservations about travelling to
22 Dundalk because he felt that a member of the Garda was in
23 the pay of 'Slab' Murphy. Are you familiar with that part
24 of the report?

25 A. Well, I recall it from the report, Chairman.

26 78 Q. Yes. So it would suggest that, certainly in the year 2000,
27 the Garda Siochana were well aware of what Alan Mains,
28 Staff Officer to Harry Breen, was saying in relation to
29 concerns about a member of the Garda Siochana.

30

1 MR. O'CALLAGHAN: It was members, not a member, Chairman.

2

3 CHAIRMAN: Sorry?

4

5 MR. O'CALLAGHAN: Mr. Mains said he had concern about
6 members, not a member. Mrs. Lavery is suggesting that
7 Mr. Mains' statement of September 2000 said that Mr. Breen
8 had concerns about a member. It didn't say that. His
9 statement of September 2000 said that Mr. Breen allegedly
10 had concerns about certain members of An Garda Siochana.

11

12 MRS. LAVERTY: So were you aware at that stage of
13 Mr. Mains' allegations?

14 A. No, Chairman, I wasn't, no.

15 79 Q. But, obviously, the people preparing the report were aware
16 of it. Now, because of your position at the time in
17 Special Branch and in charge of intelligence, there may be
18 some other matters that you might assist us with, if you
19 can?

20 A. Certainly, if I can, Chair, yes.

21 80 Q. There was -- Tom Curran gave evidence to the Chairman that
22 nine months before the murders, in July 1988, would you
23 have been in intelligence at that stage?

24 A. No, Chairman, I wasn't, no. In 1988, no.

25 81 Q. 1988?

26 A. No, Chairman, I wasn't.

27 82 Q. Because he gave evidence that there was a threat, he
28 conveyed a threat to Bob Buchanan's life. He typed the
29 letter himself and sent it to ACC Crime and Security?

30 A. Who was it? Tom?

1 83 Q. Superintendent Tom Curran, who was the Border
2 Superintendent.

3 A. Oh, yes. I wasn't in intelligence at that time, no.

4 84 Q. And you don't recall ever seeing a copy of that document?

5 A. No, Chairman, no.

6 85 Q. It appears to have got mislaid or missing. Now, there was
7 other information given by Inspector Dan Prenty that he had
8 asked -- had been asked to identify a tape of a recording
9 of a conversation around the beginning of January 1990.

10 Were you ever aware of tapes being kept in Headquarters?

11 A. No.

12 86 Q. Do you know anything about that?

13 A. I never heard --

14 87 Q. I am asking you simply because it was around your time in
15 1990.

16 A. No.

17 88 Q. You don't know anything about that?

18 A. No, I wasn't there in 1990, Chairman, no.

19 89 Q. Now, when you travelled as Border Superintendent to
20 Monaghan, was that in the mid-'90s?

21 A. 1994, Chairman, September.

22 90 Q. And what did your duties consist of at that stage on the
23 border?

24 A. Well, Chairman, actually, it was quite an unusual time, it
25 was just at the start of the Peace Process and our duties,
26 really, were to work with the local detective branch and
27 work with the other superintendents, all of the
28 superintendents along the border were border
29 superintendents, and also I would liaise with the border
30 superintendents on the opposite side, we attended meetings

1 roughly once a month on either side or whatever, and,
2 basically, report to my Chief Superintendent.

3 91 Q. So would you have long chats with collators? I presume
4 that you would have had your finger on the pulse of what
5 was going on in the border?

6 A. Well, the reports would -- some reports would come in to
7 you from the different people and, like, there was a weekly
8 conference in the station to chat about things that were
9 going on and there was, even despite the fact that we were
10 in the Peace Process at an early stage, there was still a
11 lot of work going on along the border.

12 92 Q. And your counterparts from the other side of the border,
13 did they travel freely in and out of your area at the time?

14 A. Yes.

15 93 Q. Did the Border Superintendent, for example, opposite you in
16 Monaghan, did he travel down to the station on a regular
17 basis?

18 A. Mm-hmm, mm-hmm. Well about once every month he would come
19 to me and I would go to him every other, so I suppose he
20 was down every two months, unless if there was something
21 very specific. I was there nine months and in that nine
22 months, unless there was something really specific we had
23 to deal with, he would come to see me, he would make a
24 person to person phone call to me.

25 94 Q. And when he wasn't -- you'd have a meeting with him once a
26 month -- would he also be going along to the other stations
27 along the border that were within his bailiwick, so to
28 speak?

29 A. No, he dealt just with myself and -- well he would say
30 hello, maybe, to the Chief Superintendent on his visit but

1 normally it was a person to person.

2 95 Q. But were there any particular concerns taken for safety or
3 did he just travel himself?

4 A. Well, they'd take their own precautions, Chairman, and I
5 suppose one thing was that if a meeting was due, maybe, at
6 a particular time, they might come 15 minutes before it or
7 15 minutes after it. Like, I done a lot of travelling the
8 other side and I would take my own precautions.

9 96 Q. So, effectively, nothing much had changed from the time
10 that Bob Buchanan was crossing the border and visiting
11 stations?

12 A. Well, with respect to, the Lord have mercy on both of those
13 men, I don't know what precautions they were taking, but it
14 was always crossing over and back you had to be careful.
15 Even for ourselves we were always very careful, and there
16 is so much you can do. Whereas there wasn't a direct
17 threat, shall we say, against members of the Garda
18 Siochana, you'd always be concerned, you'd always be on
19 your guard when you are travelling up or down or crossing
20 the border, even at the time of the Peace Process, because
21 I think we are all aware we still have some elements that
22 maybe don't support that, shall we say.

23

24 CHAIRMAN: On a quite different note. Did you carry a
25 personal gun on yourself?

26 A. Yes, at certain times, Chairman. I could have all of the
27 time but not when I'd be going outside the jurisdiction.
28 But if I was going out on any operations yes, of course I
29 would.

30

1 CHAIRMAN: On operations you would, but you wouldn't
2 travelling north, nor would your colleague in north
3 travelling south carry?

4 A. No, they wouldn't. And, in fact, my appointment there was
5 as a detective superintendent so all the detectives at the
6 time did carry a firearm but I wouldn't carry it all of the
7 time but most of the time, yeah.

8
9 CHAIRMAN: What is your view of that? Do you think that a
10 detective from the south should be able to carry a personal
11 firearm in the north, and vice versa?

12 A. Well, in the normal, Chairman, it never happens, but I know
13 there are some extreme cases, shall we say, when our
14 President, shall we say, would be visiting the North, there
15 would be special arrangements made with our opposite
16 liaison people in North, that the personal bodyguard to the
17 President could carry a firearm. And, you know, with some
18 VIPs, actually, that would come in from out-of-state, if
19 they were travelling north or south, if there was a
20 personal escort on them, that person would be allowed carry
21 a firearm. But in the general rule, you didn't carry
22 firearms while you were going into another jurisdiction.

23
24 CHAIRMAN: No, I can understand that

25 A. In the day-to-day running of police liaison.

26
27 CHAIRMAN: I know that that is a general rule.

28 A. Yes, that's correct, yes.

29
30 CHAIRMAN: Are you happy with that rule or do you think it

1 should be --

2 A. Yes, yes, I'd be happy enough with that, Chairman, yes.

3

4 97 Q. MRS. LAVERTY: Mr. Jennings, were there any particular
5 signals -- let me start again. I presume that one was
6 always aware, in the Gardaí, and particularly if you were
7 dealing with intelligence, of the possibility of the IRA
8 infiltrating the organisation, as they did every other
9 organisation, is that correct?

10 A. Chairman, it is a concern that a person in my position
11 would always have. And if I may, and we are not going to
12 mention any names or anything, but, like, that is the way
13 these terrorist organisations all over the world work, is
14 to infiltrate the State, and that would include the police
15 force. It would be the aim, certainly, and once this
16 investigation started, it would be a major priority for us
17 to try and identify if there was somebody giving
18 information because it puts at risk everything you are
19 doing and it puts at risk VIPs, it puts other people --
20 like, we done a lot of escorts of judiciary and members of
21 Government travelling and it would always be in the back of
22 your head and it's something you'd always be watching for,
23 really.

24 98 Q. What would you watch out for? What would be the pointers?

25 A. Chairman, not to be -- I won't say how long is a piece of
26 string. First of all, you would say if there was, we'll
27 say, contact, and that is something you have to balance
28 very carefully as well because if you are doing your work
29 as a detective investigating a terrorist group and members,
30 you going to have to contact, you have to talk to them, I

1 have done it regularly. But then you'd examine
2 information, and basically, the normal routines of
3 investigative -- you know, you'd look at everything, if you
4 got any suspicion. And, like, often times you could hear
5 this from somebody within the organisation. Then, this is
6 where, going back to what I said earlier this morning,
7 Chairman, about the whole area of analysis and very
8 specific analysis of what you get, because the experience
9 has been that, particularly professional terrorist
10 organisations, which, I have to say, the one in this
11 country was deemed as one of the most professional in the
12 world, was misinformation, and that often times, and it
13 would be a tack that was often used, and I don't want to be
14 straying too far away from the question, is that a member
15 of an organisation would tell his own troops, shall we say,
16 or members, that he had a contact, and that was to instill
17 fear into the members of the group. But without -- getting
18 back to the question from Crown counsel was that you'd
19 leave no stone unturned as to try and identify if somebody
20 within the organisation was giving information.

21 99 Q. Well, what does the organisation do about rumours? If
22 somebody gets a bad name, deservedly or not, and rumours
23 circulate time and time again and grow and grow, at what
24 point does the Force decide this is bad for the reputation
25 of the Force, we are going to have to investigate this and
26 see if there is any basis...

27 A. Well, I think --

28 100 Q. ... in the interests of the person concerned?

29 A. In short, I think the interests of the Force always will be
30 that if there is a wrong one, to use that phrase, within

1 the organisation, we would stop at nothing to root that
2 person out, and there are examples of that, as we know.
3 And rumour, getting back again, rumour, repeating myself
4 again, this is where detailed analysis of a rumour or a
5 piece of intelligence is the key as to what way you can
6 take action, and sometimes it is impossible, and then you
7 try and trawl more and more and more to see can I get
8 something else to support this. And, like, it will always
9 be there. Like, the intelligence does not -- it doesn't go
10 away, and often times it could be years afterwards
11 something else similar could pop up to say, yes, we have
12 something like this before and let's try and develop it
13 again, you know, but you have got to try and form a
14 platform of where do I start from, if I am making myself
15 clear, Chairman?

16 101 Q. But if it's as elaborate a procedure as that, it seems that
17 somebody could be in the Force for many years with a cloud
18 hanging over them and the matter never being addressed by
19 anybody?

20 A. No, I wouldn't agree with that, Chairman, no, no. Like,
21 if -- when you say a cloud hanging over them, like, do you
22 mean if an allegation is made about somebody?

23 102 Q. Yes.

24 A. It will be dealt with. It will be analysed and
25 investigated. Like, but, you know, you have to -- as I
26 said, any piece of intelligence, looking at it in its raw
27 state, can have the potential, but you have got to examine
28 it and analyse it, because, you know, it's easy to take
29 away a person's character but you can never give it back,
30 shall we say, and that's just in passing.

1 103 Q. Let's come to a specific point now that I introduced very
2 early on.

3 A. OK.

4 104 Q. In relation to Mr. Owen Corrigan, the Garda had information
5 that PIRA members had conveyed a threat to the witness
6 relative to his up and coming trial in which Detective
7 Sergeant Owen Corrigan was a defendant. The information
8 further suggests as a result of the threat the said witness
9 was in fear and unlikely to appear in court.

10 Now that was intelligence that came in in November before
11 the court case, the court case was in December, so the
12 Gardaí had intelligence saying that the -- there was
13 witness intimidation being carried out by PIRA and that
14 information, we know, was not conveyed to Jim McHugh, who
15 was in charge of a very detailed investigation, and he has
16 said to the Chairman that had he known of that, it would
17 have changed the way that he had dealt with the matter.
18 Now, why was this not conveyed to him at the time, this
19 intelligence about an upcoming trial?

20

21 MR. MCGUINNESS: I am reluctant to intervene, Chairman, but
22 Mr. McHugh, in fact, gave evidence that he was in very
23 sustained contact with the witness and he answered a
24 question that I asked, in fact, completely the opposite to
25 what Mrs. Lavery has suggested. He said that, in fact he
26 had done everything that he could possibly have done to
27 stay in touch with the witness and to reassure him and that
28 the intelligence, had he known of it, would have made no
29 difference to the way he interacted with the witness.

30

1 MRS. LAVERTY: That's not my understanding. I remember
2 distinctly asking him if he would have gone ahead with the
3 case on the day if he had known the witness wasn't going to
4 turn up, if he had known about this, and he said no, he
5 would have altered his view.

6
7 CHAIRMAN: That is my recollection too, I think he did say
8 that, that he wouldn't have gone ahead with the case on the
9 day had he known about this intelligence about the witness
10 being intimidated.

11
12 MRS. LAVERTY: I can certainly find it in the transcript
13 but I would need sometime over lunch, Chairman.

14
15 CHAIRMAN: And we can come back to it this afternoon if you
16 wish.

17
18 MR. MCGUINNESS: Mrs. Laverty's question was posed in a
19 slightly way, Chairman.

20
21 CHAIRMAN: Sorry?

22
23 MR. MCGUINNESS: Mrs. Laverty's question was posed in a
24 slightly different way. I thought it was directed to the
25 witness and what efforts had been made to deal with the
26 witness.

27
28 MRS. LAVERTY: No, no, it wasn't. It was why this -- I am
29 trying to find out why information like this that's
30 relevant to a member of the Gardaí, and a serious

1 allegation, is not conveyed to the investigating officer.

2 That's what I am --

3 A. Well I am not familiar with that investigation, Chairman.

4 105 Q. Yes.

5 A. I wasn't dealing with that.

6 106 Q. But would you agree with me that it would be something of
7 significance that should be conveyed to the investigating
8 officer?

9 A. I would agree that Mr. McHugh should have been made aware
10 of the content.

11 107 Q. I think that you dealt with other matters in your statement
12 in response to questions by counsel for the Tribunal that
13 you weren't familiar with so I won't go through those?

14 A. OK, Chairman.

15 108 Q. Perhaps other parties may wish to. And I think you dealt a
16 little bit then, in discussion about the control of
17 munitions, Mr. Jennings, in the IRA, from your own
18 knowledge?

19 A. Yes, I remember when I was with counsel we had some
20 discussions about that, from my knowledge of...

21 109 Q. Yes. And what about the area of south Armagh and in
22 relation to hides of guns. Can you assist us with that?

23 A. Yes, well, Chairman, I suppose it's a difficult area ever
24 to police and everything like that, but in some areas from
25 my knowledge of searches that we did carry out in some
26 places close to the border the munitions were hidden in
27 very small amounts in Wavin pipes and that was often times
28 to give easy access if an operation was planned, they may
29 be there beforehand or sometimes after an operation they
30 could be put into the hides and in small amounts, but that

1 was a general thing because munitions, to an organisation,
2 were very important and the loss of them would have been a
3 very serious matter, so they were kept in small amounts and
4 controlled by the OC of a group or whatever.

5 110 Q. In 1989 were weapons in short supply or had the IRA already
6 got delivery of weapons from Libya, can you recall?

7 A. I don't think the Libya stuff was in, but munitions, I
8 think, to an organisation like that, would always be in
9 short supply in the sense that where they may have quite an
10 amount of them, there would only be small amounts out to a
11 unit at each time, so they would always be very protective
12 of their munitions, as they were with their own personnel.
13 It was more important for those people to, unlike some
14 other organisations in the world, their own escape was,
15 often times the biggest part of their planning was to get
16 away with their vehicles and their munitions and be able to
17 dispose of them without being compromised. So the planning
18 would have been huge for any operation that they would
19 carry out.

20 111 Q. It has been suggested by some of your colleagues in the
21 various police forces that it was unusual for them to go
22 out in numbers in the daytime, as it appears they did on
23 this particular occasion, because they were risk adverse.
24 Would you agree?

25 A. Well, Chairman, it would, and that is why the amount of
26 planning that would go into an operation like this would be
27 quite detailed. But then it was an area that was difficult
28 to police and the terrain up there, there was quite a
29 number of places, maybe, to hide. But yeah, operations
30 during the day, they did do some operations, quite a few,

1 during the day but it would be difficult to plan and
2 organise and a lot of work would have to go into it.

3 112 Q. Who would know where the guns were hidden in regards the
4 ranking of the IRA? How difficult was it to assemble these
5 guns?

6 A. Well, on a big operation, if they were in place before an
7 operation, the OC, or maybe one person within a small cell
8 might be the person, but on some occasions the weapons
9 would be brought from a more central base, but for quite a
10 lot of operations that were done they were maybe left there
11 the night before or something and easy to access then on
12 the day. But that's in general terms, and that knowledge
13 would come from me from some hides that we found during
14 searches of ditches along the roadway quite close to the
15 border over the years in different places along the border.

16 113 Q. Did you have, in those days, contact with Sergeant
17 Corrigan?

18 A. Well, I knew him more by reputation, but I had contact with
19 him at one time. It was, I think, in -- it was '87,
20 probably '88, I am a surveillance instructor and at that
21 time there was some agreement, I was operating in Harcourt
22 Square at the time, Chairman, there was some agreement
23 between the two forces to boost the surveillance
24 capabilities all over both forces, and there were people
25 selected from the various divisions along the border, I
26 think the four divisions along the border, I think there
27 was two at a time, we trained eight at a time, and
28 Mr. Corrigan was on one of those courses. I think it was
29 '88. Now I am not just a hundred percent sure. I left in
30 late '89; I think it was in 1988 I would have met him over

1 a two-week period.

2 114 Q. So you didn't have contact with him when you were carrying
3 out the searches in the early eighties?

4 A. No, I had met him a few times around, just to say hello to
5 around the Special Criminal Court and, like, he had a
6 reputation that he was a tough man, tough on the IRA and
7 all of that, and that is the only dealings I had with him,
8 and apart from that two weeks when we done a very intense
9 two weeks surveillance by the selected people from the
10 divisions.

11 115 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Jennings. You might answer any
12 questions.

13

14 MR. DURACK: If I might reserve my position and let the
15 other persons proceed ahead of me?

16

17 CHAIRMAN: Yes, of course.

18

19 **THE WITNESS WAS CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR. O'CALLAGHAN**

20 **AS FOLLOWS:**

21

22 116 Q. MR. O'CALLAGHAN: I appear for retired Detective Sergeant
23 Owen Corrigan and I just have a couple of questions for
24 you. I mentioned, when you were giving evidence, evidence
25 that had been given by Mr. O'Dea when he gave evidence here
26 on Day 54. Mr. O'Dea was asked questions about the
27 intelligence documents that you looked at a few moments
28 ago, sir, and he said to the Chairman in his evidence that
29 he recalled seeing some of those documents. He also stated
30 that as a result of seeing those documents, that

1 surveillance was placed on an individual, not a garda, who
2 was named in them. What do you think would have been the
3 purpose of that surveillance operation from the point of
4 view of An Garda Siochana?

5 A. Well, Chair, from my experience, the purpose would be to
6 identify or could we identify this so-called contact that
7 the particular man had, or to identify other contacts that
8 you would have, and then by working on those contacts maybe
9 eventually lead on to identifying the member of the Garda
10 that was referred to earlier. And then there was technical
11 surveillance as well, Chairman, interception would have
12 been in place at that time as well.

13 117 Q. So, would you agree with me that the primary purpose was to
14 weed out any mole that may have existed in An Garda
15 Siochana?

16 A. Oh, yes, of course, Chairman, that would have been the
17 goal, to see could we identify who this alleged mole was.

18 118 Q. And from your knowledge and experience in An Garda
19 Siochana, Mr. Jennings, were the Garda Siochana and the
20 senior officers of An Garda Siochana, would they have been
21 in any way tolerant of a member of the Force who was acting
22 as a mole for the IRA?

23 A. No, Chairman, absolutely no way would it be tolerated. And
24 indeed, Chairman, I would go as far as to say is that most
25 members of the Force that I know, and indeed around
26 Dundalk, if they had any knowledge of any mole, they would
27 be the first to report it and have something done about it
28 because, as I explained, Chairman, earlier, it's your own
29 life that's at risk if there is somebody around there, and
30 you will be aware, Chairman, many, many very successful

1 operations have been ran in that part of the country, up
2 around Dundalk, if I am answering the question?

3 119 Q. And from your experience, Mr. Jennings, if there was
4 intelligence suggesting that a member of An Garda Siochana
5 was a mole acting for the IRA, would that intelligence be
6 scrutinised and investigated thoroughly?

7 A. Yes, Chairman, without doubt.

8 120 Q. Mr. O'Dea gave evidence in respect of a member from the
9 Force down in Limerick who was providing intelligence
10 information to the Provisional IRA. Were you aware of that
11 example, Mr. Jennings?

12 A. Yes, Chairman, I am very aware of it.

13 121 Q. And what ultimately happened to the member of the Force who
14 was involved in providing information to the Provisional
15 IRA?

16 A. He was convicted, Chairman, of membership of the IRA, and,
17 Chairman, if you don't mind me just saying, I think we must
18 be very careful about mentioning parts of the country or
19 individual names but without doubt, he was convicted of
20 membership of the IRA.

21 122 Q. Yes. Mr. Jennings, you were asked by Mrs. Lavery in
22 respect of the intelligence information and whether or not
23 Sean Camon and Peter Kirwan were aware of it. I just want
24 to read to you some evidence that was given by Mr. Kirwan
25 on Day 61, when he was asked about the piece of
26 intelligence which stated: *"Garda information indicated by
27 way of double hearsay there was a contact in the Gardai who
28 passed on information which facilitated the murder of Lord
29 Justice Gibson and the shooting of the two RUC officers
30 after their visit to the RUC station."* And Mr. Kirwan gave

1 evidence, on Day 61 at page 40, to state that he was aware
2 of that information and he was then asked: *"Were you aware*
3 *in 2000, when yourself and Sean Camon were conducting your*
4 *investigation?"* And he answered: *"Yes, Chairman, we were*
5 *aware of that."*

6
7 Were you aware of that before you gave evidence today,
8 Mr. Jennings?

9 A. No, Chairman, no, I wasn't, no, but I would have no doubt,
10 Chairman, knowing Peter Kirwan and how thorough he would
11 have been at the time, he said everything was shown to him.

12 123 Q. You mention in your evidence about misinformation and how
13 the Provisional IRA would seek to spread misinformation.
14 Would it be correct to state that it wouldn't be beyond
15 them to suppress misinformation about a member of An Garda
16 Siochana?

17 A. Oh no, that was the point I was making, Chairman, it is
18 just a tactic that is used and by other organisations as
19 well, and it was a reference to a member of the Garda
20 Siochana I was referring at the time.

21 124 Q. And members of An Garda Siochana who were operating in
22 border stations such as Dundalk would have been
23 particularly vulnerable to such acts on the part of the
24 Provisional IRA, would you agree?

25 A. Well, you know, they'd be, I suppose, open to the same as
26 any other member was anywhere in the country.

27 125 Q. You mentioned in respect of Mr. Corrigan, that he was known
28 around the Special Criminal Court and that he was tough in
29 his dealings with the IRA. That is your experience of
30 Mr. Corrigan, is that correct?

1 A. Well, that is what -- that was what I used to always hear
2 said and I had seen him in the court on quite a few
3 occasions and I had the knowledge of meeting him, then, for
4 two weeks in 2008 when he was selected for this course, the
5 surveillance course.

6 126 Q. You were asked about, or rather in your statement you
7 provided information about the kidnapping of Mr. Corrigan
8 in 1995 and you say that you were made aware by counsel to
9 the Tribunal that a report had been prepared by
10 Mr. Finnegan, isn't that so, Mr. Jennings?

11 A. Yes, I recall this conversation, Chairman, yes.

12 127 Q. When he gave evidence, Mr. Finnegan stated that Owen
13 Corrigan had a very strong anti-IRA record, and he also
14 gave evidence that his report was totally based on other
15 reports. Were you aware of that, Mr. Jennings?

16 A. No, I wasn't here, Chairman, for that evidence, but I know
17 that I had never seen that intelligence report in Security
18 Branch.

19 128 Q. And Mr. Finnegan also stated in his evidence that the
20 intelligence was speculative, gossip and soft intelligence.
21 Were you aware of that, sir?

22 A. No, I wasn't, Chairman, but I know that that report never
23 came to us in Security Branch. I checked since.

24 129 Q. Finally, when people who aren't police officers or members
25 of An Garda Siochana hear the word "intelligence" they are
26 sometimes liable to equate it with evidence. From your
27 experience, Mr. Jennings, what way should intelligence be
28 treated and are there different grades in terms of
29 intelligence that the Garda Siochana receives?

30 A. Yes, well, Chairman, intelligence is graded, I suppose, by

1 all intelligence agencies and forces.

2

3 MS. O'SULLIVAN: I am having grave difficulty hearing. I
4 think if the microphone could be turned off fully...

5

6 130 Q. MR. O'CALLAGHAN: I was asking you a general question about
7 intelligence, and whether or not we can equate intelligence
8 with evidence and are there different levels and grades to
9 intelligence that the Garda Siochana receive?

10 A. Well, Chairman, intelligence, an intelligence agency will
11 always try and grade its value, but without doubt, and I'm
12 not being flippant in any way, but sometimes people can
13 mistake the whole evidence/information/intelligence. And
14 in this particular -- and I am particularly referring to
15 what Mrs. Lavery said about the thing -- you have to
16 analyse your intelligence with great depth. Because if
17 not, what you'd end up doing is you'd end up chasing
18 shadows every day of the week and your organisation
19 couldn't sustain that.

20

21 CHAIRMAN: Intelligence isn't the equivalent of evidence?

22 A. Absolutely not. Certainly it can be a guiding factor, and
23 in fact I think I said it's like a piece of a jigsaw, and
24 that on working on intelligence, then you could develop
25 your case maybe to eventually end up with evidence, but a
26 piece of intelligence and, certainly as the counsel said,
27 it is a mistake that can be made by people that when they
28 see a piece of intelligence, say this is like, this is
29 evidence, and that would be a fatal mistake. Well, as
30 you'd know, Chairman, when you'd go into the court or

1 whatever... can you hear me?

2 131 Q. I can. And just because it's called intelligence doesn't
3 necessarily mean it contains intelligence information,
4 would you agree with me on that? That the intelligence is
5 a reference to information being received as opposed to the
6 content of the information?

7 A. Well, yes, of course, and then when you analyse it. But to
8 be fair to any person, I suppose, their intention may be
9 very good. Like, they may be very genuinely saying this is
10 what they heard and this is what -- and that is very much
11 the job of a good intelligence handler, is pass it on as
12 you get it and let the experts then analyse it, put it
13 together with whatever else you have and decide is this
14 something that is actionable or is it genuine, or perhaps
15 it's false. But that is kind of the way the system works.

16 132 Q. And if misinformation has been put out there, sometimes
17 that misinformation can find its way into an intelligence
18 report, would you agree with me on that?

19 A. Oh, well it could, of course, and very genuinely by the
20 handler may get this information because it may be
21 misinformation given to his source, but it's only with
22 analysis of that and proper examination by the experts that
23 you will determine whether it is something that is genuine.
24 Now, that may take some work afterwards, Chairman, but that
25 is the way you will develop the whole thing.

26 133 Q. Thanks, Mr. Jennings.

27

28 MR. COFFEY: No questions.

29

30 MS. O'SULLIVAN: No questions.

1

2

MR. ROBINSON: No questions.

3

4

CHAIRMAN: Anybody else have questions? Mr. Durack, are you ready?

5

6

7

THE WITNESS WAS CROSS-EXAMINED BY MR. DURACK AS FOLLOWS:

8

9

134 Q. MR. DURACK: In your time at this Security Task Force, did you have much involvement with the Dundalk district?

10

11

A. No, not that much. On a couple of occasions or maybe three or four during the couple of years I was there but I did do some escorts up to Dundalk and back down again but I worked more, actually, again over the Monaghan, Sligo, Leitrim area and Donegal.

12

13

14

15

16

135 Q. And in terms of those escorts you did, were they arranged headquarters to headquarters or would they have been arranged locally?

17

18

19

A. Headquarters to headquarters.

20

21

136 Q. And the people who were escorted, were they policemen or VIPs of another sort?

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

A. I remember, Chairman, on a few occasions they were policemen, but normally it was members of the judiciary or members of Government, and in fact I remember at one time, Chairman, when some of the senior police officers coming down, actually they flew down. I particularly remember the actual Chief Constable, on some occasions he would fly down and we would take him at the airport, but these were all arranged headquarters to headquarters and then it came from our headquarters down to the Chief Superintendent in the

1 Special Detective Unit.

2 137 Q. Because certainly there has been evidence, I think, that
3 escorts were provided from Dundalk to escort judges to
4 Dublin Airport, for instance, or --

5 A. Well there would be some occasions, maybe at short notice,
6 that somebody would take a run. Like, we didn't do them
7 all from the Task Force or in the Emergency Response Unit
8 but there would be some occasions that, and I know,
9 Chairman, that sometimes when we'd be going up along the
10 border in tricky times, shall we say, the local patrol cars
11 and the Detective Branch cars often times would be
12 patrolling the area because it was a pretty sensitive time.

13 138 Q. To check that it was clear in advance of your arrival?

14 A. Yes, and just like a presence on the ground often times,
15 prevention, shall we say, of maybe people getting ready to
16 do something.

17 139 Q. But, as I say, there has been evidence, I think, of there
18 being escort provided from the members in Dundalk to escort
19 people down to the airport or the courts?

20 A. Oh, yes, I don't doubt that at all, Chairman.

21 140 Q. And were you aware at any stage that Dundalk was avoided,
22 if you like, contact was avoided with Dundalk in relation
23 to any particular piece of information such as that
24 referred to by Mr. Wallace?

25 A. No, I never heard anything like that, Chairman. As I think
26 I said there earlier, there were a lot of very, very
27 sensitive operations carried out in the Dundalk area with
28 the assistance of the local people in Dundalk and in
29 surveillance operations and when I was in the Emergency
30 Response Unit as well, and over the years since when I was

1 head of Surveillance, a lot of very sensitive operations
2 carried out in the Dundalk area with the assistance of the
3 local people.

4 141 Q. And your team was based in Dublin?

5 A. Yes.

6 142 Q. So that knowledge of local people wouldn't necessarily --
7 they wouldn't have any knowledge of local people
8 necessarily?

9 A. And you would, Chairman, build up a certain knowledge of
10 some people over the years and, like, that was another
11 addition that -- to us, we will say, based in the
12 headquarters for the Surveillance Unit, was, when we
13 trained, from memory I think we trained eight in each of
14 the division along the border, we done four courses, and
15 then we had contact direct with people that would have a
16 basic knowledge of the requirements that you would have as
17 a surveillance officer or what we'd need, because you have
18 to have a local contact, even down to, talking to counsel
19 earlier, with the searches, you have to have local
20 knowledge because, you know, to check a car, and in the
21 surveillance area in particular, you avoid going near the
22 stations or anything like that because you are basically
23 working totally in a covert situation.

24 143 Q. And then the purpose, I take it, of surveillance, is to
25 watch people to see what they are doing and also to see who
26 their contacts are?

27 A. Absolutely, yes.

28 144 Q. And to build up a picture?

29 A. Absolutely, yes.

30 145 Q. And that way, that could lead you, because you know who

1 their contacts are, that could lead you further along in
2 investigations or also assist new terms of subsequent
3 incidents that occur?

4 A. Absolutely, Chairman. And, you see, the idea is whatever
5 information would be garnered, gathered by the surveillance
6 unit, often times coupled in then with intelligence that
7 you would have. Now often times the intelligence led to
8 the surveillance operation being carried out but then when
9 all was pooled together it's back to my jigsaw together,
10 you put everything together in building up your case
11 against a particular individual or individuals.

12 146 Q. And the purpose of training the various local people was to
13 bring their state of knowledge up and also improve their
14 skills, presumably, in this area?

15 A. Absolutely, and this was an agreement, Chairman, I don't
16 remember exactly when it was, it was around that time, this
17 was an agreement done between the two chief constables and
18 possibly at Government level now, but it was to boost the
19 capability locally along the border and also to boost the
20 capability big time around the, when the National
21 Surveillance Unit was set up as well very shortly
22 afterwards, there was also a surveillance unit based at
23 Harcourt Square, then it was set up more on a national
24 basis and doubled in size, actually.

25 147 Q. You said then that Sergeant Corrigan was, you believe, part
26 of one of the teams that were trained in 1988?

27 A. Oh, he was without doubt because I was an instructor on the
28 course, one of the instructors.

29 148 Q. Do we take it from that that you certainly had no knowledge
30 of the 1985 intelligence that alleged he was keeping the

1 boys happy? You may be at a loss. There has been evidence
2 that the RUC provided an item -- sorry, that they had an
3 item of intelligence in 1985 which actually named Sergeant
4 Corrigan and suggested that he was providing information to
5 the IRA. Now, that has not been found in Garda
6 Headquarters and was, in fact, I think, discovered in 2011,
7 in fact I think it was provided by the RUC, and it was not
8 provided to Camon-Kirwan, but I take it that you were not
9 aware of any such allocation?

10 A. No, Chairman. And, like, I know the time that those people
11 were selected for that course, if there was any doubt with
12 his people in Dundalk at a senior level, because they were
13 selected, my view would be that they selected by the Chief
14 Superintendent and/or the Detective Superintendent, if
15 there was any doubt on him he wouldn't be down in Harcourt
16 Square on a surveillance course because it was a very, very
17 intense course and, shall we say, a lot of the trade craft
18 that we use in the surveillance business would have been
19 given to the people and I could only say that if there was
20 any doubt or cloud on Mr. Corrigan, he wouldn't have been
21 on that course.

22 149 Q. And given that he would have learned, or at least anybody
23 participating in the course would have learned, as you say,
24 trade craft, et cetera, that that, in fact, would have been
25 very useful to any terrorist organisation to know how you
26 did, in fact, operate?

27 A. Well, it would indeed, Chairman, and the other thing is, as
28 I said, is that when, on a national point of view, when we
29 would go in to do big operations along the border, we would
30 use these people as our contact and they would be very much

1 aware of the finer details of who we were targeting and all
2 of that. So it would have been detrimental to those
3 operations.

4 150 Q. Now, if the RUC, in 1985, had intelligence suggesting that
5 a named police officer was associating with members of the
6 IRA, how would you expect that to have been communicated?

7 A. Well, Chairman, the rules were very clear: It was
8 headquarters to headquarters was where the intelligence
9 flow was. Now, certainly if there was something extremely
10 urgent came to the notice of somebody in the intelligence
11 area up in Dundalk or Monaghan or anywhere, anywhere in the
12 country, of extreme urgency, that it may have been done
13 direct, we'll say, if it was somebody on our side, direct
14 by phone to the Chief Superintendent in Security Branch or
15 the Superintendent Intelligence. There were three people,
16 really, whose phone numbers would have been available to
17 the people along the border and the chiefs around the
18 country and that would be the D Chief -- the Chief
19 Superintendent Security Branch, the Superintendent in
20 Intelligence and the Inspector of Intelligence, at weekends
21 even. But in the norm, the flow was headquarters to
22 headquarters.

23 151 Q. Would I be right in thinking that the short-circuiting of
24 the system to locals would deal with ongoing items at the
25 time rather than --

26 A. Oh, well, local information, but definitely something on
27 the strategic thing, it was, that would have a bigger
28 effect. But local intelligence. But even at that, the
29 local intelligence, particularly on named individuals that
30 would be known to be of an interest, would be channelled

1 down as well to Headquarters to where there was a lot of
2 files and a lot of people.

3 152 Q. But where there was, as I say, a suggestion that a member
4 of an Garda Siochana was an intelligence risk, how would
5 you expect that to be communicated by the RUC or from the
6 RUC?

7 A. Well, absolutely headquarters to headquarters, and very
8 likely it would come down in writing and then our, even a
9 meeting afterwards because there would be nothing more
10 serious, Chairman, than to have a member of either force
11 giving information to a group, a terrorist group that was
12 really trying to subvert the State on both sides of the --
13 in either jurisdiction, sorry. Without doubt, it was
14 something that would come in writing and then very much
15 maybe a meeting if there needed to be more of an
16 explanation, because it was something that would have to be
17 actioned immediately as to what can we do about this or is
18 there enough -- have we a basis where we can start to work
19 to root out this individual, whoever he or she may have
20 been.

21 153 Q. And this would, you would expect therefore, become part of
22 the knowledge of the head of Crime and Security?

23 A. Oh, absolutely, yes, absolutely, yes.

24 154 Q. And I take it that your Task Force also worked to Crime and
25 Security?

26 A. Yes, well the Task Force, Chairman, they worked actually to
27 the Chief Superintendent down in SDU and he would be
28 reporting up to headquarters any incidents that would come
29 to their knowledge. Like, there was the regular collating
30 of intelligence and sightings of people around the city and

1 around, whatever they would do along the border, as well,
2 would be reported back.

3 155 Q. And your surveillance unit, was that reporting to Special
4 Branch or to Crime and Security?

5 A. Oh no, into Crime and Security, yes.

6 156 Q. So that when these people were selected for the course,
7 they would have been selected either by their own Chief
8 Superintendent, but they would -- their names would be
9 provided to the head of Crime and Security?

10 A. It would -- the Chief Superintendent, shall we say, in
11 Dundalk, would send his list of names to the Chief
12 Superintendent in Security Branch and then it would come
13 down to us; we were the operators on the ground, shall we
14 say, at Harcourt Square. It would come down via the Chief
15 Superintendent in the Special Detective Unit to us. But
16 the point you are making is, it would come from Dundalk
17 into our headquarters and then all the way down to us.

18 157 Q. And is it safe, then, is it safe to take it, then, that if
19 Sergeant Corrigan, as you tell us, was sent on this course
20 in 1988, that there was nothing adverse known about him in
21 Crime and Security at that time?

22 A. Well, Chairman, what I would have to say is that if there
23 was any doubt in the people's mind, he would not be
24 selected for this course, and I'd say that hand on heart
25 without fear of contradiction.

26 158 Q. Yes, just to come back to the question then you are talking
27 about local knowledge and your needing local knowledge. If
28 you were bringing in outside members into an area, and I
29 take it that, as I say, that their usefulness would be in
30 knowing local people, perhaps knowing local vehicles,

1 knowing premises, likely places that there might be
2 evidence to be gathered, and all of that?

3 A. Yes, yes, absolutely, and the follow-on inquiries
4 afterwards. Now there would be the odd occasion where if
5 something was moved, we'll say, from one town to another
6 and straight out again, if you got an address, that inquiry
7 may be done afterwards, but we'll say where you'd have a
8 big operation in any location, you'd have to have the local
9 input to have any way of successfully completing your work.

10

11 CHAIRMAN: Yes.

12

13 159 Q. MR. DURACK: And we have heard that in relation to the
14 Surveillance Unit, that their presence might only be known
15 to one member of the local station rather than them going
16 in and out of the station as a group?

17 A. Oh, absolutely, correct, Chairman, yes.

18 160 Q. And I take it that --

19 A. Sorry, Chairperson, if I may qualify. We would always,
20 maybe at a level like mine or at Chief Superintendent or
21 Superintendent level, we would have contact with the Chief
22 Superintendent to say look, we are going to be operating in
23 your area. But on the ground level, shall we say, we'd
24 maybe have one point of contact and say -- he would very
25 often be told you are going to liaise with these people for
26 the next ten days or they are going to be working in our
27 division and more than likely have some telephone contact
28 or that.

29 161 Q. And would you have frequented the station at all?

30 A. No, no. That was for, maybe to me, obvious reasons, but

1 you were working in a covert situation and you are talking
2 about if you had cars calling to stations there would be,
3 to use the slang word, they would be blown straightaway.
4 You would be identifying your people plus your vehicles
5 because your vehicles, often times, weren't the normal
6 police vehicles that you would be using.

7 162 Q. To come on to the report by Mr. Camon. Mr. Camon, I think,
8 was head of the National Bureau of Criminal Investigation?

9 A. He was, Chairman, yes.

10 163 Q. And that would have made him the most senior investigator
11 in the State?

12 A. That's correct, Chairman, yes.

13 164 Q. Now, am I right in understanding that the reason why
14 Mr. Kirwan was designated as his assistant to help him, was
15 that he, Mr. Kirwan, was aware of everything that was in
16 Crime and Security?

17 A. Oh, yes, he would have had access to everything that was
18 there, all of the files. He was the detective inspector at
19 the time, was the only one detective inspector I had at
20 that time that dealt with the intelligence documents, and
21 he would have had access to everything.

22 165 Q. And you, other than checking with Mr. Camon as to how
23 things were going, you, in fact, had no particular contact
24 or involvement in that report?

25 A. Well, no, Chairman, and that is -- that is one professional
26 to the other. This gentleman was appointed by the
27 Commissioner to come in and examine the files and he was
28 the investigator. I was dealing with the intelligence, but
29 he had -- the idea was let him examine everything. Like,
30 he had other areas to go to as well throughout the

1 organisation but I didn't interfere in any way with him.

2 166 Q. And Mr. Kirwan has told us that he did have knowledge of
3 the various items of intelligence that had been referred to
4 here. You tell us that the letter that went to Government
5 that used the word "tangible," you think that that was, in
6 fact, prepared for you by Mr. O'Toole?

7 A. No, no, no.

8 167 Q. No, it wasn't, it was going to Mr. O'Toole; it was prepared
9 by Mr. Maher?

10 A. Yes, it would have been addressed to Mr. O'Toole, put up to
11 me for my signature and, having satisfied myself that I was
12 happy with its content and from talking to Mr. Maher, yes,
13 I signed it and forwarded it to him.

14 168 Q. Now, much has been made of the use of the word "tangible
15 evidence". How do you understand it?

16 A. Well, there is a number of ways, and I remember, actually,
17 because I had heard the word, about this "tangible" being
18 thrown around, it's something that it's -- you can't touch
19 it but there is -- "tangible" itself was that there is
20 something real and it's, like, perceivable, but if there is
21 no tangible, it's just that it's like, there may be a
22 rumour there or there may be speculation, which, you know,
23 the newspapers don't refuse ink, and all of that, and I was
24 satisfied that it was the correct word to be used. Not a
25 word that you see used that often. In fact, I heard it
26 this morning on the radio, talking about the financial
27 scene, at five to eight, that there was nothing tangible,
28 but this is a totally different scenario. But there was
29 nothing real there that you could lay your hands on, if
30 that...

1 169 Q. Do I take it, what you were differentiating it from is from
2 rumour, from something that you could stand up and prove?

3 A. Absolutely.

4

5 CHAIRMAN: But it does rather tend to give the impression
6 that if there is no tangible evidence, that, well, there is
7 something intangible out there that ought to be looked
8 into.

9 A. Well, Chairman, it's this whole thing about what was in the
10 media and what was in the book, and, I suppose, that is
11 where -- and I am sure the Commissioner of the day will
12 answer for himself, but I have no doubt that formed part of
13 the Commissioner's saying, look, we are going to dig deeper
14 than this and have the investigation into the book and the
15 article. And, I suppose, we all know the result of the
16 investigation, but there is nothing clear. When it's
17 tangible, it's something clear there. But nothing
18 tangible, there is nothing clear, and that is really,
19 maybe, my poor explanation of the word, but that is what I
20 felt at the time and I was happy with it.

21 170 Q. Now, in relation to the three items of intelligence that
22 have been referred to, I think I am right in thinking that
23 they all came from the same source?

24 A. I am not sure about that, now, Chairman, but I think so,
25 because I didn't deal with them. Now, I know there was one
26 referred to me earlier on, and I looked at them. Yes, I'd
27 be pretty happy they were from the same source, Chairman,
28 yes.

29 171 Q. And they all came via the same handler?

30 A. Yes.

1 172 Q. And as you say yourself, that one of the things that you
2 had -- you would ask a handler to do, would be to see if
3 they can dig any deeper, get any more information, provide
4 anything that might go to corroborating what is being said?

5 A. Yes, yes, absolutely, Chairman, yes.

6 173 Q. And it does appear that the handler did, in fact, have
7 three different contacts with the source, and that is why
8 there are three different pieces of information?

9 A. Yes, yes, yes, I presume so, yes.

10 174 Q. Now, what Mr. -- Judge Cory refers to it as being double
11 hearsay, and I think, essentially, that is that the person
12 who is speaking to the handler has been told by somebody
13 else that he has been told by somebody else, a piece of
14 information, isn't that right? It puts it at three removes
15 from reality?

16 A. Yes, it does. Well, at least two anyway, and maybe three.
17 And where it throws the doubt, Chairman, is the fact that
18 the handler may have very good faith in his source, but how
19 do we qualify the person that told the source? If I am
20 explaining it correctly?

21

22 CHAIRMAN: Yes.

23 A. And that is where the deep analysis needs to be done on
24 any -- on any piece of information, and, without doubt, the
25 handler, his source had proved good, and, like, was, I have
26 no doubt, giving it with best intentions, but it's when it
27 goes further out that it would lose its strength as a piece
28 of information or intelligence.

29 175 Q. MR. DURACK: He may be telling the truth about what he
30 heard, but what he heard may not, in fact, have ultimately

1 been the truth?

2 A. Exactly. And that is where you go into this whole array of
3 probing questions, to see, like, how could this person know
4 this; were they on the job, how far removed are they from
5 it, and all of that, things that, Chairman, I tried to
6 outline to you earlier on, and I hope I was clear on, and
7 that is -- that is where a deep analysis of your
8 intelligence comes in.

9

10 CHAIRMAN: It's just 1 o'clock now. I think we should have
11 lunch between now and 2 o'clock. Mr. McGuinness will take
12 up with Mrs. Lavery during the lunch interval.

13

14 MR. MCGUINNESS: We have traced it.

15

16 MRS. LAVERTY: We are both right. He agreed with both of
17 us. So we are not dispute.

18

19 MR. MCGUINNESS: I can give you the references now, if we
20 have them, just for the transcript. Mrs. Lavery's
21 questions to Mr. McHugh are on page 84 of the 7th of
22 September, 2011, Day 29. And her question --

23

24 CHAIRMAN: Day 29.

25

26 MR. MCGUINNESS: Page 48, question 414:

27 *"Would you have -- you don't recall this, and I understand*
28 *that, but I assume it would have been important for you to*
29 *know this prior to the court case?*

30 Answer: Absolutely.

1 Question: That the witness was in fear?

2 Answer: That he wasn't -- well, of course, I was told the
3 night before he wouldn't be there.

4 Question: Yes, but you weren't aware from your direct
5 evidence he was actually in fear?

6 Answer: Oh, no, absolutely not.

7 Question: That is something that one would assume would
8 have been helpful to you, to prevent, perhaps, the day
9 failing, so to speak?

10 Answer: Yes, of course."

11

12 And in cross-examination from myself, starting at the
13 bottom of page 89, question 333:

14 "Question: But in any event, knowing what you knew back in
15 1993, you had, in fact, already taken, as it were,
16 precautions because of a number of different factors.

17 Answer: Yes.

18 Question: The unusual precaution of giving him your home
19 number?

20 Answer: Yes.

21 Question: Keeping in contact with him prior to the court
22 case?

23 Answer: Yes.

24 Question: And he, for his part, would have had the
25 opportunity to phone you if he had wished?

26 Answer: Yes, absolutely.

27 Question: And you, for your part, did keep in contact with
28 him?

29 Answer: Yes. And that came across, in my view, in his
30 evidence to date that he had a large element of trust in me

1 as an investigator, an impartial investigator."
2 Going to question 441: "Would you agree with me in the
3 context of the way you had approached the investigation and
4 the prosecution of the case, the fact that you didn't know
5 of the intelligence from late 1992 probably didn't make any
6 difference?
7 Answer: Not a whit of difference insofar as my reaction to
8 it would be."

9
10 **THE TRIBUNAL THEN ADJOURNED FOR LUNCH.**

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

1 **THE TRIBUNAL CONTINUED AFTER LUNCH AS FOLLOWS:**

2

3 **DERMOT JENNINGS CONTINUED TO BE CROSS-EXAMINED BY**

4 **MR. DURACK AS FOLLOWS:**

5

6 176 Q. MR. DURACK: Yes, just to get back to those three items of
7 intelligence that were referred to. I think we know that
8 they all came in over a period of a year?

9 A. Yes, Chairman, yes.

10 177 Q. The Tribunal will have the originals in relation to it, but
11 -- and I think that would suggest that the handler had gone
12 back on two occasions, at least, to see if he could firm up
13 the evidence any better, or the information any better?

14 A. Well, I presume so, Chairman. I don't have the documents
15 in front of me now, but, yes, without doubt, the handler
16 would have -- that would be the instruction, to go back and
17 see could he develop it further.

18 178 Q. And I think that, in this case, the handler was not based
19 in the Louth-Meath division?

20 A. No, he wasn't, Chairman, no.

21 179 Q. And the division in which he was based would have nothing
22 to do with investigating anything in Louth, Meath, or
23 particularly in Dundalk?

24 A. That is correct, Chairman, yes.

25 180 Q. And if it was -- and if it was to be looked into, it would
26 have to be looked into by somebody else other than him?

27 A. Well, it would, Chairman, and there was another reason for
28 that, as well, is that it distanced the actual source
29 handler, which was only right, to keep him away from the
30 investigation. He was bringing the intelligence to the

1 table, shall we say, and -- or into the process where it
2 was analysed, but it would be very unusual to involve him
3 in the investigation as such.

4 181 Q. And you have mentioned that the subversive that was alleged
5 to have had this Garda contact was a person who was under
6 regular surveillance?

7 A. Indeed he was Chairman, yes.

8 182 Q. And that even if this information, I take it, had not been
9 received, any unusual contact that he had with members of
10 An Garda Siochana would have come to notice?

11 A. Yes, and I would hope so, yes, Chairman, because very, very
12 regular and constant surveillance on this particular man.

13 183 Q. And I think at no stage did you have any -- was there any
14 named member in either of these three reports?

15 A. No, there wasn't any member ever named, Chairman, no.

16 184 Q. And, on that basis, I suppose that the whole force is
17 potentially a suspect. You can't really start from that
18 end?

19 A. Yes, in the broad sense, yes, Chairman, because there was
20 no individual, or there was no actual location mentioned in
21 the actual reporting.

22 185 Q. And because there was a named subversive, that that was the
23 only place you could start to look?

24 A. Absolutely, Chairman, absolutely, yes.

25 186 Q. Now, in relation just to the quality of the information, I
26 think you suggested that it may well be that the person who
27 originally made the statement claiming that there was a
28 contact, may well have said that for his own reasons, such
29 as to let his underlings, if you like, know, that if they
30 at any stage became Garda informers, that he would be in a

1 position to know?

2 A. Chairman, and that -- generally, that is a tactic that was
3 regularly used by people, particularly people in positions
4 of command within the organisation, and it instilled fear
5 into their own volunteers, as they were known as, to say
6 that "I can check this with my own contacts" or "I have my
7 own contacts to check it out." And that was very much a
8 deterring factor to keep people from talking to the forces
9 of the State, talking to the guards, or anything like that,
10 and it instilled a fear into them.

11 187 Q. But equally, it may have been by way of some sort of black
12 propaganda, if you like, to perhaps damage the morale of
13 the Force?

14 A. Yes. I think I mentioned -- touched a little bit on that
15 this morning, Chairman, when I said that it could be what
16 is often referred to as misinformation, or misdirecting,
17 shall we say, the forces of law and order away from a
18 particular area. Often times, even to bring it to a
19 different level, down to robberies, or something like that,
20 a tactic would be employed as to give information that
21 something is going to happen, shall we say, in Dundalk,
22 when, in fact, the thing might be happening in Monaghan.
23 Even to try and explain it that way. That's about a
24 robbery now. But, in general, it is a tactic that would be
25 used: misinformation.

26 188 Q. And equally, of course, the suggestion that there was a
27 mole in Dundalk, might well deflect attention away from the
28 particular awfulness of the killing and direct media
29 attention towards the Gardaí rather than the subversives
30 involved?

1 A. Yeah, well that's true, Chairman, yeah.

2 189 Q. Now, can you help us in relation to what you know from your
3 experience in terms of how the IRA might have planned this
4 operation and gone about it?

5 A. Well, Chairman, I wish I knew. But, without a doubt, from
6 my knowledge of operations, this would have been a very,
7 very major operation, and an operation that would have been
8 decided at a very senior level to murder two officers of
9 the RUC, as they were at the time. Now, of course, we knew
10 that the RUC were targets, live targets, all of the time,
11 but if they had known that these two senior officers were
12 there, of course it would have been a very serious
13 decision, but to plan that operation in that part of the
14 world with its geography, and, you know, despite the fact
15 that a lot of activity on both sides of the border with the
16 aid of the towers and everything, it would have taken huge
17 amount of planning by the IRA to actually plan it and, as I
18 think I touched on this morning, to particularly plan their
19 own escape, which was always of paramount importance to
20 them, and to be able to get rid of whatever vehicles were
21 used, and dispose of their firearms and all of that. But,
22 in short, it would have been a huge operation to plan and a
23 lot of hours and manpower and everything to plan it.

24 190 Q. And I take it, it would require very significant
25 intelligence?

26 A. Absolutely. And that being said, they were good at getting
27 their intelligence. Like, they put a lot of work into
28 their intelligence-gathering on different people, their
29 targets, and there's been numerous examples of that. You
30 know, as they said, they only have to be lucky once, I

1 think was what was said one time, but their
2 intelligence-gathering capabilities were absolutely
3 immense, the ability they had to get information, and all
4 of that.

5 191 Q. And we know, the Tribunal knows, of course, that, we know
6 that it's a matter of public knowledge, that, in fact,
7 Mr. Buchanan was crossing the border a couple of times a
8 week, and that Mr. Breen had, I think, been in Dundalk
9 twice the previous month?

10 A. Yes, I have heard that, Chairman, yes.

11 192 Q. And is it fair to say that this is not a matter that would
12 have gone unnoticed by the IRA?

13 A. Well, Chairman, I don't have that knowledge exactly, but
14 what I'd say is that they had a massive capability of
15 monitoring what was going on, and they had a lot of people
16 on the ground and hanging around, and it was -- I can't
17 give an insight into exactly on the day, but, like, the
18 movement of people was regularly monitored to and from
19 stations, both north and south of the border and along the
20 road, but, as I said at the outset, I wish I knew exactly
21 what happened along that day before those two poor men were
22 murdered.

23 193 Q. There certainly appears to be a suggestion from various
24 people that there may have been as many as 20 people
25 involved in the operation.

26 A. I wouldn't doubt that at all, Chairman. And that could be
27 the very minimum, because there is four different routes
28 that you could possibly take going from Dundalk, north back
29 to their base or coming down either way. And that's why I
30 was emphasising, not to labour the point, that it would

1 have been a huge amount of planning to go into all of this
2 and to logistically get people there from different --
3 wherever they had all come from, and to be able to get
4 there without being intercepted even en route to the place,
5 and then, more so, without over-emphasising it, was to
6 escape afterwards without being caught by the security
7 forces or the Gardaí.

8 194 Q. I think the information is that the unit that actually did
9 the shooting consisted of about five people?

10 A. Yes, from what I can gather, yes, Chairman, yes.

11 195 Q. And I think that from what we know in relation to the
12 ballistics, I think there were five weapons involved?

13 A. Yes, yes, I am aware of that, Chairman, yes.

14 196 Q. And can one take it that the other units that may have been
15 involved, would also have been armed as well?

16 A. Oh, without doubt, Chairman, and, very often, maybe
17 lookouts on the way at different strategic locations as
18 well, as we have -- there is evidence of that on different
19 operations where they would have people well back from an
20 operation in the event of a trap being set by the security
21 forces, shall we say, and that they were in there ahead of
22 them, that they may be able to deal with some of them on
23 their return. So there would have been a huge amount of
24 people involved.

25 197 Q. And it would have taken, I take it, some time in order to
26 assemble those people and put them in place, wherever it
27 was planned to do so?

28 A. Well, it would, Chairman, because, logistically, even
29 though, as I said earlier, it was a sort of, you know,
30 'bandit country' was a good name, but even though it was a

1 tough area to police, like, there was a big presence on the
2 southern side, and there was, with the benefit of the air
3 support and the helicopters and the towers and operations
4 on the ground, there was a big security presence in that
5 area, and it would be difficult, and I suppose a lot of
6 strategic work by the organisation, the terrorist
7 organisation, but it would take a lot of work.

8 198 Q. And equally, one would have to -- you were telling us that
9 guns were generally kept in small numbers, I think in twos
10 or threes?

11 A. Yes, that was my experience, Chairman, where there'd be,
12 maybe for little operations along the -- in particular
13 places, they'd hide them in small groups, and that was to
14 protect, a lot of them wouldn't be found, that there
15 wouldn't be ten or twelve in an area. Now, again, I think
16 I mentioned this morning, I have no doubt there were bigger
17 locations, maybe in more safer places, but out in the
18 countryside like that, where there would be quite an amount
19 of searches carried out on both sides of the border at
20 regular intervals, they would be kept in small little
21 areas - in Wavin pipes, actually, was a regular hiding
22 place for firearms and ammunition.

23 199 Q. There might well be, in this case, there may well have been
24 a central arms-dump, if you like, from which arms had to be
25 collected and distributed to various locations?

26 A. Well, that is very possible, Chairman, yes.

27 200 Q. And that that would also require advance planning?

28 A. Yes, because, Chairman, as I said this morning, the
29 munitions and firearms were very, very valuable pieces of
30 equipment, and to lose one was a serious offence in that

1 organisation, so they would be very protective of their
2 equipment.

3 201 Q. So that the requirement then is for both people, vehicles,
4 guns and escape?

5 A. Yes, Chairman, yes.

6 202 Q. Now, on a general basis, can you tell us how close was the
7 relationship of An Garda Siochana with the RUC on an
8 intelligence basis, an intelligence front, should I say?

9 A. Very, very close, Chairman, very, very close working
10 relationship, and very, very open exchange of intelligence,
11 and I could only say it couldn't have been any better.

12 203 Q. And that this intelligence, I think the agreement was that
13 the intelligence would always be Headquarters to
14 Headquarters?

15 A. Yes, Chairman, and I touched a little bit on that this
16 morning; that was a document, I forget when it was drawn
17 up, but, again, if there was an emergency, and I could even
18 give you an example, but if there was an emergency, you
19 dealt with it, but you informed your own Chief
20 Superintendent, then informed Headquarters, you know,
21 because it's important to have kept them in the lump. But
22 in the normal, shall we say, exchange of intelligence on
23 the broad things about operations and about the threat as
24 we would see it jointly, it went from one Headquarters to
25 the other. Like, all of the other divisions around the
26 southern part of the country channelled their intelligence
27 into our Headquarters, and it was a similar system in
28 Northern Ireland. But, without doubt, if something
29 happened that was of an extreme urgency, because I recall
30 it when I was a Border Super there myself, you dealt with

1 it, but you informed as soon as you possibly can.

2 204 Q. Because we have heard evidence that Mr. Buchanan had gone
3 to the Chief Superintendent in Monaghan, Superintendent --
4 sorry, Superintendent in Monaghan, and that he had -- the
5 evidence we have heard is that he had been asked by the
6 Special Branch to convey their concern about a named member
7 to the Superintendent in Monaghan and to ask him to convey
8 that information to Headquarters. Does that strike you as
9 a usual method of communications?

10 A. That would be a very unusual, a very, very unusual thing to
11 happen, Chairman. I'm not familiar with what we're talking
12 about here, but, without doubt, that would not be the way
13 to deal with intelligence, from my knowledge, in either
14 jurisdiction, by either force.

15
16 CHAIRMAN: Well, was it conveyed by one -- there was a
17 group of border superintendents, both RUC and Garda
18 Siochana, and it was conveyed in that context by one Border
19 Superintendent in the south -- well, sorry, by
20 Superintendent Buchanan on the northern side, to his
21 Superintendent in Monaghan on the other, at a meeting of
22 superintendents?

23 A. Well, that would be unusual now in the rules on the
24 exchange of intelligence, but, like, if it did happen, it
25 should have been reported in writing straightaway. But my
26 view would have been that the normal would be, as I said
27 earlier, for the man in the RUC, as it was, to report that
28 type of information to his own Headquarters, and likewise,
29 if we had that information, if it came in to the Border
30 Superintendent, that he would to his Headquarters, unless,

1 if something had to be done immediately, like, if there was
2 an emergency with this, you'd put something in place
3 straightaway, but, in the norm, that should be reported,
4 because, like, it's very serious information, it should be
5 reported in writing straightaway to our Headquarters, and
6 likewise, and then, as I think it would be the normal,
7 there would be an exchange, and, very likely, that there
8 would be a meeting and a strategy drawn up as to how to
9 deal with it, particularly having analysed it of course, to
10 see how genuine and how -- sorry, can you hear me? -- and
11 how correct it was.

12
13 205 Q. MR. DURACK: There would have been, in the ordinary course
14 of events, I take it, regular contact with Special Branch
15 Headquarters and Special Branch in Dublin, or at least in
16 Crime and Security in Dublin?

17 A. Oh, absolutely, through Knock Road, was the Headquarters in
18 Belfast, and that's very regular contact, face-to-face and
19 by phone, and I had the experience of that myself.

20 206 Q. Because it appears that Superintendent Curran, as he
21 understood it, was receiving a message that was coming from
22 Special Branch via Mr. Buchanan?

23 A. Well, Chairman, that would be very, very strange and that
24 would be the wrong way to do it.

25
26 CHAIRMAN: He reported what he had been told directly to
27 the head of Crime and Security personally, face-to-face in
28 Dublin; that was his evidence.

29 A. Well, now, I am not familiar -- but, to me, that would be
30 very, very strange, and, without a doubt, something that

1 serious, it would have to come in writing, and the
2 recipient, even if he was told it verbally, as I think
3 maybe this morning I said sometimes if there was something
4 very urgent at the weekends, that it could be passed on by
5 phone to the Chief Superintendent or the Superintendent,
6 but it would have to be followed on by writing immediately,
7 and something as serious as that, I'd say, would be
8 delivered by hand in writing, in my experience, something
9 of how serious that was, as a follow-up. Certainly, if
10 there was a verbal communication, but it would have to be
11 followed in writing.

12
13 CHAIRMAN: Well, would the head of Crime and Security not
14 have said that to Superintendent Curran at the time?

15 A. Well, he would have. And, also, the Superintendent would
16 have reported it to his own Chief Superintendent because
17 that was the way, in the border divisions and all over the
18 country, you went in to your Chief Superintendent and then
19 it followed up the whole way to Crime and Security, to the
20 address to the Chief Superintendent, or the Assistant
21 Commissioner, either/or. But that was the way that things
22 were done. And there was an agreement, in fact, on both
23 sides of the border, in the whole area of
24 intelligence-gathering and how it should be handled. If
25 that's answering...

26
27 207 Q. MR. DURACK: And it appears that the request that was being
28 made, that this particular member be moved from the border
29 area?

30 A. Sorry, who is being moved?

1 208 Q. Sorry, the request that was being made or being passed on
2 by Mr. Buchanan was that the -- particularly the named
3 member, would be moved from Dundalk; in other words, that
4 he be transferred out, because they considered him a risk?

5 A. That -- well, like, you don't -- again, as I said, at the
6 loss of knowing the exact intelligence or having dealt with
7 it, like, you don't demand something like that from one
8 jurisdiction to the other. That would be a matter -- are
9 you talking about moving somebody from Dundalk?

10 209 Q. Yes.

11 A. That would be a matter for the local management. But,
12 without doubt, Chairman, if something very serious was
13 reported by one jurisdiction to another, it would be --
14 there would be a very serious view taken of it and analysed
15 and decided on, as to what action would be taken locally.
16 If there was a problem there, of course you'd have to get
17 rid of the problem, or try and sort it out.

18 210 Q. Would it surprise you that there -- it doesn't appear to be
19 possible to find any written record of this at all?

20 A. Well, it would, Chairman, because a serious matter like
21 that would have to come in writing. Because -- even if a
22 verbal communication took place, there would have to be a
23 follow-up in writing, a report in writing on it.

24

25 MRS. LAVERTY: Sorry to intervene here, Chairman. Just in
26 case there is any slight suggestion that perhaps the
27 officer in question, Superintendent Curran, was in some way
28 misleading the Tribunal, I must intervene. He is a witness
29 for the Tribunal and, also, he is unrepresented, so,
30 therefore, the Commissioner should be looking after his

1 interests, as well. I just feel that should be noted.

2

3 MR. DURACK: I don't think I said anything adverse to him.

4

5 MRS. LAVERTY: It's veering very close to it. I am just
6 putting a marker out.

7

8 CHAIRMAN: It's going in that direction.

9 A. Certainly, Chairman, that's not my intention, because I
10 wasn't aware of this, but I am just giving -- this is the
11 rules --

12

13 MRS. LAVERTY: It's nothing to do with you.

14 A. Sorry, Chairman.

15

16 MR. DURACK: I think, sir, that Superintendent Curran was,
17 in fact, asked about this in detail himself, and he gave
18 his account, and it's for you to judge how it is to be
19 interpreted, but...

20

21 CHAIRMAN: Yes.

22

23 MR. DURACK: I am merely asking this witness in relation to
24 what would be proper practice and what he would expect to
25 find if that was the case, and he has told you that.

26 211 Q. Assistant Commissioner Crowley, did you know him well?

27 A. Yes, I knew him quite well. He was my Chief Superintendent
28 when I was in the Special Detective Unit in Dublin Castle,
29 and afterwards I knew him as Commissioner of the Force,
30 actually.

1 212 Q. And what was his approach to his job?

2 A. He was a very, very committed, very, very hard-working,
3 very, very serious man and a very inquisitive man and a
4 hard task-master, and that was my experience in dealing
5 with him. And he asked a lot of questions, always, and
6 would be very insistent on -- because, at the time he came
7 in, from my experience, into the area of the Special Branch
8 work, it was as a Chief Superintendent, and I remember him
9 saying to me himself one time, when I was briefing him
10 after an operation with others, about he did lack some
11 knowledge and that's why he was so thorough, and he would
12 ask you 40 questions about everything. That's my
13 experience of the man.

14 213 Q. And if he had been brought information in relation to a
15 suspect guard, what would you expect him to do, or to have
16 done?

17 A. Well, in my view, and in my experience of that man, Chair,
18 the first thing he would say is, "I need a report on this,"
19 and, without a doubt, if there was something that could be
20 actioned, it would be actioned by Mr. Crowley. That would
21 be my experience of him.

22

23 MR. DURACK: Thank you very much indeed.

24

25 **THE WITNESS WAS RE-EXAMINED BY MRS. LAVERTY AS FOLLOWS:**

26

27 214 Q. MRS. LAVERTY: Arising out of your cross-examination,
28 Mr. Jennings, you briefly referred in your examination to
29 the fact that, in 1988, you were at a training surveillance
30 course in which Mr. Owen Corrigan participated, is that

1 right?

2 A. Yes, Chairman, yes.

3 215 Q. And in the course of your cross-examination, you expanded
4 as to the criteria for being selected to be a member of
5 that course, and you said that, I think, that the Chief
6 Superintendent sent a list of the Security Branch. Would
7 that be from one particular area?

8 A. Sorry if I didn't explain it properly, Chairman. These
9 people would be selected within that division, and that
10 selection would be the -- the Chief Superintendent would
11 give the nod as to who would attend, probably through the
12 Detective Superintendent, and there was two from each of
13 the -- the four divisions along the border, we'll say:
14 Donegal, Sligo-Leitrim, Cavan-Monaghan and Louth-Meath, as
15 it was at the time. There would be two selected per
16 course, and, from memory, we done four courses for the
17 border divisions.

18 216 Q. And you said that if there had been anything adverse about
19 Mr. Corrigan, he wouldn't have been selected for the
20 course?

21 A. That would be my view.

22 217 Q. I take it you wouldn't have let him participate in the
23 course if you knew anything adverse about him?

24 A. Absolutely, Chairman, yes.

25 218 Q. And is this because that it was quite a sensitive course
26 dealing with trade craft and how to carry out sensitive
27 surveillance?

28 A. Yes, it was, it was. It was a very intense course, first
29 of all, and, as I said this morning, as you rightly say,
30 about the trade craft and the methods we used in carrying

1 out surveillance.

2 219 Q. So somebody who had inappropriate contacts could learn a
3 lot from a course like that?

4 A. Oh, yes.

5 220 Q. Now, do you know, and it's been put to you by the
6 Commissioner's counsel, you do know from what they were
7 saying in cross-examination that in -- Tom Curran made an
8 approach to Assistant Commissioner Crowley in 1987, which
9 is the year before your course, which was in 1988?

10 A. Yes, from my memory, it was '88 -- between '87 and '89,
11 Chairman, but I'd say it was probably '88, late '87, maybe
12 '88.

13 221 Q. We are not talking about allegations or intelligence now;
14 we are talking about evidence that the Tribunal has heard.
15 And Tom Curran, who is a Border Superintendent, and
16 obviously a predecessor of yours, is that right? You were
17 a Border Superintendent in Monaghan?

18 A. In Monaghan. And I think afterwards, then, he was the
19 Chief Superintendent in Monaghan.

20 222 Q. And did you know him at the time?

21 A. I knew him just to see, but I had never any direct dealings
22 with him. I think maybe when I was up on searches in
23 Monaghan in earlier days in the Task Force, I would have
24 known Mr. Curran, yes.

25 223 Q. And I think he spent his life in the Gardaí, is that
26 correct?

27 A. Oh, he did, yeah, and quite a lot of it along the border
28 there, yes, yeah.

29 224 Q. And he gave evidence on Day 14, on the 29th of June, and he
30 said that Mr. Bob Buchanan, who was his counterpart, called

1 into his office in the -- probably 1987, the first half of
2 1987, and he had a reason for remembering it because he had
3 a new Toyota car, and he said when he was relaying the
4 message to Dublin, he drove his new car, and what he was
5 informed of by, he told the Tribunal -- I'm reading from
6 the transcript -- *"He informed Superintendent Curran that*
7 *the RUC had information that Detective Sergeant Owen*
8 *Corrigan in Dundalk was associating, unnecessarily*
9 *associating with the IRA and the RUC were concerned about*
10 *it."* Now, he was asked: *"In the natural order of things,*
11 *would Detective Corrigan have had to associate with the IRA*
12 *in any event?"* And he said: *"In one sphere of activity,*
13 *that you would have to."* And he admitted that he had
14 contacts with the IRA. And he was asked, then: *"Why did*
15 *this association appear to perturb Mr. Buchanan?"*
16 And he said: *"What I gathered was that the association*
17 *that Detective Sergeant Corrigan had with them went far*
18 *beyond that and I got the impression that he was assisting*
19 *the IRA."* Now, he said he got a shock about that. He knew
20 that -- he went on to say that he knew that Superintendent
21 Buchanan had a specific direction to do it, to give him the
22 message, and, because he told him to do that, that he went
23 to Dublin, he considered it to be -- he said that *"The*
24 *safety of police officers coming across the border would be*
25 *discussed regularly, but a specific allegation like that,*
26 *and someone in the guards was assisting the IRA, I never*
27 *experienced that before."* So he said, *"I thought the*
28 *matter was very serious. I decided I'd go and see him*
29 *personally."* And his version of events was, he went to see
30 Assistant Commissioner Crowley, who was the Head of Crime

1 and Security at the time, passed on this message, together
2 with other information that he knew about the officer, and
3 he said that Assistant Commissioner Crowley basically
4 listened but didn't acknowledge it and asked him about
5 Monaghan, and he didn't believe was interested in hearing
6 it. Now, there is no evidence before the Tribunal, so far,
7 that Assistant Commissioner Crowley took a note, prepared a
8 report, acknowledged what Superintendent Curran told him.
9 None of the other officers that have appeared before the
10 Tribunal, so far, have any knowledge of this. Do you have
11 any knowledge of this information?

12 A. None whatsoever, Chairman.

13 225 Q. If you had known that information, if that information had
14 been shared with you by Assistant Commissioner Crowley,
15 would you have had Sergeant Corrigan on your course, if you
16 knew that he was considered a security threat by the RUC?

17 A. Well, it wouldn't even ever have come that far to me,
18 Chairman, because it would have come in through his own
19 Chief Superintendent up to the Chief Superintendent in
20 Headquarters, but certainly, if it had gone through all of
21 those, and I became aware of it, I wouldn't want him on the
22 course.

23 226 Q. And that, obviously, was considered a very serious
24 allegation by Tom Curran. You would, I assume, consider it
25 a very serious allegation and something that should be
26 investigated straightaway?

27 A. Yes, and not knowing about this, Chairman, I certainly
28 would. But it definitely wasn't the conduit, and there
29 nearly has to be a paper trail, and, like, that would have
30 been gone through his Chief in Monaghan, but... yes.

1 227 Q. He says he didn't go through his Chief in Monaghan because
2 he went straight to the top with the information.

3

4 MR. MCGUINNESS: He said he never made a report of it.

5

6 MRS. LAVERTY: He didn't make a report, no. Instead of
7 criticising the way it was passed on, I'd like you to
8 address the seriousness of the message that was given.

9

10 MR. O'CALLAGHAN: I should just point out, Chairman, that
11 we dispute -- I know Mrs. Lavery says there hasn't been a
12 dispute -- my client disputes that this was actually said
13 by Mr. Curran, although he wasn't there. We say there is
14 no record of it. And I cross-examined Mr. Curran on this
15 and I put it to him that he was wrong.

16

17 CHAIRMAN: He gave his evidence clearly. He certainly did
18 not admit that he was wrong. He said clearly he remembers
19 going to Crime and Security and giving this message clearly
20 to Assistant Commissioner Crowley.

21

22 228 Q. MRS. LAVERTY: Can I just ask you, Mr. Jennings, for a
23 Border Superintendent in Monaghan to make a journey to pass
24 on information like that, he is trusting the person who
25 asked him to convey the message in the first place, isn't
26 he?

27 A. Of course, yeah.

28 229 Q. And he is going out on a limb in a second place, isn't he?

29 A. He is, of course. And I am not discrediting what Tom
30 Curran had said. But what I have to say, Chairman, is that

1 it was against all the protocols of how something should be
2 done and it should have been committed to writing at the
3 earliest possibility by him. That's -- they are the rules.
4 And I'm not in any way being -- in any way discrediting
5 Mr. Curran, but I'm just pointing out that this is my
6 experience and this is the -- these are the protocols that
7 are laid down and agreed by both forces as to how
8 intelligence should be handled, and, without doubt, in the
9 question about Mr. Crowley, from my experience, the first
10 thing Mr. Crowley would say is "give me a report on that".
11 That would be my experience. But I am not familiar with
12 all of this except exactly what you have outlined to me,
13 and yourself, Chairman.

14 230 Q. Of course. Did you say that the recipient, if told
15 verbally, would have to be -- it would have to be followed
16 on by writing, possibly delivered by hand, you said?

17 A. In -- like, something as serious as this would, without
18 doubt, if time permitted, shall we say, and that the person
19 who was the supposed suspect was going to do something
20 immediately, certainly it could be done verbally, but in
21 the norm, with something like this, I would imagine that it
22 should have been committed to writing before it came to the
23 notice of Headquarters, and again, at the risk of repeating
24 myself, the way to do it would be in to his Chief
25 Superintendent, but, then again, if it didn't go to the
26 Chief and if he brought it down direct, he would still have
27 to give a report, and, quite likely, I know the question I
28 would ask if I was the recipient at Headquarters, is, I'd
29 say, why did you leave your Chief out of the loop? Because
30 -- I suppose the most important thing is the content, but

1 there is a way to deal with these things to control them,
2 if I am explaining myself, Chairman.

3 231 Q. Can I come back to the role of the Assistant Commissioner
4 of Crime and Security --

5 A. Yes, mm-hmm.

6 232 Q. -- Mr. Eugene Crowley?

7 A. Mm-hmm.

8 233 Q. Wasn't his obligation to take a note and write down that
9 this had been reported to him?

10 A. Yes.

11 234 Q. Hadn't he an obligation?

12 A. Of course.

13 235 Q. It was a very serious allegation, be it correct or not, he
14 had an obligation to note it since Tom Curran had travelled
15 from Monaghan to pass it on?

16 A. Yes, and I don't disregard that. Of course, Chairman, if
17 something like that was told verbally across the desks, I
18 have no doubt.

19

20 CHAIRMAN: If he felt that it ought to be confirmed by a
21 report in writing by Superintendent Curran, he would
22 expect, would say, "well, I want to have that in writing".

23 A. Yes, and also make a note of it himself.

24

25 CHAIRMAN: But he appears not to have made any note of it
26 himself, and Superintendent Curran, in his evidence, didn't
27 say anything about being asked, he wasn't asked anything by
28 the Assistant Commissioner. His information was just
29 listened to, and no comment was made by the Assistant
30 Commissioner, and he certainly wasn't asked to put it in

1 writing.

2

3 MRS. LAVERTY: Can I ask you to --

4 A. Well, I'd be surprised at that.

5 236 Q. Sorry for interrupting.

6 A. I'd be very, very surprised at that, but...

7 237 Q. Can I ask you to consider the various options, that either
8 Assistant Commissioner Crowley didn't believe a word of it
9 and ignored it, is that possible, or would he still have
10 had to take a note of it?

11 A. No, Assistant Commissioner Crowley would not ignore that,
12 in my view and in my experience.

13 238 Q. Well, the next explanation then is that he suppressed the
14 information?

15 A. Well, what do you mean he "suppressed" it?

16 239 Q. Well, if he was the sort of person who wouldn't ignore it
17 and would have to take a note of it or take some record of
18 it, there isn't anything that we can find or that has been
19 made available to the Tribunal, so, therefore, whatever
20 information was there, was suppressed in some way or other,
21 or mislaid or lost, which seems highly unlikely as well?

22 A. Well, the man that I knew as Assistant Commissioner
23 Crowley, there is no way would he suppress something like
24 that.

25 240 Q. If he wasn't disposed to listen to Tom Curran or believe
26 the content of the message that had been said to him, is it
27 possible that, at a higher level, previously, that there
28 had been communication from the RUC which had been ignored
29 by Assistant Commissioner Crowley, and they thought that
30 perhaps this was a better way of doing it?

1 A. No, I just could not believe that, and, Chairman, from my
2 experience of Mr. Crowley, even if he didn't believe him,
3 it would be more the reason why he would say "give me a
4 report on that," because then at least he had a record of
5 what the gentleman was saying, and I'm not in any way
6 casting any doubt on Mr. Curran, but I have to say, with
7 both sides, that Mr. Crowley, he would have demanded a
8 report.

9 241 Q. You see, Mr. Jennings, it's another lost opportunity, if
10 you like, for Mr. Corrigan to clear up any rumours or any
11 allegations, that he doesn't believe him, if this matter
12 was aired then?

13

14 MR. O'CALLAGHAN: Mrs. Lavery has mentioned Mr. Corrigan.
15 Her whole cross-examination is built on an assumption that
16 this was definitely said by Mr. Curran to Mr. Crowley.
17 That is in dispute, Chairman. Simply because Mr. Curran
18 said it in his evidence and it can't be contradicted
19 because Mr. Crowley isn't alive, doesn't mean that we have
20 to accept it. The man can be wrong.

21

22 CHAIRMAN: If he was misleading the Tribunal --

23

24 MR. O'CALLAGHAN: He may not be misleading; he may just be
25 incorrect.

26

27 CHAIRMAN: Well, I can't see how anybody could be -- it
28 would seem to me that he was telling a story of what he did
29 and it seemed to me to be a very credible story. He said
30 that he actually drove to Dublin and drove to see Assistant

1 Commissioner Crowley, he said that. And nobody, really, on
2 behalf of An Garda Siochana, in cross-examination of him,
3 they haven't really shaken that evidence that he gave.

4

5 MR. O'CALLAGHAN: Although I did cross-examine him on it,
6 and it's a matter, obviously, for you, Chairman, to
7 determine what evidence is or is not accepted, but simply
8 because a witness gives evidence, doesn't mean that the
9 Tribunal has to accept it without hesitation or without
10 concern. There is a whole series of factors associated
11 with this evidence that places it under considerable doubt,
12 as to why no document was prepared in respect of it, as to
13 why there was no follow-up in respect of it, and issues
14 such as that. And an explanation that should be put to the
15 witness is that maybe Mr. Curran is mistaken in respect of
16 what he said. That's just an option that should be
17 considered by the Tribunal and, indeed, by Mrs. Lavery.

18

19 CHAIRMAN: Well...

20

21 MRS. LAVERTY: It's a matter --

22

23 CHAIRMAN: I think it's a matter for me in the last resort,
24 as to whether I believe Mr. Curran or whether I don't, but
25 most of his colleagues who have given evidence before this
26 Tribunal have spoken in very laudatory terms of
27 Superintendent Curran, and I think nobody has said that he
28 was telling a lie about that, or that he was mistaken.

29

30 MRS. LAVERTY: I think, in any event, your evidence,

1 Mr. Jennings, is that if this information was correct and
2 was accepted by Mr. Crowley and dealt with, that it would
3 never have got as far as you, when it came to selecting
4 people for this course, if there was any suggestion of
5 impropriety against any member about to participate in your
6 training course; it wouldn't have even got as far as you,
7 is that right?

8 A. I don't think he would have even been selected if there was
9 a doubt about the man.

10

11 MRS. LAVERTY: Thank you very much.

12

13 MR. DURACK: Sir, I should just draw the Tribunal's
14 attention to the fact that, in May of 1987, there was a
15 circular issued by Deputy Commissioner John Paul McMahon
16 dealing with the general threat to members of the RUC
17 travelling south, that there was a general warning, a
18 circular put out in relation to it, and that was, in fact,
19 related to information supplied by Mr. Curran, by
20 Superintendent Curran.

21

22 CHAIRMAN: I am aware of that circular.

23

24 MRS. LAVERTY: He distinguished that from the information
25 that he provided subsequently. He was asked about that.

26

27 MR. DURACK: I merely draw your attention to it, sir.

28

29 CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

30

1 MR. DURACK: There is another matter which I think I should
2 mention, which is in relation to the Cory Report, Judge
3 Cory's report. I think Mrs. Lavery referred to just one
4 item of intelligence as having been given to him. I think
5 it appears, from the list of papers that he was given, that
6 he was given all three of these items of intelligence,
7 which we have been discussing here today.

8
9 CHAIRMAN: Is that in the annex to the report?

10
11 MR. DURACK: So I believe. I think it's in the index.
12 Sorry, it's in the index to the documents which we provided
13 to Judge Cory, and the Tribunal has seen it.

14
15 MRS. LAVERTY: That concludes today's evidence, Chairman.

16
17 CHAIRMAN: Very good. Mr. Jennings, I am very grateful to
18 you for coming in to give evidence. Your help is greatly
19 appreciated.

20 A. You are very welcome, Chairman.

21
22 CHAIRMAN: Now, tomorrow is set aside for this witness
23 also, but, of course, he is finished now. That's that. So
24 we then wait for the next --

25
26 MRS. LAVERTY: Tuesday week, Chairman, the 7th of February.

27
28 CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

29
30

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

THE TRIBUNAL ADJOURNED UNTIL TUESDAY, THE 7TH OF FEBRUARY,
2012, AT 11 A.M.

	3	68:28, 69:20, 69:21 addition [1] - 54:11 address [3] - 60:6, 78:20, 86:8 addressed [3] - 16:29, 39:18, 62:10 ADJOURNED [2] - 67:10, 94:1 admit [1] - 86:18 admitted [1] - 84:13 advance [2] - 53:13, 74:27 adverse [5] - 43:23, 59:20, 80:3, 82:18, 82:23 AFTER [1] - 68:1 afternoon [1] - 41:15 afterwards [11] - 12:3, 12:25, 39:10, 51:24, 55:22, 58:9, 60:4, 60:7, 73:6, 80:29, 83:18 agencies [1] - 50:1 agency [1] - 50:10 ago [2] - 19:1, 45:28 agree [9] - 39:20, 42:6, 42:9, 43:24, 46:13, 48:24, 51:4, 51:18, 67:2 agreed [2] - 65:16, 87:7 agreement [6] - 44:21, 44:22, 55:15, 55:17, 75:12, 78:22 ahead [4] - 41:2, 41:8, 45:15, 73:21 aid [1] - 71:16 aim [1] - 37:15 air [1] - 74:2 aired [1] - 90:12 airport [2] - 52:28, 53:19 Airport [1] - 53:4 Alan [2] - 31:20, 31:27 alive [1] - 90:19 allegation [9] - 20:6, 27:26, 28:26, 39:22, 42:1, 84:25, 85:24, 85:25, 88:13 allegations [8] - 14:5, 24:10, 24:12, 24:13, 24:18, 32:13, 83:13, 90:11 alleged [3] - 46:17, 55:30, 69:4 allegedly [1] - 32:9 allocation [1] - 56:9 allowed [1] - 36:20 altered [1] - 41:5 ammunition [1] - 74:22 amount [7] - 23:29, 43:10, 43:25, 71:17, 73:1, 73:23, 74:18 amounts [4] - 42:27, 42:30, 43:3, 43:10 analyse [5] - 19:9, 39:28, 50:16, 51:7, 51:12 analysed [4] - 39:24, 69:2, 77:9, 79:14 analysis [9] - 10:30, 23:13, 27:20, 38:7, 38:8, 39:4, 51:22,	64:23, 65:7 analysts [1] - 11:17 annex [1] - 93:9 Answer [10] - 22:20, 66:2, 66:6, 66:10, 66:17, 66:20, 66:23, 66:26, 66:29, 67:7 answer [4] - 23:1, 45:11, 63:12, 65:30 answered [2] - 40:23, 48:4 answering [1] - 47:2 answering.. [1] - 78:25 anti [1] - 49:13 anti-IRA [1] - 49:13 anyway [1] - 64:16 apart [2] - 10:9, 45:8 appear [9] - 14:8, 14:20, 15:5, 21:22, 40:9, 45:22, 64:6, 79:18, 84:15 appeared [1] - 85:9 appointed [3] - 3:21, 12:6, 61:26 appointment [2] - 9:18, 36:4 appreciate [2] - 16:20, 24:30 appreciated [1] - 93:19 approach [2] - 81:1, 83:8 approached [1] - 67:3 April [1] - 10:27 area [28] - 4:7, 5:4, 5:17, 5:18, 6:19, 22:8, 34:13, 38:7, 42:21, 42:23, 43:27, 52:15, 53:12, 53:27, 54:2, 54:21, 55:14, 57:11, 59:28, 60:23, 70:18, 74:1, 74:5, 74:15, 78:23, 78:29, 81:7, 82:7 areas [5] - 5:25, 22:7, 42:24, 61:30, 74:21 arise [1] - 7:8 arising [2] - 24:11, 81:27 Arising [1] - 24:18 Armagh [1] - 42:21 armed [1] - 73:15 arms [3] - 5:4, 74:24 arms-dump [1] - 74:24 Army [1] - 5:28 arranged [5] - 24:12, 24:18, 52:16, 52:18, 52:29 arrangement [1] - 16:7 arrangements [1] - 36:15 array [1] - 65:2 arrival [1] - 53:13 article [5] - 8:22, 12:6, 12:19, 24:14, 63:15 articles [2] - 12:17, 12:18 AS [7] - 1:2, 2:2, 45:20, 52:7, 68:1, 68:4, 81:25 aside [1] - 93:22 assemble [2] - 44:4, 73:26 assigned [1] - 3:23 assist [5] - 9:7, 21:27,	32:18, 42:22, 55:2 assistance [2] - 53:28, 54:2 assistant [1] - 61:14 Assistant [21] - 3:28, 9:26, 10:27, 11:28, 16:29, 78:20, 80:26, 83:8, 84:30, 85:3, 85:7, 85:14, 86:20, 88:3, 88:28, 88:29, 89:8, 89:11, 89:22, 89:29, 90:30 assisted [3] - 4:25, 4:27, 25:4 assisting [2] - 84:18, 84:26 associate [1] - 84:11 associated [1] - 91:10 associating [3] - 57:5, 84:8, 84:9 association [2] - 84:15, 84:16 assume [4] - 23:21, 65:28, 66:7, 85:24 assumes [2] - 17:15, 30:20 assumption [1] - 90:15 astounded [1] - 17:17 AT [2] - 1:1, 94:2 attend [1] - 82:11 attended [3] - 9:25, 10:6, 33:30 attention [6] - 13:17, 25:16, 70:27, 70:29, 92:14, 92:27 auspices [1] - 11:24 available [6] - 9:9, 9:21, 13:1, 25:28, 57:16, 89:19 avoid [1] - 54:21 avoided [2] - 53:21, 53:22 aware [37] - 6:5, 7:10, 7:15, 23:30, 24:4, 24:9, 26:6, 26:14, 26:20, 26:21, 31:27, 32:12, 32:15, 33:10, 35:21, 37:6, 42:9, 46:30, 47:10, 47:12, 47:23, 48:1, 48:2, 48:5, 48:7, 49:8, 49:15, 49:21, 53:21, 56:9, 57:1, 61:15, 66:4, 73:13, 80:10, 85:21, 92:22 awful [2] - 10:6 awfulness [1] - 70:28
	4			
'82 [1] - 4:13 '83 [1] - 4:13 '85 [1] - 24:11 '87 [3] - 44:19, 83:10, 83:11 '88 [5] - 44:20, 44:29, 83:10, 83:11, 83:12 '89 [3] - 3:6, 44:30, 83:10 '90 [1] - 3:7 '91 [1] - 24:11 '95 [1] - 3:21 'bandit [1] - 73:30 'Slab' [1] - 31:23	333 [1] - 66:13 40 [2] - 48:1, 81:12 414 [1] - 65:26 441 [1] - 67:2 48 [1] - 65:26			
	5			
	54 [2] - 21:27, 45:26 542 [1] - 17:24 567 [2] - 15:16, 30:9			
1	6			
1 [1] - 65:10 11 [2] - 1:2, 94:2 131 [1] - 14:15 14 [1] - 83:29 14.3 [1] - 14:4 15 [2] - 35:6, 35:7 19 [2] - 5:3, 14:4 1973 [1] - 2:11 1978 [1] - 2:14 1981 [3] - 2:17, 4:10, 5:3 1982 [2] - 2:17, 4:10 1983 [1] - 5:3 1984 [1] - 2:26 1985 [3] - 55:30, 56:3, 57:4 1986 [1] - 2:29 1987 [4] - 83:8, 84:1, 84:2, 92:14 1988 [8] - 32:22, 32:24, 32:25, 44:30, 55:26, 59:20, 81:29, 83:9 1989 [2] - 3:4, 43:5 1990 [8] - 3:8, 3:9, 3:10, 17:24, 33:9, 33:15, 33:18 1991 [1] - 3:12 1992 [2] - 14:15, 67:5 1993 [1] - 66:15 1994 [2] - 3:18, 33:21 1995 [2] - 3:23, 49:8 1998 [2] - 3:25, 9:12 1st [1] - 10:27	61 [2] - 47:25, 48:1			
	7			
	7th [2] - 65:21, 93:26 7TH [1] - 94:1			
	8			
	84 [1] - 65:21 89 [1] - 66:13			
	A			
	A.M [2] - 1:2, 94:2 ability [1] - 72:3 able [6] - 20:21, 36:10, 43:16, 71:20, 73:3, 73:22 absolutely [27] - 7:25, 7:30, 14:2, 17:19, 26:25, 46:23, 50:22, 54:27, 54:29, 55:4, 55:15, 58:7, 58:23, 60:3, 60:17, 63:3, 64:5, 65:30, 66:6, 66:26, 69:24, 71:26, 72:2, 77:17, 82:24 ACC [2] - 21:13, 32:29 accept [2] - 90:20, 91:9 accepted [2] - 91:7, 92:2 access [10] - 13:21, 13:22, 14:1, 19:16, 25:5, 31:15, 42:28, 44:11, 61:17, 61:21 accident [1] - 14:6 accordance [1] - 2:9 account [1] - 80:18 acknowledge [1] - 85:4 acknowledged [1] - 85:8 acting [2] - 46:21, 47:5 action [3] - 17:3, 39:6, 79:15 actionable [1] - 51:14 actioned [3] - 58:17, 81:20 activities [1] - 3:2 activity [3] - 22:7, 71:15, 84:12 acts [1] - 48:23 actual [5] - 21:5, 52:27,			
2				
2 [1] - 65:11 20 [1] - 72:24 2000 [6] - 8:20, 10:27, 31:26, 32:7, 32:9, 48:3 2001 [2] - 3:28, 9:12 2005 [1] - 4:1 2008 [4] - 16:6, 18:5, 18:7, 49:4 2011 [2] - 56:6, 65:22 2012 [2] - 1:1, 94:2 2122 [1] - 30:6 236 [1] - 18:23 26TH [1] - 1:1 29 [2] - 65:22, 65:24 29th [1] - 83:29				
			B	
			backs [1] - 19:19 bad [3] - 27:29, 38:22, 38:24 bailiwick [1] - 34:27 balance [1] - 37:27 ballistics [1] - 73:12 Bandit [1] - 8:21 bank [4] - 2:23, 2:25, 2:26, 4:16 base [2] - 44:9, 72:29	

<p>based [11] - 2:14, 6:8, 16:2, 18:24, 30:17, 49:14, 54:4, 54:11, 55:22, 68:18, 68:21</p> <p>basic [1] - 54:16</p> <p>basis [7] - 10:9, 34:17, 55:24, 58:18, 69:16, 75:6, 75:8</p> <p>basis.. [1] - 38:26</p> <p>bat [1] - 20:21</p> <p>BE [1] - 68:3</p> <p>bear [2] - 19:14, 23:23</p> <p>became [2] - 69:30, 85:21</p> <p>become [1] - 58:21</p> <p>BEEN [1] - 2:1</p> <p>beforehand [1] - 42:29</p> <p>beginning [1] - 33:9</p> <p>behalf [1] - 91:2</p> <p>Belfast [1] - 77:18</p> <p>belief [1] - 8:6</p> <p>benefit [1] - 74:2</p> <p>best [1] - 64:26</p> <p>better [4] - 68:13, 75:11, 89:30</p> <p>between [7] - 5:3, 14:22, 14:28, 44:23, 55:17, 65:11, 83:10</p> <p>beyond [2] - 48:14, 84:18</p> <p>big [6] - 44:6, 55:20, 56:29, 60:8, 74:1, 74:4</p> <p>bigger [2] - 57:27, 74:16</p> <p>biggest [1] - 43:15</p> <p>bit [6] - 6:20, 19:26, 22:26, 42:16, 70:14, 75:15</p> <p>black [1] - 70:11</p> <p>Blair [1] - 4:29</p> <p>blow [1] - 8:13</p> <p>blown [1] - 61:3</p> <p>Bob [3] - 32:28, 35:10, 83:30</p> <p>bodyguard [1] - 36:16</p> <p>bones [1] - 20:8</p> <p>book [5] - 8:22, 12:5, 12:18, 63:10, 63:14</p> <p>boost [3] - 44:23, 55:18, 55:19</p> <p>border [44] - 4:15, 4:20, 4:27, 5:24, 5:25, 6:2, 6:18, 6:19, 8:1, 10:8, 33:23, 33:28, 33:29, 34:5, 34:11, 34:12, 34:27, 35:10, 35:20, 42:26, 44:15, 44:25, 44:26, 48:22, 53:10, 54:14, 55:19, 56:29, 57:17, 59:1, 71:15, 72:7, 72:19, 74:19, 76:17, 78:17, 78:23, 78:28, 82:13, 82:17, 83:27, 84:24</p> <p>Border [10] - 3:19, 33:1, 33:19, 34:15, 75:30, 76:18, 76:29, 83:15, 83:17, 86:23</p> <p>bottom [2] - 28:27, 66:13</p> <p>boys [1] - 56:1</p> <p>branch [4] - 13:9, 14:2,</p>	<p>25:27, 33:26</p> <p>Branch [26] - 3:21, 3:25, 3:26, 5:2, 11:13, 13:19, 15:2, 16:11, 16:15, 18:9, 18:17, 24:19, 32:17, 49:18, 49:23, 53:11, 57:14, 57:19, 59:4, 59:12, 76:6, 77:14, 77:15, 77:22, 81:7, 82:6</p> <p>Breen [13] - 15:17, 15:19, 15:25, 24:17, 25:13, 28:1, 28:21, 30:11, 31:21, 31:28, 32:7, 32:9, 72:8</p> <p>Brian [1] - 5:8</p> <p>briefing [1] - 81:9</p> <p>briefly [2] - 19:8, 81:28</p> <p>bring [2] - 55:13, 70:18</p> <p>bringing [3] - 5:19, 59:28, 68:30</p> <p>British [1] - 5:27</p> <p>broad [2] - 69:19, 75:23</p> <p>brought [5] - 16:7, 25:16, 44:9, 81:14, 87:26</p> <p>Buchanan [17] - 15:17, 15:19, 15:26, 24:17, 25:13, 28:1, 28:22, 30:11, 35:10, 72:7, 76:2, 76:20, 77:22, 79:2, 83:30, 84:15, 84:21</p> <p>Buchanan's [1] - 32:28</p> <p>build [3] - 21:3, 54:9, 54:28</p> <p>building [3] - 10:2, 20:29, 55:10</p> <p>built [1] - 90:15</p> <p>Bureau [1] - 61:8</p> <p>business [1] - 56:18</p> <p>but.. [4] - 18:18, 80:19, 85:30, 89:6</p> <p>BY [5] - 2:1, 45:19, 52:7, 68:3, 81:25</p> <p>Byrne [1] - 22:2</p>	<p>capacity [1] - 10:4</p> <p>car [3] - 54:20, 84:3, 84:4</p> <p>career.. [1] - 2:7</p> <p>careful [5] - 5:26, 16:19, 35:14, 35:15, 47:18</p> <p>carefully [1] - 37:28</p> <p>carried [11] - 10:30, 11:23, 11:24, 22:18, 27:20, 27:26, 40:13, 53:27, 54:2, 55:8, 74:19</p> <p>carry [12] - 20:20, 35:24, 36:3, 36:6, 36:10, 36:17, 36:20, 36:21, 42:25, 43:19, 82:26</p> <p>carrying [4] - 4:27, 26:7, 45:2, 82:30</p> <p>cars [3] - 53:10, 53:11, 61:2</p> <p>case [20] - 5:20, 14:8, 14:9, 14:12, 20:30, 21:2, 23:16, 40:11, 41:3, 41:8, 50:25, 55:10, 65:29, 66:22, 67:4, 68:18, 74:23, 79:26, 80:25</p> <p>cases [2] - 23:11, 36:13</p> <p>casting [1] - 90:6</p> <p>Castle [1] - 80:28</p> <p>caught [1] - 73:6</p> <p>caused [1] - 10:30</p> <p>Cavan [1] - 82:14</p> <p>Cavan-Monaghan [1] - 82:14</p> <p>caveat [3] - 5:5, 5:11, 5:17</p> <p>cell [1] - 44:7</p> <p>central [3] - 16:27, 44:9, 74:24</p> <p>certain [3] - 32:10, 35:26, 54:9</p> <p>certainly [22] - 9:24, 14:29, 21:5, 21:23, 23:1, 31:26, 32:20, 37:15, 41:12, 50:22, 50:26, 53:2, 55:29, 57:9, 72:23, 78:9, 80:9, 85:20, 85:27, 86:17, 87:20, 88:30</p> <p>cetera [1] - 56:24</p> <p>Chair [5] - 7:21, 26:5, 32:20, 46:5, 81:17</p> <p>Chairman [173] - 1:4, 2:13, 2:30, 3:5, 3:30, 4:7, 4:11, 4:29, 5:14, 5:24, 7:30, 9:2, 9:13, 9:17, 11:4, 11:27, 13:25, 14:29, 15:29, 16:20, 17:10, 17:17, 18:5, 18:30, 19:4, 20:9, 20:23, 20:29, 21:3, 21:15, 21:26, 22:25, 23:8, 24:4, 24:26, 25:17, 26:10, 26:15, 26:26, 27:5, 27:13, 28:3, 28:17, 29:17, 30:27, 31:3, 31:8, 31:25, 32:1, 32:14, 32:21, 32:24, 32:26,</p>	<p>33:5, 33:18, 33:21, 33:24, 35:4, 35:26, 36:12, 37:2, 37:10, 37:25, 38:7, 39:15, 39:20, 40:16, 40:21, 41:13, 41:19, 42:3, 42:14, 42:23, 43:25, 44:22, 45:28, 46:11, 46:16, 46:23, 46:24, 46:28, 46:30, 47:7, 47:12, 47:16, 47:17, 48:4, 48:9, 48:10, 48:17, 49:11, 49:16, 49:22, 49:30, 50:10, 50:30, 51:24, 52:22, 52:25, 53:9, 53:20, 53:25, 54:9, 55:4, 55:15, 56:10, 56:27, 57:7, 58:10, 58:26, 59:22, 60:17, 61:9, 61:12, 61:25, 63:9, 63:24, 63:27, 64:5, 64:17, 65:5, 68:9, 68:14, 68:20, 68:24, 68:27, 69:7, 69:11, 69:15, 69:19, 69:24, 70:2, 70:15, 71:1, 71:5, 72:10, 72:13, 72:26, 73:10, 73:13, 73:16, 73:28, 74:11, 74:26, 74:28, 75:5, 75:9, 75:15, 76:11, 77:23, 79:12, 79:20, 79:25, 80:9, 80:14, 82:2, 82:8, 82:24, 83:11, 85:12, 85:18, 85:27, 86:10, 86:30, 87:13, 88:2, 88:16, 90:1, 90:17, 91:6, 93:15, 93:20, 93:26</p> <p>CHAIRMAN [41] - 7:8, 7:28, 28:29, 29:12, 29:30, 32:3, 35:24, 36:1, 36:9, 36:24, 36:27, 36:30, 41:7, 41:15, 41:21, 45:17, 50:21, 52:4, 60:11, 63:5, 64:22, 65:10, 65:24, 76:16, 77:26, 78:13, 80:8, 80:21, 86:17, 88:20, 88:25, 90:22, 90:27, 91:19, 91:23, 92:22, 92:29, 93:9, 93:17, 93:22, 93:28</p> <p>Chairperson [1] - 60:19</p> <p>change [1] - 24:22</p> <p>changed [2] - 35:9, 40:17</p> <p>channelled [2] - 57:30, 75:26</p> <p>character [1] - 39:29</p> <p>charge [8] - 3:11, 3:15, 3:22, 7:4, 9:5, 25:20, 32:17, 40:15</p> <p>chasing [1] - 50:17</p> <p>chat [1] - 34:8</p> <p>chats [1] - 34:3</p> <p>check [7] - 24:12, 24:18,</p>	<p>30:8, 53:13, 54:20, 70:6, 70:7</p> <p>checked [1] - 49:23</p> <p>checking [2] - 8:28, 61:22</p> <p>chief [3] - 10:7, 16:10, 55:17</p> <p>Chief [42] - 3:25, 6:9, 9:7, 9:11, 9:17, 12:8, 16:23, 16:30, 31:20, 34:2, 34:30, 52:27, 52:30, 56:13, 57:14, 57:18, 58:27, 59:7, 59:10, 59:11, 59:14, 60:20, 60:21, 75:19, 76:3, 78:5, 78:16, 78:18, 78:20, 80:27, 81:8, 82:5, 82:10, 83:19, 85:19, 85:30, 86:1, 87:24, 87:26, 87:29</p> <p>chiefs [1] - 57:17</p> <p>circuiting [1] - 57:23</p> <p>circular [3] - 92:15, 92:18, 92:22</p> <p>circulate [1] - 38:23</p> <p>city [2] - 3:2, 58:30</p> <p>claiming [1] - 69:27</p> <p>clear [13] - 12:9, 12:30, 24:6, 25:25, 26:5, 39:15, 53:13, 57:7, 63:16, 63:17, 63:18, 65:6, 90:10</p> <p>clearly [3] - 86:17, 86:18, 86:19</p> <p>client [1] - 86:12</p> <p>close [6] - 42:26, 44:14, 75:6, 75:9, 80:5</p> <p>clothes [1] - 6:18</p> <p>cloud [3] - 39:17, 39:21, 56:20</p> <p>code [1] - 13:11</p> <p>codes [1] - 13:6</p> <p>COFFEY [1] - 51:28</p> <p>coin [2] - 8:13, 20:7</p> <p>coined [1] - 10:28</p> <p>collating [1] - 58:29</p> <p>collators [1] - 34:3</p> <p>colleague [1] - 36:2</p> <p>colleagues [2] - 43:20, 91:25</p> <p>collected [1] - 74:25</p> <p>colluding [1] - 27:30</p> <p>collusion [14] - 8:25, 9:16, 10:11, 10:17, 17:8, 24:10, 24:20, 25:10, 25:12, 25:13, 25:21, 27:4, 27:11, 27:12</p> <p>combatting [1] - 4:16</p> <p>comfortable [1] - 25:14</p> <p>coming [12] - 5:28, 6:19, 11:12, 16:11, 16:14, 19:24, 40:6, 52:25, 72:29, 77:21, 84:24, 93:18</p> <p>command [1] - 70:4</p> <p>comment [2] - 7:18, 88:29</p> <p>Commissioner [30] -</p>
C				
<p>border [44] - 4:15, 4:20, 4:27, 5:24, 5:25, 6:2, 6:18, 6:19, 8:1, 10:8, 33:23, 33:28, 33:29, 34:5, 34:11, 34:12, 34:27, 35:10, 35:20, 42:26, 44:15, 44:25, 44:26, 48:22, 53:10, 54:14, 55:19, 56:29, 57:17, 59:1, 71:15, 72:7, 72:19, 74:19, 76:17, 78:17, 78:23, 78:28, 82:13, 82:17, 83:27, 84:24</p> <p>Border [10] - 3:19, 33:1, 33:19, 34:15, 75:30, 76:18, 76:29, 83:15, 83:17, 86:23</p> <p>bottom [2] - 28:27, 66:13</p> <p>boys [1] - 56:1</p> <p>branch [4] - 13:9, 14:2,</p>	<p>Cabra [2] - 3:4, 16:2</p> <p>Canon [32] - 8:19, 8:20, 9:7, 9:17, 9:22, 11:25, 11:30, 12:6, 12:25, 13:10, 13:20, 14:1, 15:10, 15:13, 17:13, 24:9, 24:27, 25:7, 25:18, 26:7, 26:20, 26:27, 27:2, 31:6, 31:14, 31:19, 47:23, 48:3, 56:8, 61:7, 61:22</p> <p>Canon's [1] - 27:7</p> <p>Canon-Kirwan [9] - 8:19, 15:10, 15:13, 24:9, 25:7, 27:2, 31:6, 31:19, 56:8</p> <p>capabilities [2] - 44:24, 72:2</p> <p>capability [3] - 55:19, 55:20, 72:14</p>	<p>caused [1] - 10:30</p> <p>Cavan [1] - 82:14</p> <p>Cavan-Monaghan [1] - 82:14</p> <p>caveat [3] - 5:5, 5:11, 5:17</p> <p>cell [1] - 44:7</p> <p>central [3] - 16:27, 44:9, 74:24</p> <p>certain [3] - 32:10, 35:26, 54:9</p> <p>certainly [22] - 9:24, 14:29, 21:5, 21:23, 23:1, 31:26, 32:20, 37:15, 41:12, 50:22, 50:26, 53:2, 55:29, 57:9, 72:23, 78:9, 80:9, 85:20, 85:27, 86:17, 87:20, 88:30</p> <p>cetera [1] - 56:24</p> <p>Chair [5] - 7:21, 26:5, 32:20, 46:5, 81:17</p> <p>Chairman [173] - 1:4, 2:13, 2:30, 3:5, 3:30, 4:7, 4:11, 4:29, 5:14, 5:24, 7:30, 9:2, 9:13, 9:17, 11:4, 11:27, 13:25, 14:29, 15:29, 16:20, 17:10, 17:17, 18:5, 18:30, 19:4, 20:9, 20:23, 20:29, 21:3, 21:15, 21:26, 22:25, 23:8, 24:4, 24:26, 25:17, 26:10, 26:15, 26:26, 27:5, 27:13, 28:3, 28:17, 29:17, 30:27, 31:3, 31:8, 31:25, 32:1, 32:14, 32:21, 32:24, 32:26,</p>	<p>33:5, 33:18, 33:21, 33:24, 35:4, 35:26, 36:12, 37:2, 37:10, 37:25, 38:7, 39:15, 39:20, 40:16, 40:21, 41:13, 41:19, 42:3, 42:14, 42:23, 43:25, 44:22, 45:28, 46:11, 46:16, 46:23, 46:24, 46:28, 46:30, 47:7, 47:12, 47:16, 47:17, 48:4, 48:9, 48:10, 48:17, 49:11, 49:16, 49:22, 49:30, 50:10, 50:30, 51:24, 52:22, 52:25, 53:9, 53:20, 53:25, 54:9, 55:4, 55:15, 56:10, 56:27, 57:7, 58:10, 58:26, 59:22, 60:17, 61:9, 61:12, 61:25, 63:9, 63:24, 63:27, 64:5, 64:17, 65:5, 68:9, 68:14, 68:20, 68:24, 68:27, 69:7, 69:11, 69:15, 69:19, 69:24, 70:2, 70:15, 71:1, 71:5, 72:10, 72:13, 72:26, 73:10, 73:13, 73:16, 73:28, 74:11, 74:26, 74:28, 75:5, 75:9, 75:15, 76:11, 77:23, 79:12, 79:20, 79:25, 80:9, 80:14, 82:2, 82:8, 82:24, 83:11, 85:12, 85:18, 85:27, 86:10, 86:30, 87:13, 88:2, 88:16, 90:1, 90:17, 91:6, 93:15, 93:20, 93:26</p> <p>CHAIRMAN [41] - 7:8, 7:28, 28:29, 29:12, 29:30, 32:3, 35:24, 36:1, 36:9, 36:24, 36:27, 36:30, 41:7, 41:15, 41:21, 45:17, 50:21, 52:4, 60:11, 63:5, 64:22, 65:10, 65:24, 76:16, 77:26, 78:13, 80:8, 80:21, 86:17, 88:20, 88:25, 90:22, 90:27, 91:19, 91:23, 92:22, 92:29, 93:9, 93:17, 93:22, 93:28</p> <p>Chairperson [1] - 60:19</p> <p>change [1] - 24:22</p> <p>changed [2] - 35:9, 40:17</p> <p>channelled [2] - 57:30, 75:26</p> <p>character [1] - 39:29</p> <p>charge [8] - 3:11, 3:15, 3:22, 7:4, 9:5, 25:20, 32:17, 40:15</p> <p>chasing [1] - 50:17</p> <p>chat [1] - 34:8</p> <p>chats [1] - 34:3</p> <p>check [7] - 24:12, 24:18,</p>	<p>30:8, 53:13, 54:20, 70:6, 70:7</p> <p>checked [1] - 49:23</p> <p>checking [2] - 8:28, 61:22</p> <p>chief [3] - 10:7, 16:10, 55:17</p> <p>Chief [42] - 3:25, 6:9, 9:7, 9:11, 9:17, 12:8, 16:23, 16:30, 31:20, 34:2, 34:30, 52:27, 52:30, 56:13, 57:14, 57:18, 58:27, 59:7, 59:10, 59:11, 59:14, 60:20, 60:21, 75:19, 76:3, 78:5, 78:16, 78:18, 78:20, 80:27, 81:8, 82:5, 82:10, 83:19, 85:19, 85:30, 86:1, 87:24, 87:26, 87:29</p> <p>chiefs [1] - 57:17</p> <p>circuiting [1] - 57:23</p> <p>circular [3] - 92:15, 92:18, 92:22</p> <p>circulate [1] - 38:23</p> <p>city [2] - 3:2, 58:30</p> <p>claiming [1] - 69:27</p> <p>clear [13] - 12:9, 12:30, 24:6, 25:25, 26:5, 39:15, 53:13, 57:7, 63:16, 63:17, 63:18, 65:6, 90:10</p> <p>clearly [3] - 86:17, 86:18, 86:19</p> <p>client [1] - 86:12</p> <p>close [6] - 42:26, 44:14, 75:6, 75:9, 80:5</p> <p>clothes [1] - 6:18</p> <p>cloud [3] - 39:17, 39:21, 56:20</p> <p>code [1] - 13:11</p> <p>codes [1] - 13:6</p> <p>COFFEY [1] - 51:28</p> <p>coin [2] - 8:13, 20:7</p> <p>coined [1] - 10:28</p> <p>collating [1] - 58:29</p> <p>collators [1] - 34:3</p> <p>colleague [1] - 36:2</p> <p>colleagues [2] - 43:20, 91:25</p> <p>collected [1] - 74:25</p> <p>colluding [1] - 27:30</p> <p>collusion [14] - 8:25, 9:16, 10:11, 10:17, 17:8, 24:10, 24:20, 25:10, 25:12, 25:13, 25:21, 27:4, 27:11, 27:12</p> <p>combatting [1] - 4:16</p> <p>comfortable [1] - 25:14</p> <p>coming [12] - 5:28, 6:19, 11:12, 16:11, 16:14, 19:24, 40:6, 52:25, 72:29, 77:21, 84:24, 93:18</p> <p>command [1] - 70:4</p> <p>comment [2] - 7:18, 88:29</p> <p>Commissioner [30] -</p>

<p>3:29, 9:18, 9:26, 10:27, 11:7, 11:29, 12:4, 16:30, 26:20, 61:27, 63:11, 78:21, 79:30, 80:26, 80:29, 83:8, 84:30, 85:3, 85:7, 85:14, 86:20, 88:3, 88:28, 88:30, 89:8, 89:11, 89:22, 89:29, 91:1, 92:15</p> <p>Commissioner's [4] - 12:3, 12:21, 63:13, 83:6</p> <p>committed [4] - 8:26, 81:2, 87:2, 87:22</p> <p>communicated [3] - 16:10, 57:6, 58:5</p> <p>communication [3] - 78:10, 79:22, 89:28</p> <p>communications [1] - 76:9</p> <p>completed [1] - 27:7</p> <p>completely [2] - 30:19, 40:24</p> <p>completing [1] - 60:9</p> <p>compromised [1] - 43:17</p> <p>computer [3] - 12:26, 12:29, 13:5</p> <p>concern [6] - 11:6, 30:17, 32:5, 37:10, 76:6, 91:10</p> <p>concerned [4] - 15:4, 35:18, 38:28, 84:9</p> <p>concerns [6] - 26:30, 31:21, 31:29, 32:8, 32:10, 35:2</p> <p>concluded [1] - 13:20</p> <p>concludes [1] - 93:15</p> <p>conclusion [2] - 27:2, 27:3</p> <p>conducted [1] - 22:21</p> <p>conducting [1] - 48:3</p> <p>conduit [2] - 6:6, 85:28</p> <p>conference [1] - 34:8</p> <p>conferences [1] - 10:6</p> <p>confirm [1] - 24:19</p> <p>confirmed [2] - 20:18, 88:20</p> <p>conjunction [1] - 2:21</p> <p>connection [3] - 14:22, 14:28, 29:21</p> <p>consider [3] - 20:1, 85:24, 89:7</p> <p>considerable [1] - 91:11</p> <p>considered [5] - 79:4, 84:23, 85:16, 85:23, 91:17</p> <p>consist [1] - 33:22</p> <p>consisted [1] - 73:9</p> <p>consistent [1] - 28:5</p> <p>constable [2] - 4:30, 5:1</p> <p>Constable [1] - 52:27</p> <p>constables [1] - 55:17</p> <p>constant [1] - 69:12</p> <p>contact [34] - 8:7, 9:4, 15:18, 15:25, 17:26, 18:9, 18:26, 29:28, 30:10, 30:12, 37:27, 37:30, 38:16, 40:23, 44:16, 44:18, 45:2,</p>	<p>46:6, 47:27, 53:22, 54:15, 54:18, 56:30, 60:21, 60:24, 60:27, 61:23, 66:21, 66:27, 69:5, 69:9, 69:28, 77:14, 77:18</p> <p>contacts [11] - 24:1, 29:23, 46:7, 46:8, 54:26, 55:1, 64:7, 70:6, 70:7, 83:2, 84:14</p> <p>contained [2] - 17:14, 24:21</p> <p>contains [1] - 51:3</p> <p>content [5] - 42:10, 51:6, 62:12, 87:30, 89:26</p> <p>context [2] - 67:3, 76:18</p> <p>CONTINUED [2] - 68:1, 68:3</p> <p>contradict [1] - 27:18</p> <p>contradicted [1] - 90:18</p> <p>contradiction [1] - 59:25</p> <p>contradicts [1] - 19:19</p> <p>control [2] - 42:16, 88:1</p> <p>controlled [1] - 43:4</p> <p>conversation [2] - 33:9, 49:11</p> <p>convey [3] - 76:6, 76:7, 86:25</p> <p>conveyed [10] - 14:16, 14:24, 32:28, 40:5, 40:14, 40:18, 42:1, 42:7, 76:16, 76:18</p> <p>convicted [2] - 47:16, 47:19</p> <p>cooperation [1] - 9:30</p> <p>copy [3] - 2:12, 11:13, 33:4</p> <p>correct [26] - 2:8, 2:16, 2:20, 2:30, 3:5, 3:17, 3:30, 4:3, 4:11, 4:15, 8:29, 9:13, 11:3, 16:16, 36:28, 37:9, 48:14, 48:30, 60:17, 61:12, 62:24, 68:24, 77:11, 83:26, 88:13, 92:1</p> <p>correctly [1] - 64:20</p> <p>corrigan [1] - 90:14</p> <p>Corrigan [23] - 14:6, 14:7, 14:18, 40:4, 40:7, 44:17, 44:28, 45:23, 48:27, 48:30, 49:7, 49:13, 55:25, 56:4, 56:20, 59:19, 81:30, 82:19, 84:8, 84:11, 84:17, 85:15, 90:10</p> <p>corroborate [1] - 19:18</p> <p>corroborating [1] - 64:4</p> <p>Cory [6] - 17:24, 30:19, 30:28, 64:10, 93:2, 93:13</p> <p>Cory's [2] - 30:4, 93:3</p> <p>counsel [9] - 25:23, 26:19, 38:18, 42:12, 42:19, 49:8, 50:26, 54:18, 83:6</p> <p>counterpart [1] - 83:30</p> <p>counterparts [1] - 34:12</p> <p>Country [1] - 8:21</p>	<p>country [13] - 6:1, 10:8, 13:3, 13:15, 17:6, 38:11, 47:1, 47:18, 48:26, 57:12, 57:18, 75:26, 78:18</p> <p>country' [1] - 73:30</p> <p>countryside [1] - 74:18</p> <p>couple [6] - 10:2, 19:1, 45:23, 52:11, 52:12, 72:7</p> <p>coupled [1] - 55:6</p> <p>course [48] - 9:15, 16:8, 23:28, 35:28, 45:17, 46:16, 49:4, 49:5, 51:7, 51:19, 55:28, 56:11, 56:16, 56:17, 56:21, 56:23, 59:6, 59:19, 59:24, 66:2, 66:10, 70:26, 71:9, 71:12, 72:5, 77:9, 77:13, 79:16, 81:30, 82:3, 82:5, 82:16, 82:20, 82:23, 82:25, 82:28, 83:3, 83:9, 85:15, 85:22, 86:27, 86:29, 87:14, 88:12, 88:16, 92:4, 92:6, 93:23</p> <p>courses [3] - 44:28, 54:14, 82:16</p> <p>Court [2] - 45:5, 48:28</p> <p>court [9] - 14:12, 14:20, 40:9, 40:11, 49:2, 50:30, 65:29, 66:21</p> <p>courts [1] - 53:19</p> <p>cover [1] - 15:22</p> <p>coverage [6] - 22:30, 23:28, 23:29, 23:30, 24:3, 24:5</p> <p>covert [2] - 54:23, 61:1</p> <p>craft [4] - 56:17, 56:24, 82:26, 82:30</p> <p>credible [1] - 90:29</p> <p>crime [1] - 4:19</p> <p>Crime [17] - 3:13, 27:1, 32:29, 58:22, 58:24, 59:4, 59:5, 59:9, 59:21, 61:16, 77:16, 77:27, 78:13, 78:19, 84:30, 86:19, 88:4</p> <p>Criminal [3] - 45:5, 48:28, 61:8</p> <p>criminal [2] - 4:8, 14:4</p> <p>criteria [2] - 13:4, 82:4</p> <p>critical [1] - 27:20</p> <p>criticising [1] - 86:7</p> <p>cross [9] - 25:1, 66:12, 81:27, 82:3, 83:7, 86:14, 90:15, 91:2, 91:5</p> <p>CROSS [3] - 45:19, 52:7, 68:3</p> <p>cross-examination [6] - 66:12, 81:27, 82:3, 83:7, 90:15, 91:2</p> <p>cross-examine [1] - 91:5</p> <p>cross-examined [1] - 86:14</p> <p>CROSS-EXAMINED [3] - 45:19, 52:7, 68:3</p>	<p>crossing [4] - 35:10, 35:14, 35:19, 72:7</p> <p>crossroads [1] - 7:29</p> <p>Crowley [21] - 80:26, 81:20, 83:8, 84:30, 85:3, 85:7, 85:14, 86:20, 87:9, 87:10, 88:6, 89:8, 89:11, 89:23, 89:29, 90:2, 90:7, 90:16, 90:19, 91:1, 92:2</p> <p>Crown [1] - 38:18</p> <p>Curran [28] - 32:21, 33:1, 77:20, 78:14, 79:27, 80:16, 83:7, 83:15, 83:24, 84:6, 85:8, 85:24, 86:13, 86:14, 86:30, 87:5, 88:14, 88:21, 88:26, 89:25, 90:6, 90:16, 90:17, 91:15, 91:24, 91:27, 92:19, 92:20</p>	<p>demand [1] - 79:7</p> <p>demanded [1] - 90:7</p> <p>department [5] - 10:22, 11:5, 11:9, 13:19, 31:11</p> <p>Department [1] - 27:1</p> <p>departments [1] - 9:27</p> <p>depth [1] - 50:16</p> <p>Deputy [1] - 92:15</p> <p>deputy [2] - 4:30, 5:1</p> <p>Dermot [1] - 1:5</p> <p>DERMOT [2] - 2:1, 68:3</p> <p>described [1] - 14:15</p> <p>description [1] - 14:10</p> <p>deservedly [1] - 38:22</p> <p>designated [1] - 61:14</p> <p>desks [1] - 88:17</p> <p>despite [2] - 34:9, 71:14</p> <p>detail [1] - 80:17</p> <p>detailed [3] - 39:4, 40:15, 43:27</p> <p>detailing [1] - 10:18</p> <p>details [3] - 16:18, 29:30, 57:1</p> <p>detective [14] - 4:23, 6:11, 6:24, 6:26, 6:28, 7:2, 16:10, 33:26, 36:5, 36:10, 37:29, 61:18, 61:19</p> <p>Detective [22] - 2:15, 2:24, 3:11, 3:15, 3:21, 3:23, 14:5, 14:17, 16:23, 17:1, 40:6, 45:22, 53:1, 53:11, 56:14, 59:15, 80:28, 82:12, 84:7, 84:11, 84:17</p> <p>detectives [3] - 6:12, 7:2, 36:5</p> <p>determine [2] - 51:23, 91:7</p> <p>detering [1] - 70:8</p> <p>detrimental [1] - 57:2</p> <p>develop [7] - 20:7, 21:8, 28:7, 39:12, 50:24, 51:25, 68:17</p> <p>developed [1] - 28:11</p> <p>difference [3] - 40:29, 67:6, 67:7</p> <p>different [25] - 4:19, 4:28, 9:27, 11:18, 13:14, 18:20, 20:12, 20:13, 34:7, 35:24, 41:24, 44:15, 49:28, 50:8, 62:28, 64:7, 64:8, 66:16, 70:19, 71:28, 72:27, 73:2, 73:17, 73:18</p> <p>differentiating [1] - 63:1</p> <p>difficult [5] - 42:23, 43:27, 44:1, 44:4, 74:5</p> <p>difficulty [1] - 50:3</p> <p>dig [3] - 27:16, 63:13, 64:3</p> <p>direct [8] - 35:16, 54:15, 57:13, 66:4, 70:28, 83:21, 87:26</p> <p>directed [2] - 21:24, 41:24</p>
D				
			<p>damage [1] - 70:12</p> <p>Dan [1] - 33:7</p> <p>dangers [1] - 19:23</p> <p>date [4] - 11:10, 18:11, 18:12, 66:30</p> <p>day-to-day [1] - 36:25</p> <p>days [4] - 11:10, 44:16, 60:26, 83:23</p> <p>daytime [1] - 43:22</p> <p>deal [9] - 20:27, 34:23, 41:25, 57:24, 63:25, 73:22, 76:13, 77:9, 88:1</p> <p>dealing [8] - 20:24, 23:23, 37:7, 42:5, 61:28, 81:4, 82:26, 92:16</p> <p>dealings [5] - 10:7, 30:27, 45:7, 48:29, 83:21</p> <p>dealt [16] - 5:8, 10:8, 18:16, 18:17, 23:12, 31:11, 34:29, 39:24, 40:17, 42:11, 42:15, 61:20, 75:19, 75:30, 79:6, 92:2</p> <p>December [3] - 3:10, 3:23, 40:11</p> <p>decide [2] - 38:24, 51:13</p> <p>decided [3] - 71:8, 79:15, 84:28</p> <p>decision [3] - 12:4, 12:22, 71:13</p> <p>decisions [1] - 20:13</p> <p>deemed [1] - 38:11</p> <p>deep [3] - 27:16, 64:23, 65:7</p> <p>deeper [2] - 63:13, 64:3</p> <p>defendant [2] - 14:18, 40:7</p> <p>definitely [3] - 57:26, 85:28, 90:16</p> <p>deflect [1] - 70:27</p> <p>delegated [1] - 25:3</p> <p>delivered [2] - 78:8, 87:16</p> <p>delivery [1] - 43:6</p>	

<p>directing [1] - 9:6 direction [5] - 4:21, 4:23, 25:26, 80:8, 84:21 directly [2] - 5:8, 77:26 discovered [1] - 56:6 discrediting [2] - 86:29, 87:4 discussed [1] - 84:25 discussing [1] - 93:7 discussion [1] - 42:16 discussions [2] - 8:23, 42:20 dismiss [1] - 27:21 dismissing [1] - 19:30 dismissive [1] - 30:25 disposal [1] - 12:8 dispose [2] - 43:17, 71:21 disposed [1] - 89:25 dispute [4] - 65:17, 86:11, 86:12, 90:17 disputes [1] - 86:12 disregard [1] - 88:16 distanced [1] - 68:28 distinctly [1] - 41:2 distinguished [1] - 92:24 distributed [1] - 74:25 district [1] - 52:10 ditches [1] - 44:14 division [5] - 54:14, 60:27, 68:19, 68:21, 82:9 Divisional [1] - 2:22 divisions [9] - 4:27, 6:2, 44:25, 44:26, 45:10, 75:25, 78:17, 82:13, 82:17 Document [3] - 14:15, 18:23, 30:9 document [29] - 11:11, 11:14, 11:19, 11:20, 14:12, 15:1, 15:16, 16:9, 16:22, 16:26, 17:23, 17:24, 18:3, 18:5, 18:8, 18:10, 18:12, 18:20, 18:23, 20:1, 20:4, 22:3, 22:27, 27:21, 27:23, 30:28, 33:4, 75:16, 91:12 documents [17] - 15:8, 15:9, 15:12, 16:4, 18:14, 18:29, 21:28, 22:9, 24:22, 28:9, 30:29, 45:27, 45:29, 45:30, 61:20, 68:14, 93:12 domain [1] - 15:11 done [34] - 8:11, 11:10, 11:14, 11:17, 11:29, 12:19, 13:9, 20:16, 21:12, 21:21, 22:8, 26:3, 27:25, 28:23, 29:4, 35:7, 37:20, 38:1, 40:26, 44:10, 45:8, 46:27, 54:14, 55:17, 57:12, 60:7, 64:23, 77:1, 78:22, 81:16, 82:16, 87:2, 87:20 Donegal [2] - 52:15,</p>	<p>82:14 double [7] - 17:25, 18:24, 19:26, 30:12, 30:17, 47:27, 64:10 doubled [1] - 55:24 doubt [51] - 8:9, 14:30, 15:3, 17:10, 17:12, 18:17, 19:4, 19:5, 20:1, 21:15, 21:20, 23:2, 23:8, 24:2, 26:2, 26:23, 26:29, 27:15, 27:22, 31:10, 47:7, 47:19, 48:9, 50:11, 53:20, 55:27, 56:11, 56:15, 56:20, 58:13, 59:23, 63:12, 64:17, 64:24, 64:26, 68:15, 71:5, 72:26, 73:16, 74:16, 75:28, 76:12, 77:30, 79:12, 81:19, 87:8, 87:18, 88:18, 90:6, 91:11, 92:9 down [27] - 6:9, 16:7, 29:20, 34:16, 34:20, 35:19, 47:9, 52:13, 52:26, 52:27, 52:30, 53:19, 54:18, 56:15, 58:1, 58:8, 58:27, 59:13, 59:14, 59:17, 70:19, 72:29, 87:7, 87:26, 88:8 downplayed [1] - 30:24 DPP [1] - 14:7 draft [1] - 18:6 drag [1] - 21:11 draw [2] - 92:13, 92:27 drawn [2] - 75:16, 77:8 drift [1] - 8:3 drove [3] - 84:4, 90:30 Dublin [10] - 5:9, 53:4, 54:4, 77:15, 77:16, 77:28, 80:28, 84:4, 84:23, 90:30 due [1] - 35:5 dump [1] - 74:24 Dundalk [33] - 5:5, 5:10, 6:10, 8:7, 15:19, 15:26, 17:29, 30:15, 31:22, 46:26, 47:2, 48:22, 52:10, 52:13, 53:3, 53:18, 53:21, 53:22, 53:27, 53:28, 54:2, 56:12, 57:11, 59:11, 59:16, 68:23, 70:21, 70:27, 72:8, 72:28, 79:3, 79:9, 84:8 DURACK [19] - 29:9, 29:19, 45:14, 52:7, 52:9, 60:13, 64:29, 68:4, 68:6, 77:13, 78:27, 80:3, 80:16, 80:23, 81:23, 92:13, 92:27, 93:1, 93:11 Durack [1] - 52:4 during [8] - 3:6, 13:26, 24:11, 43:30, 44:1, 44:13, 52:12, 65:12 duties [5] - 3:1, 4:12,</p>	<p>4:20, 33:22, 33:25 duty [1] - 3:1</p> <p style="text-align: center;">E</p> <p>earliest [1] - 87:3 early [3] - 34:10, 40:2, 45:3 easy [4] - 8:3, 39:28, 42:28, 44:11 effect [1] - 57:28 effectively [3] - 14:9, 14:22, 35:9 efforts [1] - 41:25 eight [3] - 44:27, 54:13, 62:27 eighties [1] - 45:3 either [12] - 4:13, 26:7, 26:9, 34:1, 58:10, 58:13, 59:7, 69:14, 72:29, 76:13, 76:14, 89:7 either/or [1] - 78:21 elaborate [1] - 39:16 element [1] - 66:30 elements [1] - 35:21 emergency [3] - 75:17, 75:18, 77:2 Emergency [4] - 2:27, 3:12, 53:7, 53:29 emphasising [2] - 72:30, 73:5 employed [2] - 3:14, 70:20 empt [1] - 12:21 en [1] - 73:4 end [9] - 10:12, 24:4, 25:9, 27:2, 29:5, 50:17, 50:25, 69:18 ended [1] - 4:30 ensue [1] - 20:26 equally [3] - 70:11, 70:26, 74:8 equate [2] - 49:26, 50:7 equipment [2] - 74:30, 75:2 equivalent [1] - 50:21 escape [4] - 43:14, 71:19, 73:6, 75:4 escort [4] - 36:20, 53:3, 53:18 escorted [1] - 52:20 escorts [6] - 4:18, 4:19, 37:20, 52:13, 52:16, 53:3 essentially [1] - 64:11 establish [1] - 19:15 et [1] - 56:24 Eugene [1] - 88:6 evade [1] - 26:10 event [4] - 66:14, 73:20, 84:12, 91:30 events [2] - 77:14, 84:29 eventually [4] - 24:1, 24:5, 46:9, 50:25 evidence [73] - 4:29, 9:23, 10:11, 10:16, 10:22, 10:29, 11:16,</p>	<p>11:21, 12:13, 12:14, 12:20, 21:28, 21:30, 23:13, 23:15, 24:20, 25:9, 25:21, 26:13, 27:4, 27:5, 27:10, 28:4, 29:21, 29:26, 31:13, 32:21, 32:27, 40:22, 45:24, 45:25, 45:28, 47:8, 47:24, 48:1, 48:7, 48:12, 49:12, 49:14, 49:16, 49:19, 49:26, 50:8, 50:21, 50:25, 50:29, 53:2, 53:17, 56:1, 60:2, 63:6, 66:5, 66:30, 68:13, 73:18, 76:2, 76:5, 77:28, 83:14, 83:29, 85:6, 86:17, 88:26, 90:18, 91:3, 91:7, 91:8, 91:11, 91:25, 91:30, 93:15, 93:18 evidence [1] - 62:15 evidence/information/intelligence [1] - 50:13 evident [1] - 28:8 evidential [1] - 12:23 exact [1] - 79:6 exactly [7] - 31:1, 55:16, 65:2, 72:13, 72:17, 72:20, 87:12 examination [8] - 51:22, 66:12, 81:27, 81:28, 82:3, 83:7, 90:15, 91:2 examine [7] - 24:28, 25:24, 38:1, 39:27, 61:27, 61:29, 91:5 examined [2] - 17:13, 86:14 EXAMINED [5] - 2:1, 45:19, 52:7, 68:3, 81:25 example [5] - 14:3, 15:7, 34:15, 47:11, 75:18 examples [2] - 39:2, 71:29 except [1] - 87:12 exchange [4] - 75:10, 75:22, 76:24, 77:7 excluded [1] - 5:10 existed [1] - 46:14 existence [1] - 25:11 expanded [1] - 82:3 expect [8] - 9:14, 28:6, 57:6, 58:5, 58:21, 80:24, 81:15, 88:22 expected [1] - 14:25 experience [21] - 23:22, 38:8, 46:5, 46:18, 47:3, 48:29, 49:27, 71:3, 74:11, 77:19, 78:8, 81:4, 81:7, 81:13, 81:17, 81:21, 87:6, 87:9, 87:11, 89:12, 90:2 experienced [2] - 13:2, 84:27 experts [2] - 51:12, 51:22 explain [6] - 11:4, 13:24, 19:5, 25:17, 70:23, 82:8 explained [5] - 8:1, 10:15,</p>	<p>10:16, 25:18, 46:28 explaining [4] - 19:8, 20:9, 64:20, 88:2 explains [1] - 6:23 explanation [4] - 58:16, 63:19, 89:13, 91:14 extreme [3] - 36:13, 57:12, 75:29 extremely [1] - 57:9</p> <p style="text-align: center;">F</p> <p>face [6] - 27:11, 28:19, 77:18, 77:27 face-to-face [2] - 77:18, 77:27 facilitated [5] - 9:28, 17:27, 18:26, 30:13, 47:28 facilities [1] - 26:28 fact [36] - 6:3, 7:19, 8:11, 10:18, 11:17, 29:3, 29:21, 30:7, 30:22, 34:9, 36:4, 40:22, 40:24, 40:25, 50:23, 52:24, 56:6, 56:7, 56:24, 56:26, 61:23, 62:6, 62:25, 64:6, 64:17, 64:30, 66:15, 67:4, 70:22, 71:14, 72:6, 78:22, 80:17, 81:29, 92:14, 92:18 factor [2] - 50:22, 70:8 factors [2] - 66:16, 91:10 facts [1] - 31:16 failed [1] - 14:8 failing [1] - 66:9 fair [5] - 21:10, 23:12, 31:8, 51:8, 72:11 faith [1] - 64:18 false [2] - 14:5, 51:15 familiar [6] - 31:23, 42:3, 42:13, 76:11, 77:29, 87:11 family [3] - 18:27, 24:16 far [11] - 10:22, 21:22, 38:14, 46:24, 65:4, 84:17, 85:6, 85:10, 85:17, 92:3, 92:6 farmyard [1] - 6:19 fashion [1] - 9:2 fatal [1] - 50:29 FBI [2] - 3:7, 3:9 fear [8] - 14:20, 38:17, 40:9, 59:25, 66:1, 66:5, 70:4, 70:10 feared [1] - 5:7 feature [1] - 11:5 February [1] - 93:26 FEBRUARY [1] - 94:1 felt [3] - 31:22, 63:20, 88:20 few [5] - 43:30, 45:4, 45:27, 49:2, 52:22 files [16] - 9:8, 9:19, 10:30, 11:23, 12:27, 12:29, 13:14, 14:21, 14:26, 14:27, 24:12,</p>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

<p>47:28, 48:2, 49:7, 51:3, 51:5, 51:6, 51:20, 53:23, 55:5, 56:4, 57:26, 58:11, 64:3, 64:8, 64:14, 64:24, 64:28, 68:13, 69:8, 69:25, 70:20, 72:3, 73:8, 76:8, 76:28, 76:29, 77:4, 81:14, 84:7, 85:2, 85:11, 85:13, 86:2, 86:24, 88:28, 89:14, 89:20, 92:1, 92:19, 92:24</p> <p>informed [5] - 75:19, 75:20, 76:1, 84:5, 84:6</p> <p>informers [1] - 69:30</p> <p>injury [1] - 3:1</p> <p>ink [1] - 62:23</p> <p>INLA [1] - 2:23</p> <p>input [4] - 5:22, 6:4, 6:5, 60:9</p> <p>inquiries [2] - 6:15, 60:3</p> <p>inquiry [1] - 60:6</p> <p>inquisitive [1] - 81:3</p> <p>insight [1] - 72:17</p> <p>insistent [1] - 81:6</p> <p>insofar [1] - 67:7</p> <p>inspector [12] - 3:3, 4:24, 6:11, 6:24, 6:26, 6:28, 6:30, 7:2, 7:4, 9:21, 61:18, 61:19</p> <p>Inspector [8] - 3:11, 3:15, 8:30, 12:7, 12:25, 13:26, 33:7, 57:20</p> <p>instance [2] - 23:27, 53:4</p> <p>instances [4] - 5:7, 5:27, 6:3, 7:10</p> <p>instead [1] - 86:6</p> <p>instill [1] - 38:16</p> <p>instilled [2] - 70:4, 70:10</p> <p>instruction [2] - 26:24, 68:16</p> <p>instructor [2] - 44:20, 55:27</p> <p>instructors [1] - 55:28</p> <p>intangible [1] - 63:7</p> <p>Intelligence [4] - 3:24, 57:15, 57:20</p> <p>intelligence [131] - 3:27, 6:6, 6:7, 9:3, 9:5, 12:24, 13:18, 14:12, 14:21, 15:4, 15:7, 15:28, 16:15, 16:27, 16:28, 17:1, 17:3, 17:5, 17:11, 17:12, 19:3, 19:7, 19:9, 19:11, 19:15, 19:17, 21:7, 21:16, 21:28, 22:9, 22:21, 24:25, 24:28, 25:4, 25:5, 25:6, 25:15, 25:21, 25:24, 25:25, 25:27, 25:28, 25:30, 26:6, 27:11, 28:17, 29:4, 30:5, 31:7, 32:17, 32:23, 33:3, 37:7, 39:5, 39:9, 39:26, 40:10, 40:12, 40:19, 40:28, 41:9, 45:27, 47:4, 47:5, 47:9, 47:22,</p>	<p>47:26, 49:17, 49:20, 49:25, 49:27, 49:29, 49:30, 50:1, 50:7, 50:9, 50:10, 50:16, 50:21, 50:24, 50:26, 50:28, 51:2, 51:3, 51:4, 51:11, 51:17, 55:6, 55:7, 55:30, 56:3, 57:4, 57:8, 57:10, 57:28, 57:29, 58:4, 58:30, 61:20, 61:28, 62:3, 63:21, 64:28, 65:8, 67:5, 68:7, 68:30, 71:25, 71:27, 71:28, 72:2, 75:8, 75:10, 75:12, 75:13, 75:22, 75:26, 76:13, 76:24, 78:24, 79:6, 83:13, 87:8, 93:4, 93:6</p> <p>intelligence-gathering [3] - 71:28, 72:2, 78:24</p> <p>intense [3] - 45:8, 56:17, 82:28</p> <p>intention [2] - 51:8, 80:9</p> <p>intentions [1] - 64:26</p> <p>interacted [1] - 40:29</p> <p>intercepted [1] - 73:4</p> <p>interception [1] - 46:11</p> <p>interest [2] - 8:18, 57:30</p> <p>interested [2] - 12:10, 85:5</p> <p>interests [3] - 38:28, 38:29, 80:1</p> <p>interfere [1] - 62:1</p> <p>international [1] - 10:9</p> <p>interpreted [1] - 80:19</p> <p>interrogate [2] - 20:2, 21:17</p> <p>interrupt [1] - 21:26</p> <p>interrupting [1] - 89:5</p> <p>interval [1] - 65:12</p> <p>intervals [1] - 74:20</p> <p>intervene [3] - 40:21, 79:25, 79:28</p> <p>intimidated [1] - 41:10</p> <p>intimidation [2] - 14:23, 40:13</p> <p>introduced [1] - 40:1</p> <p>investigate [6] - 12:22, 21:16, 27:29, 28:23, 29:4, 38:25</p> <p>investigated [6] - 23:4, 23:7, 28:25, 39:25, 47:6, 85:26</p> <p>investigating [8] - 3:2, 4:7, 8:24, 20:19, 37:29, 42:1, 42:7, 68:22</p> <p>investigation [34] - 9:8, 10:12, 12:5, 12:9, 12:22, 14:4, 20:21, 20:26, 20:28, 21:5, 21:6, 21:11, 21:14, 21:24, 22:8, 22:15, 22:21, 25:3, 27:25, 28:25, 28:30, 29:2, 29:13, 31:10, 37:16, 40:15, 42:3, 48:4, 63:14, 63:16, 67:3, 68:30, 69:3</p>	<p>Investigation [1] - 61:8</p> <p>investigations [1] - 55:2</p> <p>investigative [1] - 38:3</p> <p>investigator [7] - 9:23, 13:2, 31:9, 61:10, 61:28, 67:1</p> <p>involve [1] - 69:2</p> <p>involved [19] - 2:28, 4:4, 5:6, 5:13, 5:14, 7:20, 8:18, 8:25, 14:6, 14:23, 20:17, 26:2, 31:9, 47:14, 70:30, 72:25, 73:12, 73:15, 73:24</p> <p>involvement [3] - 8:12, 52:10, 61:24</p> <p>IRA [26] - 14:28, 37:7, 42:17, 43:5, 44:4, 45:6, 46:22, 47:5, 47:10, 47:15, 47:16, 47:20, 48:13, 48:24, 48:29, 49:13, 56:5, 57:6, 71:3, 71:17, 72:12, 84:9, 84:11, 84:14, 84:19, 84:26</p> <p>Ireland [1] - 75:28</p> <p>issued [1] - 92:15</p> <p>issues [1] - 91:13</p> <p>item [3] - 56:2, 56:3, 93:4</p> <p>items [5] - 57:24, 62:3, 63:21, 68:6, 93:6</p> <p>itself [1] - 62:19</p>	<p>76:14, 79:8, 79:13</p> <p>Justice [4] - 17:27, 18:2, 30:14, 47:29</p>	<p>28:16, 29:7, 29:17, 30:3, 32:12, 37:4, 41:1, 41:12, 41:28, 65:16, 79:25, 80:5, 80:13, 81:25, 81:27, 86:6, 86:22, 89:3, 91:21, 91:30, 92:11, 92:24, 93:15, 93:26</p> <p>Laverty [10] - 21:27, 29:12, 32:6, 40:25, 50:15, 65:12, 86:11, 90:14, 91:17, 93:3</p> <p>laverty [1] - 47:21</p> <p>laverty's [1] - 41:18</p> <p>Laverty's [2] - 41:23, 65:20</p> <p>law [1] - 70:17</p> <p>lawyers [3] - 16:4, 18:6, 19:8</p> <p>lay [1] - 62:29</p> <p>lead [3] - 46:9, 54:30, 55:1</p> <p>leading [1] - 15:9</p> <p>leak [1] - 5:7</p> <p>learn [1] - 83:2</p> <p>learned [2] - 56:22, 56:23</p> <p>least [6] - 9:24, 56:22, 64:16, 68:12, 77:15, 90:4</p> <p>leave [3] - 24:7, 38:19, 87:29</p> <p>led [1] - 55:7</p> <p>left [3] - 7:28, 44:10, 44:29</p> <p>Leitrim [2] - 52:14, 82:14</p> <p>lest [1] - 28:13</p> <p>letter [3] - 10:26, 32:29, 62:4</p> <p>level [10] - 6:25, 6:27, 55:18, 56:12, 60:20, 60:21, 60:23, 70:19, 71:8, 89:27</p> <p>levels [2] - 20:12, 50:8</p> <p>liable [1] - 49:26</p> <p>liaise [2] - 33:29, 60:25</p> <p>liaison [7] - 4:24, 6:13, 6:14, 7:1, 36:16, 36:25</p> <p>Libya [2] - 43:6, 43:7</p> <p>lie [1] - 91:28</p> <p>life [3] - 32:28, 46:29, 83:25</p> <p>likely [5] - 58:8, 60:1, 60:27, 77:7, 87:27</p> <p>likewise [2] - 76:28, 77:6</p> <p>limb [1] - 86:28</p> <p>Limerick [1] - 47:9</p> <p>limited [1] - 23:29</p> <p>line [1] - 8:2</p> <p>link [1] - 23:5</p> <p>list [3] - 59:11, 82:6, 93:5</p> <p>listen [1] - 89:25</p> <p>listened [2] - 85:4, 88:29</p> <p>live [1] - 71:10</p> <p>local [37] - 4:22, 4:25, 5:22, 6:13, 6:15, 6:20, 6:22, 6:26, 6:27, 7:1, 7:5, 7:19, 7:24, 7:25, 8:12, 8:15, 33:26,</p>		
		J				
		<p>JANUARY [1] - 1:1</p> <p>January [1] - 33:9</p> <p>Jennings [28] - 1:5, 2:4, 8:19, 14:14, 15:12, 23:3, 24:9, 27:10, 28:5, 28:12, 30:4, 37:4, 42:17, 45:11, 46:19, 47:3, 47:11, 47:21, 48:8, 49:10, 49:15, 49:27, 51:26, 81:28, 86:22, 90:9, 92:1, 93:17</p> <p>JENNINGS [2] - 2:1, 68:3</p> <p>jigsaw [3] - 21:2, 50:23, 55:9</p> <p>Jim [1] - 40:14</p> <p>job [7] - 7:18, 8:28, 19:16, 21:12, 51:11, 65:4, 81:1</p> <p>jobs [1] - 20:13</p> <p>John [1] - 92:15</p> <p>joined [2] - 2:11, 2:15</p> <p>jointly [1] - 75:24</p> <p>journey [1] - 86:23</p> <p>judge [2] - 30:28, 80:18</p> <p>Judge [7] - 17:23, 21:2, 30:4, 30:19, 64:10, 93:2, 93:13</p> <p>judges [1] - 53:3</p> <p>judiciary [2] - 37:20, 52:23</p> <p>July [1] - 32:22</p> <p>jump [1] - 17:7</p> <p>June [2] - 3:21, 83:29</p> <p>jurisdiction [8] - 8:2, 8:3, 35:27, 36:22, 58:13,</p>	K			
		<p>keep [5] - 21:4, 29:19, 66:27, 68:29, 70:8</p> <p>keeping [2] - 55:30, 66:21</p> <p>kept [7] - 13:18, 17:5, 33:10, 43:3, 74:9, 74:20, 75:21</p> <p>Kevin [4] - 8:22, 10:15, 12:18, 24:14</p> <p>key [1] - 39:5</p> <p>kidnapping [1] - 49:7</p> <p>killings [1] - 70:28</p> <p>killings [1] - 18:25</p> <p>kind [1] - 51:15</p> <p>Kirwan [30] - 8:19, 8:20, 9:1, 9:7, 12:25, 13:8, 13:26, 13:28, 14:30, 15:10, 15:13, 17:18, 24:9, 25:7, 25:26, 26:13, 26:16, 26:20, 26:24, 27:2, 31:6, 31:19, 47:23, 47:24, 47:30, 48:10, 56:8, 61:14, 61:15, 62:2</p> <p>Knock [1] - 77:17</p> <p>knowing [10] - 25:11, 26:2, 26:23, 48:10, 59:30, 60:1, 66:14, 79:6, 85:27</p> <p>knowledge [31] - 5:23, 7:25, 8:15, 10:11, 31:10, 42:18, 42:20, 42:25, 44:12, 46:18, 46:26, 49:3, 54:6, 54:7, 54:9, 54:16, 54:20, 55:13, 55:29, 58:22, 58:29, 59:27, 62:2, 71:6, 72:6, 72:13, 76:13, 81:11, 85:10, 85:11</p> <p>known [14] - 26:4, 40:16, 40:28, 41:3, 41:4, 41:9, 48:27, 57:30, 59:20, 60:14, 70:5, 71:11, 83:24, 85:13</p> <p>knows [1] - 72:5</p>		L		
		<p>laborious [2] - 13:13, 14:27</p> <p>labour [1] - 72:30</p> <p>lack [1] - 81:10</p> <p>LAFFERTY [1] - 22:12</p> <p>laid [1] - 87:7</p> <p>laptop [1] - 13:12</p> <p>large [1] - 66:30</p> <p>last [5] - 4:2, 4:3, 17:20, 18:6, 91:23</p> <p>late [3] - 44:30, 67:5, 83:11</p> <p>laudatory [1] - 91:26</p> <p>LAVERTY [30] - 1:4, 2:2, 2:4, 8:6, 22:24, 26:19,</p>				

<p>53:10, 53:28, 54:3, 54:6, 54:7, 54:18, 54:19, 55:12, 57:26, 57:28, 57:29, 59:27, 59:30, 60:8, 60:15, 79:11</p> <p>locally [4] - 6:4, 52:18, 55:19, 79:15</p> <p>locals [1] - 57:24</p> <p>location [3] - 7:6, 60:8, 69:20</p> <p>locations [3] - 73:17, 74:17, 74:25</p> <p>logistically [2] - 73:2, 73:28</p> <p>look [8] - 5:19, 8:12, 17:16, 21:7, 38:3, 60:22, 63:13, 69:23</p> <p>looked [6] - 13:7, 45:27, 63:7, 63:26, 68:25, 68:26</p> <p>looking [7] - 9:23, 14:27, 17:8, 21:9, 21:13, 39:26, 79:30</p> <p>lookouts [1] - 73:17</p> <p>loop [1] - 87:29</p> <p>Lord [7] - 9:7, 17:27, 18:2, 26:16, 30:14, 35:12, 47:28</p> <p>lose [2] - 64:27, 74:30</p> <p>loss [4] - 30:27, 43:2, 56:1, 79:6</p> <p>lost [2] - 89:21, 90:9</p> <p>Louth [4] - 5:4, 68:19, 68:22, 82:14</p> <p>Louth-Meath [2] - 68:19, 82:14</p> <p>lucky [1] - 71:30</p> <p>lump [1] - 75:21</p> <p>lunch [3] - 41:13, 65:11, 65:12</p> <p>LUNCH [2] - 67:10, 68:1</p>	<p>79:11, 79:20, 84:28, 90:11, 91:6, 91:21, 91:23, 93:1</p> <p>matters [2] - 32:18, 42:11</p> <p>McGuinness [10] - 26:13, 28:3, 40:21, 41:18, 41:23, 65:11, 65:14, 65:19, 65:26, 86:4</p> <p>McHugh [4] - 40:14, 40:22, 42:9, 65:21</p> <p>McMahon [1] - 92:15</p> <p>mean [11] - 12:13, 13:7, 21:16, 27:27, 29:19, 39:22, 51:3, 89:15, 90:19, 91:8</p> <p>meant [2] - 20:23, 25:22</p> <p>meanwhile [1] - 25:5</p> <p>meat [1] - 20:7</p> <p>Meath [3] - 68:19, 68:22, 82:14</p> <p>media [2] - 63:10, 70:28</p> <p>meet [3] - 9:24, 10:3, 10:14</p> <p>meeting [8] - 9:26, 34:25, 35:5, 49:3, 58:9, 58:15, 76:21, 77:8</p> <p>meetings [1] - 33:30</p> <p>member [48] - 1:5, 14:23, 14:24, 14:28, 15:18, 18:1, 20:24, 22:19, 23:5, 23:10, 23:19, 23:20, 23:24, 27:26, 28:12, 28:14, 28:18, 28:20, 29:3, 29:9, 29:14, 31:22, 31:29, 32:1, 32:6, 32:8, 38:14, 41:30, 46:9, 46:21, 47:4, 47:8, 47:13, 48:15, 48:19, 48:26, 58:3, 58:10, 60:15, 69:14, 69:15, 76:6, 78:28, 79:3, 82:4, 92:5</p> <p>members [20] - 14:16, 32:1, 32:6, 32:10, 35:17, 37:20, 37:29, 38:16, 38:17, 40:5, 46:25, 48:21, 49:24, 52:23, 52:24, 53:18, 57:5, 59:28, 69:9, 92:16</p> <p>membership [2] - 47:16, 47:20</p> <p>memory [4] - 30:28, 54:13, 82:16, 83:10</p> <p>men [2] - 35:13, 72:21</p> <p>mention [6] - 22:25, 23:17, 23:25, 37:12, 48:12, 93:2</p> <p>mentioned [11] - 6:24, 22:14, 22:28, 24:13, 45:24, 48:27, 69:4, 69:20, 70:14, 74:16, 90:14</p> <p>mentioning [1] - 47:18</p> <p>mercy [3] - 9:7, 26:16, 35:12</p> <p>merely [2] - 80:23, 92:27</p> <p>message [8] - 77:21, 84:4, 84:22, 85:1, 86:8,</p>	<p>86:19, 86:25, 89:26</p> <p>met [4] - 16:4, 18:6, 44:30, 45:4</p> <p>method [1] - 76:9</p> <p>methods [1] - 82:30</p> <p>microphone [1] - 50:4</p> <p>mid-'90s [1] - 33:20</p> <p>might [18] - 2:7, 5:19, 6:15, 6:25, 8:13, 29:23, 32:18, 35:6, 44:8, 45:11, 45:14, 60:1, 60:14, 64:4, 70:22, 70:27, 71:3, 74:23</p> <p>Mills [1] - 14:13</p> <p>mind [3] - 24:22, 47:17, 59:23</p> <p>mine [1] - 60:20</p> <p>minimum [1] - 72:27</p> <p>minutes [2] - 35:6, 35:7</p> <p>misdirecting [1] - 70:16</p> <p>misinformation [10] - 19:28, 38:12, 48:12, 48:13, 48:15, 51:16, 51:17, 51:21, 70:16, 70:25</p> <p>misaid [2] - 33:6, 89:21</p> <p>misleading [3] - 79:28, 90:22, 90:24</p> <p>missing [1] - 33:6</p> <p>mistake [3] - 50:13, 50:27, 50:29</p> <p>mistaken [2] - 91:15, 91:28</p> <p>mistakenly [1] - 6:22</p> <p>mole [6] - 46:14, 46:17, 46:22, 46:26, 47:5, 70:27</p> <p>moment [2] - 19:30, 24:8</p> <p>moments [1] - 45:27</p> <p>Monaghan [20] - 3:19, 33:20, 34:16, 52:14, 57:11, 70:22, 76:3, 76:4, 76:7, 76:21, 82:14, 83:17, 83:18, 83:19, 83:23, 85:5, 85:30, 86:1, 86:23, 88:15</p> <p>monitored [1] - 72:18</p> <p>monitoring [1] - 72:15</p> <p>month [4] - 34:1, 34:18, 34:26, 72:9</p> <p>months [8] - 3:7, 3:9, 3:20, 19:1, 32:22, 34:20, 34:21, 34:22</p> <p>morale [1] - 70:12</p> <p>morning [12] - 1:4, 2:4, 2:5, 38:6, 62:26, 70:15, 71:18, 74:16, 74:28, 75:16, 78:3, 82:29</p> <p>most [8] - 13:2, 13:13, 36:7, 38:11, 46:24, 61:10, 87:30, 91:25</p> <p>mounted [1] - 22:4</p> <p>move [1] - 30:3</p> <p>moved [5] - 4:2, 60:5, 78:28, 78:30, 79:3</p> <p>movement [1] - 72:18</p> <p>moving [2] - 4:5, 79:9</p>	<p>MR [41] - 21:26, 22:17, 26:13, 28:3, 29:9, 29:19, 29:26, 32:1, 32:5, 40:21, 41:18, 41:23, 45:19, 45:22, 50:6, 51:28, 52:2, 52:7, 52:9, 60:13, 64:29, 65:14, 65:19, 65:26, 68:4, 68:6, 77:13, 78:27, 80:3, 80:16, 80:23, 81:23, 86:4, 86:10, 90:14, 90:24, 91:5, 92:13, 92:27, 93:1, 93:11</p> <p>MRS [31] - 1:4, 2:1, 2:4, 8:6, 22:12, 22:24, 26:19, 28:16, 29:7, 29:17, 30:3, 32:12, 37:4, 41:1, 41:12, 41:28, 65:16, 79:25, 80:5, 80:13, 81:25, 81:27, 86:6, 86:22, 89:3, 91:21, 91:30, 92:11, 92:24, 93:15, 93:26</p> <p>MS [2] - 50:3, 51:30</p> <p>Mullingar [1] - 4:2</p> <p>munitions [7] - 42:17, 42:26, 43:1, 43:7, 43:12, 43:16, 74:29</p> <p>murder [7] - 17:27, 18:2, 18:27, 28:21, 30:13, 47:28, 71:8</p> <p>murdered [1] - 72:22</p> <p>murders [11] - 8:25, 15:17, 24:20, 25:10, 25:12, 25:13, 28:1, 28:21, 28:22, 32:22</p> <p>Murphy [1] - 31:23</p> <p>must [5] - 19:9, 23:14, 27:15, 47:17, 79:28</p> <p>mustn't [1] - 26:8</p> <p>Myers [3] - 8:22, 10:15, 24:14</p> <p>Myers' [2] - 12:18, 24:14</p>	<p>necessarily [4] - 7:18, 51:3, 54:6, 54:8</p> <p>Ned [1] - 21:27</p> <p>need [3] - 41:13, 54:17, 81:18</p> <p>needed [1] - 58:15</p> <p>needing [1] - 59:27</p> <p>needs [1] - 64:23</p> <p>never [13] - 7:16, 18:15, 33:13, 36:12, 39:18, 39:29, 49:17, 49:22, 53:25, 83:21, 84:26, 86:4, 92:3</p> <p>new [3] - 55:2, 84:3, 84:4</p> <p>newspaper [2] - 12:17, 24:14</p> <p>newspapers [1] - 62:23</p> <p>next [4] - 17:23, 60:26, 89:13, 93:24</p> <p>night [2] - 44:11, 66:3</p> <p>nine [4] - 3:20, 32:22, 34:21</p> <p>no.. [1] - 27:9</p> <p>nobody [5] - 17:20, 29:7, 29:10, 91:1, 91:27</p> <p>nominated [1] - 7:5</p> <p>none [3] - 27:6, 85:9, 85:12</p> <p>norm [3] - 57:21, 77:3, 87:21</p> <p>normal [8] - 9:2, 20:27, 36:12, 38:2, 61:5, 75:22, 76:26, 77:6</p> <p>normally [5] - 4:21, 6:10, 6:28, 35:1, 52:23</p> <p>north [7] - 5:25, 36:2, 36:11, 36:19, 72:19, 72:28</p> <p>North [3] - 5:1, 36:14, 36:16</p> <p>Northern [1] - 75:28</p> <p>northern [1] - 76:20</p> <p>note [11] - 4:10, 10:24, 10:26, 35:24, 85:7, 88:8, 88:14, 88:23, 88:25, 89:10, 89:17</p> <p>noted [1] - 80:1</p> <p>nothing [16] - 10:25, 12:23, 22:6, 22:7, 29:4, 35:9, 39:1, 58:9, 59:20, 62:27, 62:29, 63:16, 63:17, 63:18, 68:21, 80:13</p> <p>notice [8] - 11:12, 15:18, 15:25, 30:10, 53:5, 57:10, 69:10, 87:23</p> <p>notified [2] - 9:14, 12:7</p> <p>November [1] - 40:10</p> <p>number [8] - 6:18, 19:12, 19:13, 26:26, 43:29, 62:16, 66:16, 66:19</p> <p>numbers [5] - 4:26, 6:1, 43:22, 57:16, 74:9</p> <p>numerous [1] - 71:29</p>	
M				N	
<p>Maher [4] - 11:15, 11:25, 62:9, 62:12</p> <p>main [1] - 14:8</p> <p>Mains [2] - 31:20, 31:27</p> <p>mains [1] - 32:5</p> <p>mains' [2] - 32:7, 32:13</p> <p>major [4] - 8:17, 22:30, 37:16, 71:7</p> <p>man [18] - 6:14, 6:15, 7:5, 13:2, 16:22, 26:16, 26:23, 45:6, 46:7, 69:12, 76:27, 81:3, 81:13, 81:17, 89:22, 90:20, 92:9</p> <p>management [1] - 79:11</p> <p>manpower [1] - 71:23</p> <p>March [1] - 4:1</p> <p>marker [1] - 80:6</p> <p>massive [1] - 72:14</p> <p>master [1] - 81:4</p> <p>matter [16] - 20:19, 28:24, 39:18, 40:17, 43:3, 72:6, 72:11, 79:8,</p>	<p>25:5, 25:11, 25:12, 25:13, 25:14, 25:15, 25:16, 25:17, 25:18, 25:19, 25:20, 25:21, 25:22, 25:23, 25:24, 25:25, 25:26, 25:27, 25:28, 25:29, 25:30, 25:31, 25:32, 25:33, 25:34, 25:35, 25:36, 25:37, 25:38, 25:39, 25:40, 25:41, 25:42, 25:43, 25:44, 25:45, 25:46, 25:47, 25:48, 25:49, 25:50, 25:51, 25:52, 25:53, 25:54, 25:55, 25:56, 25:57, 25:58, 25:59, 25:60, 25:61, 25:62, 25:63, 25:64, 25:65, 25:66, 25:67, 25:68, 25:69, 25:70, 25:71, 25:72, 25:73, 25:74, 25:75, 25:76, 25:77, 25:78, 25:79, 25:80, 25:81, 25:82, 25:83, 25:84, 25:85, 25:86, 25:87, 25:88, 25:89, 25:90, 25:91, 25:92, 25:93, 25:94, 25:95, 25:96, 25:97, 25:98, 25:99, 25:100</p>	<p>25:5, 25:11, 25:12, 25:13, 25:14, 25:15, 25:16, 25:17, 25:18, 25:19, 25:20, 25:21, 25:22, 25:23, 25:24, 25:25, 25:26, 25:27, 25:28, 25:29, 25:30, 25:31, 25:32, 25:33, 25:34, 25:35, 25:36, 25:37, 25:38, 25:39, 25:40, 25:41, 25:42, 25:43, 25:44, 25:45, 25:46, 25:47, 25:48, 25:49, 25:50, 25:51, 25:52, 25:53, 25:54, 25:55, 25:56, 25:57, 25:58, 25:59, 25:60, 25:61, 25:62, 25:63, 25:64, 25:65, 25:66, 25:67, 25:68, 25:69, 25:70, 25:71, 25:72, 25:73, 25:74, 25:75, 25:76, 25:77, 25:78, 25:79, 25:80, 25:81, 25:82, 25:83, 25:84, 25:85, 25:86, 25:87, 25:88, 25:89, 25:90, 25:91, 25:92, 25:93, 25:94, 25:95, 25:96, 25:97, 25:98, 25:99, 25:100</p>	<p>nailed [1] - 24:30</p> <p>name [4] - 22:26, 22:28, 38:22, 73:30</p> <p>named [20] - 15:17, 22:3, 23:17, 23:26, 26:4, 28:12, 28:14, 29:3, 29:7, 29:10, 46:2, 56:3, 57:5, 57:29, 69:14, 69:15, 69:22, 76:6, 79:2</p> <p>names [5] - 13:14, 37:12, 47:19, 59:8, 59:11</p> <p>National [5] - 3:15, 3:22, 4:5, 55:20, 61:8</p> <p>national [2] - 55:23, 56:28</p> <p>natural [1] - 84:10</p> <p>naturally [1] - 6:20</p> <p>nature [1] - 19:9</p> <p>near [1] - 54:21</p> <p>nearly [2] - 13:25, 85:29</p>		
				O	
					<p>O'CALLAGHAN [11] -</p>

<p>21:26, 22:17, 32:1, 32:5, 45:19, 45:22, 50:6, 86:10, 90:14, 90:24, 91:5</p> <p>O'Callaghan [2] - 22:12, 22:24</p> <p>o'clock [2] - 65:10, 65:11</p> <p>O'Dea [5] - 21:27, 31:13, 45:25, 45:26, 47:8</p> <p>O'SULLIVAN [2] - 50:3, 51:30</p> <p>O'Toole [5] - 10:27, 11:29, 62:6, 62:8, 62:10</p> <p>obligation [3] - 88:8, 88:11, 88:14</p> <p>obvious [1] - 60:30</p> <p>obviously [4] - 32:15, 83:16, 85:23, 91:6</p> <p>OC [2] - 43:4, 44:7</p> <p>occasion [2] - 43:23, 60:4</p> <p>occasionally [1] - 19:29</p> <p>occasions [11] - 5:9, 13:24, 26:26, 44:8, 49:3, 52:11, 52:22, 52:27, 53:5, 53:8, 68:12</p> <p>occur [1] - 55:3</p> <p>occurred [1] - 28:8</p> <p>odd [1] - 60:4</p> <p>OF [2] - 1:1, 94:1</p> <p>of.. [1] - 42:20</p> <p>offence [1] - 74:30</p> <p>office [3] - 8:30, 12:3, 84:1</p> <p>officer [6] - 42:1, 42:8, 54:17, 57:5, 79:27, 85:2</p> <p>Officer [1] - 31:28</p> <p>officers [11] - 15:20, 17:28, 30:15, 46:20, 47:29, 49:24, 52:25, 71:8, 71:11, 84:24, 85:9</p> <p>often [24] - 5:17, 6:13, 8:10, 8:11, 16:29, 17:2, 21:4, 38:4, 38:12, 38:13, 39:10, 42:27, 43:15, 53:11, 53:14, 55:6, 55:7, 60:25, 61:5, 62:25, 70:16, 70:18, 73:16</p> <p>Oireachtas [1] - 11:7</p> <p>OK [6] - 9:10, 9:28, 13:29, 20:9, 40:3, 42:14</p> <p>old [1] - 13:13</p> <p>Oliver [1] - 24:17</p> <p>ON [1] - 1:1</p> <p>on-and-off [1] - 10:1</p> <p>on-the-job [1] - 19:16</p> <p>once [9] - 9:17, 9:19, 9:24, 9:25, 34:1, 34:18, 34:25, 37:15, 71:30</p> <p>one [62] - 2:27, 8:2, 8:17, 11:17, 11:27, 12:26, 14:25, 15:8, 15:21, 15:26, 16:3, 17:4, 17:15, 17:19, 18:5, 18:19, 22:2, 22:9, 22:13, 22:20, 22:21, 22:27, 23:8, 23:21, 28:6, 30:5, 30:8, 30:19,</p>	<p>30:29, 35:5, 37:5, 38:10, 38:11, 38:30, 44:7, 44:19, 44:28, 52:24, 55:26, 55:28, 60:5, 60:15, 60:24, 61:19, 61:25, 63:25, 64:1, 66:7, 72:1, 73:14, 74:8, 74:30, 75:24, 76:16, 76:18, 79:7, 79:13, 81:9, 82:7, 84:12, 93:3</p> <p>ones [1] - 24:13</p> <p>ongoing [1] - 57:24</p> <p>open [3] - 6:19, 48:25, 75:10</p> <p>operate [1] - 56:26</p> <p>operating [3] - 44:21, 48:21, 60:22</p> <p>operation [18] - 23:26, 42:28, 42:29, 43:18, 43:26, 44:6, 44:7, 46:3, 55:8, 60:8, 71:4, 71:7, 71:13, 71:22, 72:25, 73:20, 81:10</p> <p>Operational [1] - 3:14</p> <p>operations [19] - 4:28, 5:30, 28:10, 35:28, 36:1, 43:29, 43:30, 44:10, 47:1, 53:27, 53:29, 54:1, 56:29, 57:3, 71:6, 73:19, 74:3, 74:12, 75:23</p> <p>operators [1] - 59:13</p> <p>opinion [1] - 30:21</p> <p>opportunity [2] - 66:25, 90:9</p> <p>opposed [1] - 51:5</p> <p>opposite [4] - 33:30, 34:15, 36:15, 40:24</p> <p>opposition [1] - 22:20</p> <p>option [1] - 91:16</p> <p>options [1] - 89:7</p> <p>order [3] - 70:17, 73:25, 84:10</p> <p>ordinary [1] - 77:13</p> <p>organisation [17] - 20:12, 37:8, 37:9, 38:5, 38:15, 38:20, 38:21, 39:1, 43:1, 43:8, 50:18, 56:25, 62:1, 70:4, 74:6, 74:7, 75:1</p> <p>organisations [6] - 4:8, 19:29, 37:13, 38:10, 43:14, 48:18</p> <p>organise [1] - 44:2</p> <p>original [2] - 18:3, 31:5</p> <p>originally [1] - 69:27</p> <p>originals [1] - 68:10</p> <p>otherwise [1] - 28:14</p> <p>ought [2] - 63:7, 88:20</p> <p>ourselves [2] - 8:11, 35:15</p> <p>out-of-state [1] - 36:18</p> <p>outline [2] - 25:30, 65:6</p> <p>outlined [3] - 21:17, 27:17, 87:12</p> <p>outlying [1] - 16:14</p> <p>outset [1] - 72:20</p>	<p>outside [2] - 35:27, 59:28</p> <p>outsiders [1] - 5:19</p> <p>over-emphasising [1] - 73:5</p> <p>overall [2] - 25:20, 26:30</p> <p>Owen [7] - 14:18, 40:4, 40:7, 45:23, 49:12, 81:30, 84:7</p> <p>own [19] - 13:11, 20:21, 35:4, 35:8, 38:15, 42:17, 43:12, 43:14, 46:28, 59:7, 69:28, 70:5, 70:6, 70:7, 71:19, 75:19, 76:28, 78:16, 85:18</p>	<p>Peace [3] - 33:25, 34:10, 35:20</p> <p>people [66] - 2:28, 4:25, 6:16, 6:18, 6:20, 6:23, 12:10, 12:12, 17:13, 17:20, 18:9, 20:4, 20:12, 23:1, 23:30, 26:2, 32:15, 34:7, 36:16, 37:19, 43:13, 44:24, 45:9, 49:24, 50:12, 50:27, 52:20, 53:15, 53:19, 53:28, 54:3, 54:6, 54:7, 54:10, 54:15, 54:25, 55:12, 56:10, 56:12, 56:19, 56:30, 57:15, 57:17, 58:2, 58:30, 59:6, 59:30, 60:25, 61:4, 70:3, 70:8, 71:28, 72:15, 72:18, 72:24, 73:2, 73:9, 73:19, 73:24, 73:26, 75:3, 82:9, 92:4</p> <p>people's [1] - 59:23</p> <p>per [1] - 82:15</p> <p>perceivable [1] - 62:20</p> <p>percent [1] - 44:29</p> <p>perhaps [11] - 5:18, 7:14, 11:19, 19:25, 42:15, 51:14, 59:30, 66:8, 70:12, 79:26, 89:30</p> <p>period [5] - 3:20, 22:7, 24:11, 45:1, 68:8</p> <p>permitted [1] - 87:18</p> <p>person [33] - 5:11, 6:26, 13:9, 17:3, 17:11, 20:16, 20:30, 22:3, 22:13, 22:25, 23:22, 26:3, 26:15, 28:10, 34:24, 35:1, 36:20, 37:10, 38:28, 39:2, 44:7, 44:8, 51:8, 64:11, 64:19, 65:3, 69:5, 69:26, 86:24, 87:18, 89:16</p> <p>person's [3] - 22:26, 22:27, 39:29</p> <p>personal [5] - 10:11, 35:25, 36:10, 36:16, 36:20</p> <p>personally [4] - 11:24, 27:5, 77:27, 84:29</p> <p>personnel [1] - 43:12</p> <p>persons [1] - 45:15</p> <p>perturb [1] - 84:15</p> <p>Peter [8] - 8:20, 9:6, 13:8, 13:26, 13:28, 26:24, 47:23, 48:10</p> <p>Phoenix [1] - 6:8</p> <p>phone [6] - 34:24, 57:14, 57:16, 66:25, 77:19, 78:5</p> <p>phrase [4] - 8:13, 10:29, 20:7, 38:30</p> <p>picture [2] - 20:30, 54:28</p> <p>piece [14] - 15:24, 21:1, 25:27, 37:25, 39:5, 39:26, 47:25, 50:23,</p>	<p>50:26, 50:28, 53:23, 64:13, 64:24, 64:27</p> <p>pieces [4] - 21:3, 30:5, 64:8, 74:29</p> <p>pipes [2] - 42:27, 74:21</p> <p>PIRA [7] - 14:16, 14:25, 15:18, 15:20, 15:22, 40:5, 40:13</p> <p>place [16] - 17:5, 20:3, 23:18, 26:25, 28:9, 28:10, 44:6, 46:12, 69:23, 73:4, 73:26, 74:22, 77:2, 79:22, 86:25, 86:28</p> <p>placed [2] - 29:27, 46:1</p> <p>places [7] - 42:26, 43:29, 44:15, 60:1, 74:13, 74:17, 91:11</p> <p>plain [1] - 6:18</p> <p>plan [6] - 44:1, 71:13, 71:17, 71:18, 71:22, 71:23</p> <p>planned [3] - 42:28, 71:3, 73:27</p> <p>planning [6] - 43:15, 43:17, 43:26, 71:17, 73:1, 74:27</p> <p>platform [1] - 39:14</p> <p>plus [1] - 61:4</p> <p>point [20] - 5:23, 7:25, 8:4, 8:15, 12:23, 21:19, 23:14, 23:16, 29:1, 29:13, 31:5, 38:24, 40:1, 46:3, 48:17, 56:28, 59:16, 60:24, 72:30, 86:10</p> <p>pointers [1] - 37:24</p> <p>pointing [2] - 28:17, 87:5</p> <p>police [12] - 28:26, 36:25, 37:14, 42:24, 43:21, 43:28, 49:24, 52:25, 57:5, 61:6, 74:1, 84:24</p> <p>policemen [2] - 52:20, 52:23</p> <p>pooled [1] - 55:9</p> <p>poor [2] - 63:19, 72:21</p> <p>pop [1] - 39:11</p> <p>popping [1] - 29:20</p> <p>posed [2] - 41:18, 41:23</p> <p>position [6] - 23:9, 25:19, 32:16, 37:10, 45:14, 70:1</p> <p>positions [1] - 70:3</p> <p>possession [2] - 10:17, 31:15</p> <p>possibility [2] - 37:7, 87:3</p> <p>possible [6] - 19:15, 19:28, 74:26, 79:19, 89:9, 89:27</p> <p>possibly [5] - 40:26, 55:18, 72:28, 76:1, 87:16</p> <p>potential [5] - 19:6, 21:10, 25:30, 27:15, 39:27</p> <p>potentially [1] - 69:17</p> <p>practice [2] - 8:8, 80:24</p>
P				
<p>page [5] - 14:3, 48:1, 65:21, 65:26, 66:13</p> <p>paper [3] - 12:29, 13:13, 85:29</p> <p>papers [1] - 93:5</p> <p>paragraph [2] - 14:4, 30:6</p> <p>parameters [1] - 12:27</p> <p>paramount [1] - 71:19</p> <p>Park [2] - 2:23, 6:8</p> <p>part [13] - 2:24, 25:23, 31:23, 43:15, 47:1, 48:23, 55:25, 58:21, 63:12, 66:24, 66:27, 71:13, 75:26</p> <p>participants [1] - 22:13</p> <p>participate [2] - 82:22, 92:5</p> <p>participated [1] - 81:30</p> <p>participating [1] - 56:23</p> <p>particular [26] - 5:23, 6:17, 7:5, 14:10, 15:24, 18:11, 22:3, 22:29, 24:2, 26:3, 35:2, 35:6, 37:4, 43:23, 46:7, 50:14, 53:23, 54:21, 55:11, 61:23, 69:12, 70:18, 70:28, 74:12, 78:28, 82:7</p> <p>particularly [16] - 5:24, 7:11, 7:30, 15:9, 15:27, 37:6, 38:9, 48:23, 50:14, 52:26, 57:29, 68:23, 70:3, 71:18, 77:9, 79:2</p> <p>parties [1] - 42:15</p> <p>parts [1] - 47:18</p> <p>pass [3] - 51:11, 86:23, 88:15</p> <p>passed [12] - 5:5, 9:1, 10:19, 17:26, 18:26, 20:13, 30:13, 47:28, 78:4, 79:1, 85:1, 86:7</p> <p>passing [2] - 20:17, 39:30</p> <p>past [1] - 13:17</p> <p>Pat [1] - 11:29</p> <p>patrol [1] - 53:10</p> <p>patrolling [1] - 53:12</p> <p>patrols [2] - 4:16, 4:19</p> <p>Paul [1] - 92:15</p> <p>pay [1] - 31:23</p>	<p>page [5] - 14:3, 48:1, 65:21, 65:26, 66:13</p> <p>paper [3] - 12:29, 13:13, 85:29</p> <p>papers [1] - 93:5</p> <p>paragraph [2] - 14:4, 30:6</p> <p>parameters [1] - 12:27</p> <p>paramount [1] - 71:19</p> <p>Park [2] - 2:23, 6:8</p> <p>part [13] - 2:24, 25:23, 31:23, 43:15, 47:1, 48:23, 55:25, 58:21, 63:12, 66:24, 66:27, 71:13, 75:26</p> <p>participants [1] - 22:13</p> <p>participate [2] - 82:22, 92:5</p> <p>participated [1] - 81:30</p> <p>participating [1] - 56:23</p> <p>particular [26] - 5:23, 6:17, 7:5, 14:10, 15:24, 18:11, 22:3, 22:29, 24:2, 26:3, 35:2, 35:6, 37:4, 43:23, 46:7, 50:14, 53:23, 54:21, 55:11, 61:23, 69:12, 70:18, 70:28, 74:12, 78:28, 82:7</p> <p>particularly [16] - 5:24, 7:11, 7:30, 15:9, 15:27, 37:6, 38:9, 48:23, 50:14, 52:26, 57:29, 68:23, 70:3, 71:18, 77:9, 79:2</p> <p>parties [1] - 42:15</p> <p>parts [1] - 47:18</p> <p>pass [3] - 51:11, 86:23, 88:15</p> <p>passed [12] - 5:5, 9:1, 10:19, 17:26, 18:26, 20:13, 30:13, 47:28, 78:4, 79:1, 85:1, 86:7</p> <p>passing [2] - 20:17, 39:30</p> <p>past [1] - 13:17</p> <p>Pat [1] - 11:29</p> <p>patrol [1] - 53:10</p> <p>patrolling [1] - 53:12</p> <p>patrols [2] - 4:16, 4:19</p> <p>Paul [1] - 92:15</p> <p>pay [1] - 31:23</p>	<p>Peace [3] - 33:25, 34:10, 35:20</p> <p>people [66] - 2:28, 4:25, 6:16, 6:18, 6:20, 6:23, 12:10, 12:12, 17:13, 17:20, 18:9, 20:4, 20:12, 23:1, 23:30, 26:2, 32:15, 34:7, 36:16, 37:19, 43:13, 44:24, 45:9, 49:24, 50:12, 50:27, 52:20, 53:15, 53:19, 53:28, 54:3, 54:6, 54:7, 54:10, 54:15, 54:25, 55:12, 56:10, 56:12, 56:19, 56:30, 57:15, 57:17, 58:2, 58:30, 59:6, 59:30, 60:25, 61:4, 70:3, 70:8, 71:28, 72:15, 72:18, 72:24, 73:2, 73:9, 73:19, 73:24, 73:26, 75:3, 82:9, 92:4</p> <p>people's [1] - 59:23</p> <p>per [1] - 82:15</p> <p>perceivable [1] - 62:20</p> <p>percent [1] - 44:29</p> <p>perhaps [11] - 5:18, 7:14, 11:19, 19:25, 42:15, 51:14, 59:30, 66:8, 70:12, 79:26, 89:30</p> <p>period [5] - 3:20, 22:7, 24:11, 45:1, 68:8</p> <p>permitted [1] - 87:18</p> <p>person [33] - 5:11, 6:26, 13:9, 17:3, 17:11, 20:16, 20:30, 22:3, 22:13, 22:25, 23:22, 26:3, 26:15, 28:10, 34:24, 35:1, 36:20, 37:10, 38:28, 39:2, 44:7, 44:8, 51:8, 64:11, 64:19, 65:3, 69:5, 69:26, 86:24, 87:18, 89:16</p> <p>person's [3] - 22:26, 22:27, 39:29</p> <p>personal [5] - 10:11, 35:25, 36:10, 36:16, 36:20</p> <p>personally [4] - 11:24, 27:5, 77:27, 84:29</p> <p>personnel [1] - 43:12</p> <p>persons [1] - 45:15</p> <p>perturb [1] - 84:15</p> <p>Peter [8] - 8:20, 9:6, 13:8, 13:26, 13:28, 26:24, 47:23, 48:10</p> <p>Phoenix [1] - 6:8</p> <p>phone [6] - 34:24, 57:14, 57:16, 66:25, 77:19, 78:5</p> <p>phrase [4] - 8:13, 10:29, 20:7, 38:30</p> <p>picture [2] - 20:30, 54:28</p> <p>piece [14] - 15:24, 21:1, 25:27, 37:25, 39:5, 39:26, 47:25, 50:23,</p>	<p>50:26, 50:28, 53:23, 64:13, 64:24, 64:27</p> <p>pieces [4] - 21:3, 30:5, 64:8, 74:29</p> <p>pipes [2] - 42:27, 74:21</p> <p>PIRA [7] - 14:16, 14:25, 15:18, 15:20, 15:22, 40:5, 40:13</p> <p>place [16] - 17:5, 20:3, 23:18, 26:25, 28:9, 28:10, 44:6, 46:12, 69:23, 73:4, 73:26, 74:22, 77:2, 79:22, 86:25, 86:28</p> <p>placed [2] - 29:27, 46:1</p> <p>places [7] - 42:26, 43:29, 44:15, 60:1, 74:13, 74:17, 91:11</p> <p>plain [1] - 6:18</p> <p>plan [6] - 44:1, 71:13, 71:17, 71:18, 71:22, 71:23</p> <p>planned [3] - 42:28, 71:3, 73:27</p> <p>planning [6] - 43:15, 43:17, 43:26, 71:17, 73:1, 74:27</p> <p>platform [1] - 39:14</p> <p>plus [1] - 61:4</p> <p>point [20] - 5:23, 7:25, 8:4, 8:15, 12:23, 21:19, 23:14, 23:16, 29:1, 29:13, 31:5, 38:24, 40:1, 46:3, 48:17, 56:28, 59:16, 60:24, 72:30, 86:10</p> <p>pointers [1] - 37:24</p> <p>pointing [2] - 28:17, 87:5</p> <p>police [12] - 28:26, 36:25, 37:14, 42:24, 43:21, 43:28, 49:24, 52:25, 57:5, 61:6, 74:1, 84:24</p> <p>policemen [2] - 52:20, 52:23</p> <p>pooled [1] - 55:9</p> <p>poor [2] - 63:19, 72:21</p> <p>pop [1] - 39:11</p> <p>popping [1] - 29:20</p> <p>posed [2] - 41:18, 41:23</p> <p>position [6] - 23:9, 25:19, 32:16, 37:10, 45:14, 70:1</p> <p>positions [1] - 70:3</p> <p>possession [2] - 10:17, 31:15</p> <p>possibility [2] - 37:7, 87:3</p> <p>possible [6] - 19:15, 19:28, 74:26, 79:19, 89:9, 89:27</p> <p>possibly [5] - 40:26, 55:18, 72:28, 76:1, 87:16</p> <p>potential [5] - 19:6, 21:10, 25:30, 27:15, 39:27</p> <p>potentially [1] - 69:17</p> <p>practice [2] - 8:8, 80:24</p>	

<p>pre [1] - 12:21 pre-empt [1] - 12:21 precaution [1] - 66:18 precautions [4] - 35:4, 35:8, 35:13, 66:16 precisely [1] - 28:16 predecessor [1] - 83:16 premises [1] - 60:1 Prenty [1] - 33:7 preparation [2] - 17:9, 31:18 prepared [8] - 8:20, 8:24, 11:15, 49:9, 62:6, 62:8, 85:7, 91:12 preparing [1] - 32:15 presence [4] - 53:14, 60:14, 74:1, 74:4 President [2] - 36:14, 36:17 presumably [1] - 55:14 presume [7] - 3:6, 7:17, 26:6, 34:3, 37:5, 64:9, 68:14 pretences [1] - 14:5 pretty [2] - 53:12, 63:27 prevent [1] - 66:8 prevention [1] - 53:15 previous [1] - 72:9 previously [1] - 89:27 primary [1] - 46:13 priority [1] - 37:16 probing [1] - 65:3 problem [3] - 27:13, 79:16, 79:17 procedure [1] - 39:16 proceed [1] - 45:15 Process [3] - 33:25, 34:10, 35:20 process [3] - 26:1, 27:24, 69:1 produced [3] - 17:23, 25:6 professional [3] - 38:9, 38:11, 61:25 profile [1] - 23:5 programme [1] - 22:4 progressing [1] - 13:29 promoted [4] - 2:18, 3:3, 3:25, 3:28 propaganda [1] - 70:12 proper [3] - 29:2, 51:22, 80:24 properly [1] - 82:8 prosecuting [1] - 14:7 prosecution [1] - 67:4 protect [1] - 74:14 protection [2] - 5:17, 8:11 protective [2] - 43:11, 75:1 protocols [2] - 87:1, 87:6 prove [1] - 63:2 proved [1] - 64:25 provide [1] - 64:3 provided [9] - 49:7, 53:3, 53:18, 56:2, 56:7, 56:8, 59:9, 92:25, 93:12 providing [3] - 47:9,</p>	<p>47:14, 56:4 Provisional [4] - 47:10, 47:14, 48:13, 48:24 précis [1] - 14:14 PSNI [1] - 10:8 public [3] - 15:11, 28:20, 72:6 pulse [1] - 34:4 purpose [6] - 29:22, 46:3, 46:5, 46:13, 54:24, 55:12 put [28] - 13:5, 13:11, 14:13, 15:10, 15:11, 17:18, 17:19, 17:20, 20:7, 27:23, 28:10, 29:1, 29:22, 30:1, 42:30, 51:12, 51:16, 55:10, 62:10, 71:27, 73:26, 77:2, 83:5, 86:15, 88:30, 91:14, 92:18 puts [4] - 37:18, 37:19, 64:14 putting [2] - 28:4, 80:6</p>	<p>reality [2] - 8:8, 64:15 really [9] - 33:26, 34:22, 37:23, 57:16, 58:12, 63:18, 69:17, 91:1, 91:3 reason [8] - 8:10, 8:12, 18:11, 23:3, 61:13, 68:27, 84:2, 90:3 reasons [4] - 5:15, 20:29, 60:30, 69:28 reassure [1] - 40:27 recalled [1] - 45:29 receive [1] - 50:9 received [8] - 3:1, 15:16, 18:24, 30:7, 30:9, 30:16, 51:5, 69:9 receives [1] - 49:29 receiving [1] - 77:21 recipient [3] - 78:2, 87:14, 87:28 recollection [1] - 41:7 record [5] - 49:13, 79:19, 86:14, 89:17, 90:4 recording [1] - 33:8 records [1] - 8:28 refer [1] - 23:13 reference [11] - 17:15, 18:14, 19:26, 23:19, 25:7, 30:4, 31:6, 31:14, 31:19, 48:19, 51:5 references [1] - 65:19 referred [15] - 11:27, 14:24, 15:12, 22:10, 24:21, 25:10, 46:10, 53:24, 62:3, 63:22, 63:26, 68:7, 70:16, 81:28, 93:3 referring [5] - 11:18, 25:24, 30:8, 48:20, 50:14 refers [4] - 14:3, 14:4, 30:6, 64:10 reflection [1] - 23:6 refuse [1] - 62:23 regards [1] - 44:3 regular [11] - 10:9, 11:5, 13:27, 34:16, 58:29, 69:6, 69:12, 74:20, 74:21, 77:14, 77:18 regularly [5] - 9:27, 38:1, 70:3, 72:18, 84:25 related [1] - 92:19 relates [1] - 10:25 relating [1] - 8:20 relation [16] - 20:16, 22:13, 31:28, 40:4, 42:22, 53:22, 60:13, 63:21, 68:10, 69:25, 71:2, 73:11, 80:23, 81:14, 92:18, 93:2 relationship [2] - 75:7, 75:10 relative [2] - 14:17, 40:6 relaying [1] - 84:3 relevant [3] - 24:12, 24:19, 41:30 reluctant [1] - 40:21 remained [1] - 3:26 remember [12] - 9:27,</p>	<p>10:20, 19:8, 22:1, 41:1, 42:19, 52:22, 52:24, 52:26, 55:16, 62:16, 81:8 remembering [2] - 18:12, 84:2 remembers [1] - 86:18 removed [1] - 65:4 removes [1] - 64:14 repeating [4] - 27:13, 27:14, 39:3, 87:23 Report [1] - 93:2 report [48] - 8:19, 8:23, 14:3, 15:10, 15:13, 15:20, 16:15, 17:9, 17:14, 24:9, 25:7, 25:8, 26:8, 27:2, 27:7, 27:8, 30:4, 30:6, 30:7, 30:16, 30:22, 31:7, 31:19, 31:24, 31:25, 32:15, 34:2, 46:27, 49:9, 49:14, 49:17, 49:22, 51:18, 61:7, 61:24, 76:27, 79:23, 81:18, 85:8, 86:4, 86:6, 87:10, 87:27, 88:21, 90:4, 90:8, 93:3, 93:9 reported [8] - 59:2, 76:25, 77:3, 77:5, 77:26, 78:16, 79:13, 88:9 reporting [3] - 58:28, 59:3, 69:21 reportings [2] - 18:21, 25:12 reports [4] - 34:6, 49:15, 69:14 reports" [1] - 22:22 repository [1] - 16:28 reputation [3] - 38:24, 44:18, 45:6 request [5] - 8:30, 9:1, 9:3, 78:27, 79:1 requested [1] - 13:10 require [2] - 71:24, 74:27 requirement [1] - 75:3 requirements [1] - 54:16 research [2] - 9:19, 11:17 reservations [1] - 31:21 reserve [1] - 45:14 resort [1] - 91:23 respect [10] - 21:28, 21:30, 28:3, 35:12, 47:8, 47:22, 48:27, 91:12, 91:13, 91:15 Response [4] - 2:27, 3:12, 53:7, 53:30 response [1] - 42:12 responsibility [2] - 3:27, 10:5 result [12] - 2:22, 6:16, 8:21, 11:22, 14:19, 22:1, 22:2, 24:5, 24:27, 40:8, 45:30, 63:15 RESUMED [1] - 1:1 retired [4] - 1:5, 4:2, 21:13, 45:22 return [1] - 73:23 rid [3] - 28:24, 71:20,</p>	<p>79:17 rightly [1] - 82:29 risk [8] - 27:13, 37:18, 37:19, 43:23, 46:29, 58:4, 79:4, 87:23 road [1] - 72:20 Road [1] - 77:17 roads [2] - 15:21, 15:22 roadway [1] - 44:14 robberies [2] - 4:17, 70:19 robbery [4] - 2:24, 2:25, 2:26, 70:24 ROBINSON [2] - 29:26, 52:2 role [1] - 88:3 root [2] - 39:1, 58:19 roughly [1] - 34:1 route [1] - 73:4 routes [1] - 72:27 routines [1] - 38:2 RUC [19] - 17:28, 30:14, 47:29, 47:30, 56:2, 56:7, 57:4, 58:5, 58:6, 71:9, 71:10, 75:7, 76:17, 76:27, 84:7, 84:9, 85:16, 89:28, 92:16 rule [3] - 36:21, 36:27, 36:30 rules [4] - 57:7, 76:23, 80:11, 87:3 rumour [5] - 39:3, 39:4, 62:22, 63:2 rumours [4] - 28:16, 38:21, 38:22, 90:10 run [1] - 53:6 running [1] - 36:25</p>
<p>pre [1] - 12:21 pre-empt [1] - 12:21 precaution [1] - 66:18 precautions [4] - 35:4, 35:8, 35:13, 66:16 precisely [1] - 28:16 predecessor [1] - 83:16 premises [1] - 60:1 Prenty [1] - 33:7 preparation [2] - 17:9, 31:18 prepared [8] - 8:20, 8:24, 11:15, 49:9, 62:6, 62:8, 85:7, 91:12 preparing [1] - 32:15 presence [4] - 53:14, 60:14, 74:1, 74:4 President [2] - 36:14, 36:17 presumably [1] - 55:14 presume [7] - 3:6, 7:17, 26:6, 34:3, 37:5, 64:9, 68:14 pretences [1] - 14:5 pretty [2] - 53:12, 63:27 prevent [1] - 66:8 prevention [1] - 53:15 previous [1] - 72:9 previously [1] - 89:27 primary [1] - 46:13 priority [1] - 37:16 probing [1] - 65:3 problem [3] - 27:13, 79:16, 79:17 procedure [1] - 39:16 proceed [1] - 45:15 Process [3] - 33:25, 34:10, 35:20 process [3] - 26:1, 27:24, 69:1 produced [3] - 17:23, 25:6 professional [3] - 38:9, 38:11, 61:25 profile [1] - 23:5 programme [1] - 22:4 progressing [1] - 13:29 promoted [4] - 2:18, 3:3, 3:25, 3:28 propaganda [1] - 70:12 proper [3] - 29:2, 51:22, 80:24 properly [1] - 82:8 prosecuting [1] - 14:7 prosecution [1] - 67:4 protect [1] - 74:14 protection [2] - 5:17, 8:11 protective [2] - 43:11, 75:1 protocols [2] - 87:1, 87:6 prove [1] - 63:2 proved [1] - 64:25 provide [1] - 64:3 provided [9] - 49:7, 53:3, 53:18, 56:2, 56:7, 56:8, 59:9, 92:25, 93:12 providing [3] - 47:9,</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Q</p> <p>quality [3] - 19:15, 60:19, 64:19 quality [1] - 69:25 queries [1] - 12:2 query [2] - 11:9, 11:10 questioned [1] - 21:29 questions [13] - 19:12, 42:12, 45:12, 45:23, 45:26, 51:28, 51:30, 52:2, 52:4, 65:3, 65:21, 81:5, 81:12 quickly [1] - 2:7 quite [19] - 9:29, 22:4, 25:14, 26:28, 28:7, 33:24, 35:24, 43:9, 43:27, 43:28, 43:30, 44:9, 44:14, 49:2, 74:18, 80:27, 82:25, 83:27, 87:27</p>	<p>reality [2] - 8:8, 64:15 really [9] - 33:26, 34:22, 37:23, 57:16, 58:12, 63:18, 69:17, 91:1, 91:3 reason [8] - 8:10, 8:12, 18:11, 23:3, 61:13, 68:27, 84:2, 90:3 reasons [4] - 5:15, 20:29, 60:30, 69:28 reassure [1] - 40:27 recalled [1] - 45:29 receive [1] - 50:9 received [8] - 3:1, 15:16, 18:24, 30:7, 30:9, 30:16, 51:5, 69:9 receives [1] - 49:29 receiving [1] - 77:21 recipient [3] - 78:2, 87:14, 87:28 recollection [1] - 41:7 record [5] - 49:13, 79:19, 86:14, 89:17, 90:4 recording [1] - 33:8 records [1] - 8:28 refer [1] - 23:13 reference [11] - 17:15, 18:14, 19:26, 23:19, 25:7, 30:4, 31:6, 31:14, 31:19, 48:19, 51:5 references [1] - 65:19 referred [15] - 11:27, 14:24, 15:12, 22:10, 24:21, 25:10, 46:10, 53:24, 62:3, 63:22, 63:26, 68:7, 70:16, 81:28, 93:3 referring [5] - 11:18, 25:24, 30:8, 48:20, 50:14 refers [4] - 14:3, 14:4, 30:6, 64:10 reflection [1] - 23:6 refuse [1] - 62:23 regards [1] - 44:3 regular [11] - 10:9, 11:5, 13:27, 34:16, 58:29, 69:6, 69:12, 74:20, 74:21, 77:14, 77:18 regularly [5] - 9:27, 38:1, 70:3, 72:18, 84:25 related [1] - 92:19 relates [1] - 10:25 relating [1] - 8:20 relation [16] - 20:16, 22:13, 31:28, 40:4, 42:22, 53:22, 60:13, 63:21, 68:10, 69:25, 71:2, 73:11, 80:23, 81:14, 92:18, 93:2 relationship [2] - 75:7, 75:10 relative [2] - 14:17, 40:6 relaying [1] - 84:3 relevant [3] - 24:12, 24:19, 41:30 reluctant [1] - 40:21 remained [1] - 3:26 remember [12] - 9:27,</p>	<p>10:20, 19:8, 22:1, 41:1, 42:19, 52:22, 52:24, 52:26, 55:16, 62:16, 81:8 remembering [2] - 18:12, 84:2 remembers [1] - 86:18 removed [1] - 65:4 removes [1] - 64:14 repeating [4] - 27:13, 27:14, 39:3, 87:23 Report [1] - 93:2 report [48] - 8:19, 8:23, 14:3, 15:10, 15:13, 15:20, 16:15, 17:9, 17:14, 24:9, 25:7, 25:8, 26:8, 27:2, 27:7, 27:8, 30:4, 30:6, 30:7, 30:16, 30:22, 31:7, 31:19, 31:24, 31:25, 32:15, 34:2, 46:27, 49:9, 49:14, 49:17, 49:22, 51:18, 61:7, 61:24, 76:27, 79:23, 81:18, 85:8, 86:4, 86:6, 87:10, 87:27, 88:21, 90:4, 90:8, 93:3, 93:9 reported [8] - 59:2, 76:25, 77:3, 77:5, 77:26, 78:16, 79:13, 88:9 reporting [3] - 58:28, 59:3, 69:21 reportings [2] - 18:21, 25:12 reports [4] - 34:6, 49:15, 69:14 reports" [1] - 22:22 repository [1] - 16:28 reputation [3] - 38:24, 44:18, 45:6 request [5] - 8:30, 9:1, 9:3, 78:27, 79:1 requested [1] - 13:10 require [2] - 71:24, 74:27 requirement [1] - 75:3 requirements [1] - 54:16 research [2] - 9:19, 11:17 reservations [1] - 31:21 reserve [1] - 45:14 resort [1] - 91:23 respect [10] - 21:28, 21:30, 28:3, 35:12, 47:8, 47:22, 48:27, 91:12, 91:13, 91:15 Response [4] - 2:27, 3:12, 53:7, 53:30 response [1] - 42:12 responsibility [2] - 3:27, 10:5 result [12] - 2:22, 6:16, 8:21, 11:22, 14:19, 22:1, 22:2, 24:5, 24:27, 40:8, 45:30, 63:15 RESUMED [1] - 1:1 retired [4] - 1:5, 4:2, 21:13, 45:22 return [1] - 73:23 rid [3] - 28:24, 71:20,</p>	<p>79:17 rightly [1] - 82:29 risk [8] - 27:13, 37:18, 37:19, 43:23, 46:29, 58:4, 79:4, 87:23 road [1] - 72:20 Road [1] - 77:17 roads [2] - 15:21, 15:22 roadway [1] - 44:14 robberies [2] - 4:17, 70:19 robbery [4] - 2:24, 2:25, 2:26, 70:24 ROBINSON [2] - 29:26, 52:2 role [1] - 88:3 root [2] - 39:1, 58:19 roughly [1] - 34:1 route [1] - 73:4 routes [1] - 72:27 routines [1] - 38:2 RUC [19] - 17:28, 30:14, 47:29, 47:30, 56:2, 56:7, 57:4, 58:5, 58:6, 71:9, 71:10, 75:7, 76:17, 76:27, 84:7, 84:9, 85:16, 89:28, 92:16 rule [3] - 36:21, 36:27, 36:30 rules [4] - 57:7, 76:23, 80:11, 87:3 rumour [5] - 39:3, 39:4, 62:22, 63:2 rumours [4] - 28:16, 38:21, 38:22, 90:10 run [1] - 53:6 running [1] - 36:25</p>
<p>pre [1] - 12:21 pre-empt [1] - 12:21 precaution [1] - 66:18 precautions [4] - 35:4, 35:8, 35:13, 66:16 precisely [1] - 28:16 predecessor [1] - 83:16 premises [1] - 60:1 Prenty [1] - 33:7 preparation [2] - 17:9, 31:18 prepared [8] - 8:20, 8:24, 11:15, 49:9, 62:6, 62:8, 85:7, 91:12 preparing [1] - 32:15 presence [4] - 53:14, 60:14, 74:1, 74:4 President [2] - 36:14, 36:17 presumably [1] - 55:14 presume [7] - 3:6, 7:17, 26:6, 34:3, 37:5, 64:9, 68:14 pretences [1] - 14:5 pretty [2] - 53:12, 63:27 prevent [1] - 66:8 prevention [1] - 53:15 previous [1] - 72:9 previously [1] - 89:27 primary [1] - 46:13 priority [1] - 37:16 probing [1] - 65:3 problem [3] - 27:13, 79:16, 79:17 procedure [1] - 39:16 proceed [1] - 45:15 Process [3] - 33:25, 34:10, 35:20 process [3] - 26:1, 27:24, 69:1 produced [3] - 17:23, 25:6 professional [3] - 38:9, 38:11, 61:25 profile [1] - 23:5 programme [1] - 22:4 progressing [1] - 13:29 promoted [4] - 2:18, 3:3, 3:25, 3:28 propaganda [1] - 70:12 proper [3] - 29:2, 51:22, 80:24 properly [1] - 82:8 prosecuting [1] - 14:7 prosecution [1] - 67:4 protect [1] - 74:14 protection [2] - 5:17, 8:11 protective [2] - 43:11, 75:1 protocols [2] - 87:1, 87:6 prove [1] - 63:2 proved [1] - 64:25 provide [1] - 64:3 provided [9] - 49:7, 53:3, 53:18, 56:2, 56:7, 56:8, 59:9, 92:25, 93:12 providing [3] - 47:9,</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">R</p> <p>radio [1] - 62:26 ran [1] - 47:1 rank [3] - 2:18, 16:12, 16:22 ranking [1] - 44:4 ranks [1] - 4:5 rather [7] - 23:17, 29:5, 49:6, 57:25, 60:15, 63:5, 70:29 raw [1] - 39:26 RE [1] - 81:25 RE-EXAMINED [1] - 81:25 reaction [1] - 67:7 read [4] - 27:7, 27:8, 28:19, 47:24 reading [1] - 84:5 ready [2] - 52:5, 53:15 real [2] - 62:20, 62:29</p>	<p>reality [2] - 8:8, 64:15 really [9] - 33:26, 34:22, 37:23, 57:16, 58:12, 63:18, 69:17, 91:1, 91:3 reason [8] - 8:10, 8:12, 18:11, 23:3, 61:13, 68:27, 84:2, 90:3 reasons [4] - </p>		

<p>searches [16] - 4:15, 4:16, 4:26, 4:28, 5:6, 5:10, 5:13, 7:11, 8:14, 13:4, 42:25, 44:14, 45:3, 54:19, 74:19, 83:22</p> <p>searching [1] - 7:18</p> <p>second [6] - 4:30, 5:1, 30:6, 31:9, 31:16, 86:28</p> <p>second-guess [2] - 31:9, 31:16</p> <p>secondly [1] - 13:22</p> <p>section [4] - 3:14, 17:1, 21:7, 21:16</p> <p>Section [1] - 3:24</p> <p>sections [1] - 25:20</p> <p>security [7] - 3:27, 4:16, 11:8, 73:6, 73:20, 74:4, 85:16</p> <p>Security [35] - 2:19, 3:13, 3:20, 3:24, 3:26, 4:9, 11:13, 13:19, 15:2, 18:9, 18:17, 24:19, 27:1, 32:29, 49:17, 49:23, 52:9, 57:14, 57:19, 58:22, 58:25, 59:4, 59:5, 59:9, 59:12, 59:21, 61:16, 77:16, 77:27, 78:13, 78:19, 82:6, 85:1, 86:19, 88:4</p> <p>see [43] - 10:4, 11:11, 12:1, 14:3, 15:4, 15:27, 16:3, 16:9, 18:10, 18:13, 18:14, 19:23, 20:2, 20:8, 24:27, 25:28, 25:29, 27:16, 28:11, 29:14, 29:22, 31:18, 34:23, 38:26, 39:7, 46:17, 50:28, 54:25, 55:4, 62:25, 64:2, 65:3, 68:12, 68:17, 75:24, 77:10, 83:21, 84:28, 84:29, 90:9, 90:27, 90:30</p> <p>seeing [5] - 22:1, 24:1, 33:4, 45:29, 45:30</p> <p>seek [1] - 48:13</p> <p>seem [2] - 4:4, 90:28</p> <p>selected [14] - 44:25, 45:9, 49:4, 56:11, 56:13, 59:6, 59:7, 59:24, 82:4, 82:9, 82:15, 82:19, 92:8</p> <p>selecting [1] - 92:3</p> <p>selection [1] - 82:10</p> <p>self [1] - 10:26</p> <p>send [1] - 59:11</p> <p>senior [6] - 46:20, 52:25, 56:12, 61:10, 71:8, 71:11</p> <p>sense [4] - 20:5, 20:29, 43:9, 69:19</p> <p>sensitive [5] - 53:12, 53:27, 54:1, 82:25, 82:26</p> <p>sent [3] - 32:29, 59:19, 82:6</p> <p>separate [4] - 13:16,</p>	<p>19:11, 25:11, 28:25</p> <p>September [5] - 3:18, 32:7, 32:9, 33:21, 65:22</p> <p>Sergeant [13] - 2:18, 14:6, 14:7, 14:18, 40:7, 44:16, 45:22, 55:25, 56:3, 59:19, 84:7, 84:17, 85:15</p> <p>sergeant [2] - 6:30, 7:2</p> <p>sergeants [2] - 6:12, 6:30</p> <p>series [1] - 91:10</p> <p>serious [21] - 18:2, 20:5, 23:6, 41:30, 43:3, 58:10, 71:12, 74:30, 77:4, 78:1, 78:7, 78:9, 79:12, 79:14, 79:20, 81:3, 84:28, 85:23, 85:25, 87:17, 88:13</p> <p>seriously [1] - 20:2</p> <p>seriousness [2] - 16:25, 86:8</p> <p>serves [1] - 30:29</p> <p>set [7] - 2:21, 2:27, 15:22, 55:21, 55:23, 73:20, 93:22</p> <p>setting [1] - 2:28</p> <p>shadow [2] - 27:15, 27:22</p> <p>shadows [1] - 50:18</p> <p>shaken [1] - 91:3</p> <p>shall [22] - 19:16, 19:20, 20:24, 29:1, 35:17, 35:22, 36:13, 36:14, 38:15, 39:30, 53:10, 53:15, 56:17, 59:10, 59:13, 60:23, 69:1, 70:17, 70:21, 73:21, 75:22, 87:18</p> <p>shared [1] - 85:14</p> <p>shock [1] - 84:19</p> <p>shooting [7] - 17:28, 30:14, 30:16, 30:22, 30:23, 47:29, 73:9</p> <p>short [10] - 10:18, 15:18, 15:25, 30:10, 38:29, 43:5, 43:9, 53:5, 57:23, 71:22</p> <p>short-circuiting [1] - 57:23</p> <p>shortly [2] - 10:20, 55:21</p> <p>shot [1] - 2:23</p> <p>show [2] - 9:21, 26:25</p> <p>showed [2] - 11:20, 17:11</p> <p>shown [7] - 11:13, 17:12, 18:5, 18:8, 18:30, 24:24, 48:11</p> <p>side [11] - 5:27, 5:28, 6:21, 11:8, 33:30, 34:1, 34:12, 35:8, 57:13, 74:2, 76:20</p> <p>sides [5] - 58:12, 71:15, 74:19, 78:23, 90:7</p> <p>sightings [1] - 58:30</p> <p>signals [1] - 37:5</p> <p>signature [2] - 11:16, 62:11</p> <p>signed [3] - 11:28, 25:8, 62:13</p> <p>significance [1] - 42:7</p>	<p>significant [3] - 15:9, 15:27, 71:24</p> <p>similar [3] - 23:24, 39:11, 75:27</p> <p>simple [3] - 8:12, 27:27, 27:28</p> <p>simply [3] - 33:14, 90:17, 91:7</p> <p>singular [1] - 18:8</p> <p>Siochana [32] - 20:11, 22:19, 22:30, 23:20, 23:21, 23:25, 28:13, 28:19, 29:3, 29:9, 29:14, 31:27, 31:29, 32:10, 35:18, 46:4, 46:15, 46:19, 46:20, 47:4, 48:16, 48:20, 48:21, 49:25, 49:29, 50:9, 58:4, 69:10, 75:7, 76:18, 91:2</p> <p>situation [2] - 54:23, 61:1</p> <p>size [1] - 55:24</p> <p>skills [1] - 55:14</p> <p>slang [1] - 61:3</p> <p>slight [1] - 79:26</p> <p>slightly [2] - 41:19, 41:24</p> <p>Sligo [2] - 52:14, 82:14</p> <p>Sligo-Leitrim [1] - 82:14</p> <p>slur [1] - 27:28</p> <p>small [11] - 4:26, 6:1, 22:27, 42:27, 42:30, 43:3, 43:10, 44:7, 74:9, 74:13, 74:20</p> <p>so-called [1] - 46:6</p> <p>soft [1] - 49:20</p> <p>someone [3] - 6:24, 16:11, 84:26</p> <p>sometime [2] - 27:7, 41:13</p> <p>sometimes [11] - 6:14, 9:25, 19:23, 23:29, 39:6, 42:29, 49:26, 50:12, 51:16, 53:9, 78:3</p> <p>soon [1] - 76:1</p> <p>sorry [22] - 7:21, 11:27, 20:23, 21:26, 22:17, 29:19, 32:3, 41:21, 56:2, 58:13, 60:19, 76:4, 76:19, 77:10, 78:30, 79:1, 79:25, 80:14, 82:8, 89:5, 93:12</p> <p>sort [8] - 2:7, 20:11, 24:7, 52:21, 70:11, 73:29, 79:17, 89:16</p> <p>source [24] - 5:3, 5:17, 5:18, 8:7, 8:10, 8:13, 19:11, 19:16, 19:21, 19:22, 20:24, 20:26, 20:27, 21:1, 21:4, 28:7, 51:21, 63:23, 63:27, 64:7, 64:18, 64:19, 64:25, 68:28</p> <p>south [8] - 5:26, 36:3, 36:10, 36:19, 42:21, 72:19, 76:19, 92:17</p> <p>southern [3] - 5:28, 74:2, 75:26</p> <p>speaking [1] - 64:12</p>	<p>special [1] - 36:15</p> <p>Special [20] - 2:15, 2:24, 3:11, 4:14, 5:2, 16:10, 16:15, 16:23, 32:17, 45:5, 48:28, 53:1, 59:3, 59:15, 76:6, 77:14, 77:15, 77:22, 80:28, 81:7</p> <p>specific [7] - 8:25, 34:21, 34:22, 38:8, 40:1, 84:21, 84:25</p> <p>speculation [1] - 62:22</p> <p>speculative [1] - 49:20</p> <p>spent [3] - 3:7, 4:4, 83:25</p> <p>sphere [1] - 84:12</p> <p>spoken [1] - 91:26</p> <p>spread [1] - 48:13</p> <p>Square [5] - 6:9, 44:22, 55:23, 56:16, 59:14</p> <p>Staff [1] - 31:28</p> <p>stage [9] - 9:11, 12:7, 32:12, 32:23, 33:22, 34:10, 53:21, 69:13, 69:30</p> <p>stand [1] - 63:2</p> <p>start [10] - 20:4, 20:6, 21:19, 23:18, 33:25, 37:5, 39:14, 58:18, 69:17, 69:23</p> <p>started [2] - 11:30, 37:16</p> <p>starting [4] - 21:19, 23:14, 23:16, 66:12</p> <p>state [5] - 36:18, 39:27, 48:1, 48:14, 55:13</p> <p>State [4] - 37:14, 58:12, 61:11, 70:9</p> <p>statement [13] - 2:6, 2:9, 10:18, 18:7, 24:8, 24:26, 25:18, 25:22, 32:7, 32:9, 42:11, 49:6, 69:27</p> <p>states [1] - 18:23</p> <p>stating [1] - 25:15</p> <p>Station [3] - 15:20, 17:29, 30:15</p> <p>station [8] - 7:20, 16:14, 34:8, 34:16, 47:30, 60:15, 60:16, 60:29</p> <p>stations [6] - 34:26, 35:11, 48:22, 54:22, 61:2, 72:19</p> <p>stay [1] - 40:27</p> <p>stepped [1] - 9:20</p> <p>stern [1] - 27:24</p> <p>still [5] - 23:10, 34:10, 35:21, 87:26, 89:9</p> <p>stone [1] - 38:19</p> <p>stop [1] - 39:1</p> <p>story [2] - 90:28, 90:29</p> <p>straight [2] - 60:6, 86:2</p> <p>straightaway [6] - 21:9, 61:3, 76:25, 77:3, 77:5, 85:26</p> <p>strange [2] - 77:23, 77:30</p> <p>strategic [4] - 23:25, 57:27, 73:17, 74:6</p> <p>strategy [1] - 77:8</p> <p>straying [1] - 38:14</p>	<p>Street [1] - 3:10</p> <p>strength [1] - 64:27</p> <p>strike [1] - 76:8</p> <p>string [1] - 37:26</p> <p>strong [1] - 49:13</p> <p>struck [1] - 14:9</p> <p>stuff [1] - 43:7</p> <p>subject [1] - 22:29</p> <p>subsequent [1] - 55:2</p> <p>subsequently [2] - 17:23, 92:25</p> <p>subversive [6] - 3:2, 4:8, 29:1, 29:21, 69:4, 69:22</p> <p>subversives [1] - 70:29</p> <p>subvert [1] - 58:12</p> <p>successful [1] - 46:30</p> <p>successfully [1] - 60:9</p> <p>successively [1] - 28:9</p> <p>suggest [3] - 25:12, 31:26, 68:11</p> <p>suggested [8] - 14:16, 14:19, 15:17, 15:20, 40:25, 43:20, 56:4, 69:26</p> <p>suggesting [5] - 14:22, 27:11, 32:6, 47:4, 57:4</p> <p>suggestion [8] - 8:25, 17:8, 27:30, 58:3, 70:26, 72:23, 79:26, 92:4</p> <p>suggestive [1] - 9:16</p> <p>suggests [2] - 15:24, 40:8</p> <p>Super [1] - 75:30</p> <p>superintendent [5] - 6:14, 7:3, 9:4, 16:10, 36:5</p> <p>Superintendent [75] - 3:19, 3:22, 3:24, 3:26, 6:10, 9:7, 9:12, 9:17, 11:15, 12:8, 13:27, 16:23, 16:30, 17:2, 22:2, 31:20, 33:1, 33:2, 33:19, 34:2, 34:15, 34:30, 52:30, 56:14, 57:14, 57:15, 57:19, 58:27, 59:8, 59:10, 59:12, 59:15, 60:20, 60:21, 60:22, 75:20, 76:3, 76:4, 76:7, 76:19, 76:20, 76:21, 76:30, 77:20, 78:5, 78:14, 78:15, 78:16, 78:18, 78:20, 79:27, 80:16, 80:27, 81:8, 82:6, 82:10, 82:12, 83:15, 83:17, 83:19, 84:6, 84:20, 85:8, 85:19, 86:23, 87:25, 88:21, 88:26, 91:27, 92:20</p> <p>superintendents [7] - 10:7, 33:27, 33:28, 33:29, 33:30, 76:17, 76:22</p> <p>supplied [3] - 20:19, 21:12, 92:19</p> <p>supply [2] - 43:5, 43:9</p> <p>supplying [1] - 5:11</p>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

<p>support [5] - 22:5, 27:19, 35:22, 39:8, 74:3</p> <p>suppose [12] - 21:2, 34:19, 35:5, 42:23, 48:25, 49:30, 51:8, 63:10, 63:15, 69:16, 74:5, 87:30</p> <p>supposed [1] - 87:19</p> <p>suppress [2] - 48:15, 89:23</p> <p>suppressed [3] - 89:13, 89:15, 89:20</p> <p>surely [1] - 27:27</p> <p>surfaced [1] - 15:5</p> <p>surprise [1] - 79:18</p> <p>surprised [2] - 89:4, 89:6</p> <p>surveillance [28] - 4:5, 22:4, 22:18, 29:22, 29:27, 29:30, 44:20, 44:23, 45:9, 46:1, 46:3, 46:11, 49:5, 53:29, 54:17, 54:21, 54:24, 55:5, 55:8, 55:22, 56:16, 56:18, 59:3, 69:6, 69:12, 81:29, 82:27, 83:1</p> <p>Surveillance [8] - 3:15, 3:22, 4:6, 10:5, 54:1, 54:12, 55:21, 60:14</p> <p>suspect [3] - 69:17, 81:15, 87:19</p> <p>suspicion [3] - 12:16, 29:14, 38:4</p> <p>sustain [1] - 50:19</p> <p>sustained [1] - 40:23</p> <p>SWORN [1] - 2:1</p> <p>system [11] - 9:4, 11:18, 12:24, 12:30, 13:5, 13:16, 20:2, 21:17, 51:15, 57:24, 75:27</p>	<p>teams [1] - 55:26</p> <p>technical [2] - 22:5, 46:10</p> <p>telephone [1] - 60:27</p> <p>ten [3] - 6:12, 60:26, 74:15</p> <p>tend [1] - 63:5</p> <p>terms [6] - 44:12, 49:28, 52:16, 55:2, 71:3, 91:26</p> <p>terrain [1] - 43:28</p> <p>terribly [1] - 29:19</p> <p>terrorist [7] - 19:28, 37:13, 37:29, 38:9, 56:25, 58:11, 74:6</p> <p>terrorists [1] - 24:10</p> <p>than.. [1] - 29:5</p> <p>that" [1] - 87:10</p> <p>that.. [1] - 62:30</p> <p>THE [9] - 1:1, 45:19, 52:7, 67:10, 68:1, 81:25, 94:1</p> <p>themselves [1] - 6:4</p> <p>THEN [1] - 67:10</p> <p>then.. [1] - 13:12</p> <p>there'd [1] - 74:11</p> <p>therefore [4] - 9:14, 58:21, 79:30, 89:19</p> <p>thinking [2] - 57:23, 63:22</p> <p>third [1] - 18:23</p> <p>thorough [2] - 48:10, 81:11</p> <p>thoroughly [2] - 19:10, 47:6</p> <p>threat [11] - 14:16, 14:19, 14:24, 32:27, 32:28, 35:17, 40:5, 40:8, 75:23, 85:16, 92:16</p> <p>three [21] - 3:7, 3:9, 5:9, 6:11, 7:11, 15:7, 18:14, 18:15, 18:20, 18:29, 25:11, 52:11, 57:15, 63:21, 64:7, 64:8, 64:14, 64:16, 68:6, 69:14, 93:6</p> <p>threes [1] - 74:10</p> <p>throughout [1] - 61:30</p> <p>thrown [1] - 62:18</p> <p>throws [1] - 64:17</p> <p>Tim [2] - 11:15, 11:25</p> <p>TO [1] - 68:3</p> <p>Toby [2] - 8:22, 10:14</p> <p>today [3] - 1:5, 48:7, 93:7</p> <p>today's [1] - 93:15</p> <p>together [6] - 21:3, 51:13, 55:9, 55:10, 85:1</p> <p>tolerant [1] - 46:21</p> <p>tolerated [1] - 46:23</p> <p>Tom [10] - 24:17, 32:21, 32:30, 33:1, 83:7, 83:15, 85:24, 86:29, 88:14, 89:25</p> <p>tomorrow [1] - 93:22</p> <p>took [2] - 79:22, 85:7</p> <p>top [1] - 86:2</p> <p>topic [2] - 18:21, 28:5</p> <p>totally [4] - 12:24, 49:14, 54:23, 62:28</p> <p>touch [2] - 40:27, 62:18</p> <p>touched [3] - 70:14,</p>	<p>71:18, 75:15</p> <p>tough [4] - 45:6, 48:28, 74:1</p> <p>towards [2] - 10:12, 70:29</p> <p>towers [2] - 71:16, 74:3</p> <p>town [1] - 60:5</p> <p>Toyota [1] - 84:3</p> <p>traced [1] - 65:14</p> <p>trade [4] - 56:17, 56:24, 82:26, 82:30</p> <p>traffic [1] - 14:6</p> <p>trail [1] - 85:29</p> <p>trained [4] - 44:27, 54:13, 55:26</p> <p>training [3] - 55:12, 81:29, 92:6</p> <p>transcript [3] - 41:12, 65:20, 84:6</p> <p>transfer [1] - 22:6</p> <p>transferred [6] - 3:10, 3:13, 3:19, 3:20, 4:1, 79:4</p> <p>transpired [1] - 18:20</p> <p>trap [1] - 73:20</p> <p>travel [4] - 6:28, 34:13, 34:16, 35:3</p> <p>travelled [2] - 33:19, 88:14</p> <p>travelling [8] - 31:21, 35:7, 35:19, 36:2, 36:3, 36:19, 37:21, 92:17</p> <p>trawl [3] - 11:23, 15:9, 39:7</p> <p>trawling [1] - 13:13</p> <p>treated [1] - 49:28</p> <p>trial [4] - 14:8, 14:17, 40:6, 40:19</p> <p>TRIBUNAL [4] - 1:1, 67:10, 68:1, 94:1</p> <p>Tribunal [26] - 2:6, 8:18, 11:12, 14:10, 15:6, 16:4, 18:4, 18:19, 20:18, 28:4, 42:12, 49:9, 68:10, 72:5, 79:28, 79:29, 83:14, 84:5, 85:6, 85:10, 89:19, 90:22, 91:9, 91:17, 91:26, 93:13</p> <p>Tribunal's [1] - 92:13</p> <p>tricky [1] - 53:10</p> <p>tried [1] - 65:5</p> <p>trivialised [1] - 30:24</p> <p>troops [1] - 38:15</p> <p>trouble [1] - 23:9</p> <p>true [2] - 30:1, 71:1</p> <p>trust [1] - 66:30</p> <p>trusting [1] - 86:24</p> <p>truth [2] - 64:29, 65:1</p> <p>try [11] - 20:6, 28:7, 28:11, 37:17, 38:19, 39:7, 39:12, 39:13, 50:11, 70:23, 79:17</p> <p>trying [6] - 24:30, 26:10, 28:27, 29:22, 41:29, 58:12</p> <p>Tuesday [1] - 93:26</p> <p>TUESDAY [1] - 94:1</p>	<p>turn [2] - 7:28, 41:4</p> <p>turned [2] - 9:15, 50:4</p> <p>twelve [2] - 6:12, 74:15</p> <p>twice [1] - 72:9</p> <p>two [25] - 2:22, 6:11, 6:30, 12:5, 15:16, 17:28, 18:25, 28:21, 30:14, 34:20, 44:23, 44:27, 45:1, 45:8, 45:9, 47:29, 49:4, 55:17, 64:16, 68:12, 71:8, 71:11, 72:21, 82:12, 82:15</p> <p>two-week [1] - 45:1</p> <p>twos [1] - 74:9</p> <p>type [1] - 76:28</p> <p>typed [1] - 32:28</p>	<p>55:10, 55:13, 55:21, 55:23, 57:11, 58:28, 62:10, 63:2, 65:12, 68:12, 75:17, 77:8, 78:9, 78:19, 79:23, 83:22, 85:19, 90:10, 91:13</p> <p>upcoming [2] - 14:17, 40:19</p> <p>urgency [2] - 57:12, 75:29</p> <p>urgent [2] - 57:10, 78:4</p> <p>useful [1] - 56:25</p> <p>usefulness [1] - 59:29</p> <p>usual [1] - 76:9</p>
T			U	V
<p>table [1] - 69:1</p> <p>tack [1] - 38:13</p> <p>tactic [4] - 48:18, 70:2, 70:20, 70:24</p> <p>tangible [14] - 10:29, 11:16, 11:21, 12:13, 12:20, 62:5, 62:14, 62:17, 62:19, 62:21, 62:27, 63:6, 63:17, 63:18</p> <p>tape [1] - 33:8</p> <p>tapes [1] - 33:10</p> <p>target [2] - 28:11, 29:27</p> <p>targeting [1] - 57:1</p> <p>targets [3] - 71:10, 71:29</p> <p>task [2] - 20:4, 81:4</p> <p>Task [14] - 2:19, 2:22, 4:9, 4:14, 5:8, 5:21, 5:30, 6:3, 6:29, 52:9, 53:7, 58:24, 58:26, 83:23</p> <p>task-master [1] - 81:4</p> <p>tasked [3] - 20:18, 20:20, 20:23</p> <p>tasking [2] - 19:20, 23:25</p> <p>team [3] - 6:10, 21:6, 54:4</p>	<p>threes [1] - 74:10</p> <p>throughout [1] - 61:30</p> <p>thrown [1] - 62:18</p> <p>throws [1] - 64:17</p> <p>Tim [2] - 11:15, 11:25</p> <p>TO [1] - 68:3</p> <p>Toby [2] - 8:22, 10:14</p> <p>today [3] - 1:5, 48:7, 93:7</p> <p>today's [1] - 93:15</p> <p>together [6] - 21:3, 51:13, 55:9, 55:10, 85:1</p> <p>tolerant [1] - 46:21</p> <p>tolerated [1] - 46:23</p> <p>Tom [10] - 24:17, 32:21, 32:30, 33:1, 83:7, 83:15, 85:24, 86:29, 88:14, 89:25</p> <p>tomorrow [1] - 93:22</p> <p>took [2] - 79:22, 85:7</p> <p>top [1] - 86:2</p> <p>topic [2] - 18:21, 28:5</p> <p>totally [4] - 12:24, 49:14, 54:23, 62:28</p> <p>touch [2] - 40:27, 62:18</p> <p>touched [3] - 70:14,</p>	<p>71:18, 75:15</p> <p>tough [4] - 45:6, 48:28, 74:1</p> <p>towards [2] - 10:12, 70:29</p> <p>towers [2] - 71:16, 74:3</p> <p>town [1] - 60:5</p> <p>Toyota [1] - 84:3</p> <p>traced [1] - 65:14</p> <p>trade [4] - 56:17, 56:24, 82:26, 82:30</p> <p>traffic [1] - 14:6</p> <p>trail [1] - 85:29</p> <p>trained [4] - 44:27, 54:13, 55:26</p> <p>training [3] - 55:12, 81:29, 92:6</p> <p>transcript [3] - 41:12, 65:20, 84:6</p> <p>transfer [1] - 22:6</p> <p>transferred [6] - 3:10, 3:13, 3:19, 3:20, 4:1, 79:4</p> <p>transpired [1] - 18:20</p> <p>trap [1] - 73:20</p> <p>travel [4] - 6:28, 34:13, 34:16, 35:3</p> <p>travelled [2] - 33:19, 88:14</p> <p>travelling [8] - 31:21, 35:7, 35:19, 36:2, 36:3, 36:19, 37:21, 92:17</p> <p>trawl [3] - 11:23, 15:9, 39:7</p> <p>trawling [1] - 13:13</p> <p>treated [1] - 49:28</p> <p>trial [4] - 14:8, 14:17, 40:6, 40:19</p> <p>TRIBUNAL [4] - 1:1, 67:10, 68:1, 94:1</p> <p>Tribunal [26] - 2:6, 8:18, 11:12, 14:10, 15:6, 16:4, 18:4, 18:19, 20:18, 28:4, 42:12, 49:9, 68:10, 72:5, 79:28, 79:29, 83:14, 84:5, 85:6, 85:10, 89:19, 90:22, 91:9, 91:17, 91:26, 93:13</p> <p>Tribunal's [1] - 92:13</p> <p>tricky [1] - 53:10</p> <p>tried [1] - 65:5</p> <p>trivialised [1] - 30:24</p> <p>troops [1] - 38:15</p> <p>trouble [1] - 23:9</p> <p>true [2] - 30:1, 71:1</p> <p>trust [1] - 66:30</p> <p>trusting [1] - 86:24</p> <p>truth [2] - 64:29, 65:1</p> <p>try [11] - 20:6, 28:7, 28:11, 37:17, 38:19, 39:7, 39:12, 39:13, 50:11, 70:23, 79:17</p> <p>trying [6] - 24:30, 26:10, 28:27, 29:22, 41:29, 58:12</p> <p>Tuesday [1] - 93:26</p> <p>TUESDAY [1] - 94:1</p>	<p>ultimately [2] - 47:13, 64:30</p> <p>uncovered [1] - 10:29</p> <p>under [11] - 4:21, 4:23, 11:24, 13:17, 17:1, 29:14, 29:22, 29:27, 29:30, 69:5, 91:11</p> <p>underlings [1] - 69:29</p> <p>understood [1] - 77:21</p> <p>undue [1] - 13:17</p> <p>unfair [1] - 28:3</p> <p>unfortunately [1] - 10:24</p> <p>uniform [2] - 3:3, 6:15</p> <p>Unit [18] - 2:15, 2:24, 2:27, 3:11, 3:12, 3:16, 3:22, 4:6, 10:5, 16:23, 53:1, 53:7, 53:30, 54:12, 55:21, 59:15, 60:14, 80:28</p> <p>unit [6] - 2:28, 43:11, 55:6, 55:22, 59:3, 73:8</p> <p>units [2] - 15:22, 73:14</p> <p>unless [3] - 34:20, 34:22, 76:30</p> <p>unlike [1] - 43:13</p> <p>unlikely [3] - 14:20, 40:9, 89:21</p> <p>unlock [1] - 13:12</p> <p>unnamed [1] - 28:18</p> <p>unnecessarily [1] - 84:8</p> <p>unnoticed [1] - 72:12</p> <p>unrepresented [1] - 79:29</p> <p>UNTIL [1] - 94:1</p> <p>unturned [1] - 38:19</p> <p>unusual [9] - 5:30, 33:24, 43:21, 66:18, 69:2, 69:9, 76:10, 76:23</p> <p>up [53] - 2:21, 2:27, 2:28, 4:5, 4:30, 5:30, 6:16, 7:1, 9:15, 11:6, 11:12, 12:11, 12:12, 13:15, 14:13, 14:26, 15:10, 19:19, 20:13, 21:16, 29:20, 35:19, 39:11, 40:6, 41:4, 43:28, 47:1, 50:17, 50:25, 52:13, 53:9, 54:9, 54:28,</p>	<p>valuable [1] - 74:29</p> <p>value [2] - 28:19, 50:11</p> <p>various [10] - 5:15, 24:20, 25:10, 43:21, 44:25, 55:12, 62:3, 72:23, 74:25, 89:7</p> <p>veering [1] - 80:5</p> <p>vehicles [7] - 43:16, 59:30, 61:4, 61:5, 61:6, 71:20, 75:3</p> <p>veracity [1] - 29:15</p> <p>verbal [2] - 78:10, 79:22</p> <p>verbally [4] - 78:2, 87:15, 87:20, 88:17</p> <p>versa [1] - 36:11</p> <p>version [1] - 84:29</p> <p>via [3] - 59:14, 63:29, 77:22</p> <p>vice [1] - 36:11</p> <p>view [17] - 5:23, 7:26, 8:4, 8:16, 12:24, 31:5, 36:9, 41:5, 46:4, 56:13, 56:28, 66:29, 76:26, 79:14, 81:17, 82:21, 89:12</p> <p>viewing [1] - 28:13</p> <p>VIPS [4] - 4:19, 36:18, 37:19, 52:21</p> <p>visit [7] - 15:19, 15:25, 17:28, 30:10, 30:15, 34:30, 47:30</p> <p>visiting [2] - 35:10, 36:14</p> <p>volunteers [1] - 70:5</p> <p>vulnerable [1] - 48:23</p>
			W	<p>wait [1] - 93:24</p> <p>Wallace [5] - 4:30, 7:10, 8:6, 8:9, 53:24</p> <p>wants [1] - 13:30</p> <p>warning [1] - 92:17</p> <p>warrant [1] - 21:14</p> <p>WAS [4] - 2:1, 45:19, 52:7, 81:25</p> <p>was.. [1] - 12:14</p> <p>watch [2] - 37:24, 54:25</p> <p>watching [1] - 37:22</p> <p>Wavin [2] - 42:27, 74:21</p> <p>ways [1] - 62:16</p>

<p>weapons [4] - 43:5, 43:6, 44:8, 73:12</p> <p>weed [1] - 46:14</p> <p>week [5] - 9:25, 45:1, 50:18, 72:8, 93:26</p> <p>weekends [2] - 57:20, 78:4</p> <p>weekly [1] - 34:7</p> <p>weeks [3] - 45:8, 45:9, 49:4</p> <p>welcome [1] - 93:20</p> <p>well-known [1] - 26:4</p> <p>well.. [2] - 12:15, 91:19</p> <p>whatever.. [1] - 51:1</p> <p>whatsoever [4] - 19:19, 25:8, 30:28, 85:12</p> <p>whereas [3] - 8:6, 30:22, 35:16</p> <p>whit [1] - 67:7</p> <p>whole [12] - 4:7, 5:16, 38:7, 50:13, 51:25, 63:9, 65:2, 69:16, 78:19, 78:23, 90:15, 91:10</p> <p>wish [4] - 41:16, 42:15, 71:5, 72:20</p> <p>wished [1] - 66:25</p> <p>WITNESS [3] - 45:19, 52:7, 81:25</p> <p>witness [25] - 1:4, 14:8, 14:17, 14:20, 14:22, 21:29, 22:10, 28:29, 29:20, 40:5, 40:8, 40:13, 40:23, 40:27, 40:29, 41:3, 41:9, 41:25, 41:26, 66:1, 79:28, 80:23, 91:8, 91:15, 93:22</p> <p>wondering [2] - 15:6</p> <p>word [9] - 49:25, 61:3, 62:5, 62:14, 62:17, 62:24, 62:25, 63:19, 89:8</p> <p>words [2] - 13:5, 79:3</p> <p>workings [1] - 31:11</p> <p>works [1] - 51:15</p> <p>world [5] - 19:29, 37:13, 38:12, 43:14, 71:14</p> <p>write [1] - 88:8</p> <p>writing [17] - 9:6, 58:8, 58:14, 76:25, 77:5, 78:1, 78:6, 78:8, 78:11, 79:21, 79:23, 87:2, 87:16, 87:22, 88:21, 89:1</p> <p>writing" [1] - 88:22</p> <p>written [1] - 79:19</p>	<p>30:22, 31:2, 39:10, 39:17, 44:15, 52:12, 53:30, 54:10</p> <p>yourself [6] - 19:13, 24:4, 35:25, 48:3, 64:1, 87:13</p>
Z	
	<p>zigzag [1] - 8:1</p>
Y	
<p>year [13] - 3:4, 3:6, 4:2, 4:3, 13:25, 13:26, 16:2, 18:6, 30:23, 30:30, 31:26, 68:8, 83:9</p> <p>year-and-a-half [1] - 30:30</p> <p>years [13] - 15:16, 18:25, 22:30, 24:3, 30:16,</p>	